Wilson v. State
| Decision Date | 24 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-366 |
| Citation | 173 N.E.3d 1063 |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
| Parties | Marcus M. WILSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Attorneys for Appellant: Yvette M. LaPlante, Keating & LaPlante, LLP, Evansville, Indiana, Barry M. Blackard, Blackard & Brinkmeyer, Evansville, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Caryn Nieman-Szyper, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Marcus Wilson (Wilson), pursues this interlocutory appeal following the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
[2] We affirm.
[3] Wilson presents at least three issues on appeal, one of which we find to be dispositive and restate as: Whether Wilson met his burden of proof to show that he had a protectable privacy interest in the rental car he drove at the time of the traffic stop.
[4] On September 5, 2019, the Evansville/Vanderburgh County Joint Drug Task Force was surveilling a house in the 1200 block of Marshall Street in Evansville to follow up on a tip they had received regarding narcotics activity there. Lieutenant Monty Guenin (Lieutenant Guenin) followed a black Tahoe, subsequently learned to be driven by Wilson, after it stopped at the house on Marshall Street. Lieutenant Guenin observed Wilson commit two traffic infractions by speeding and changing lanes without signaling. Lieutenant Guenin relayed this information to Detective Robert Schmitt (Detective Schmitt), who initiated a traffic stop.
[5] Detective Schmitt requested identification from Wilson and from the female passenger in the Tahoe. Wilson provided Detective Schmitt with a driver's license bearing the name Latroy Stovall (Stovall) and an address in Russellville, Kentucky. Wilson also provided Detective Schmitt with a Hertz rental agreement for the Tahoe. Detective Schmitt asked Wilson for permission to search the Tahoe, but Wilson did not consent. Detective Schmitt observed that Wilson was agitated, nervous, sweating, and argumentative as he conversed with him. During the traffic stop, Detective Schmitt and other officers who arrived to assist smelled an intermittent odor of marijuana but could not discern its source. A K-9 officer that sniffed the vehicle did not alert to the presence of narcotics. However, an assisting officer observed what he suspected was the remnant of a marijuana cigarette in plain view in the ashtray of the Tahoe's console.
[6] Upon inspecting the driver's license that Wilson had provided, Detective Schmitt suspicioned that Wilson had provided false identification because his physical appearance did not match Stovall's photograph, height, and weight. However, Wilson was adamant that he was Stovall. Wilson told Detective Schmitt that he was from Owensboro, Kentucky, and that he had been arrested there. Detective Schmitt contacted the Owensboro authorities, who reported that they had no record of Stovall. Detective Schmitt next contacted the Russellville Sheriff's Department, who indicated that they were familiar with Stovall and asked Detective Schmitt to send them a digital image of the person being investigated at the traffic stop. After receiving the image, the Russellville Sheriff's Department confirmed that Wilson was not Stovall. Detective Schmitt arrested Wilson for false informing.
[7] Wilson's passenger was not an authorized driver of the Tahoe, so pursuant to his normal practice and as a courtesy to the rental car company so that it could avoid incurring an impound fee, Detective Schmitt contacted Hertz to determine if the company would retrieve the Tahoe. While conversing with the Hertz representative, Detective Schmitt was granted consent by Hertz to search the Tahoe prior to it being returned to the company. On the floorboard of the Tahoe, the officers performing the search found a purse containing what was later alleged to be cocaine, heroin, MDMA, and marijuana. After removing these items, the Tahoe was turned over to Hertz. While Wilson was in custody, he told an officer that his driver's license was "suspended" and that his cousin "Troy" had rented the Tahoe. (Exh. 1, file 05D2158C20190905154209001i100 at 2:35 and 4:44).
[8] On September 9, 2019, the State filed an Information, charging Wilson with Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine; Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug; Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance; and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. On January 20, 2020, Wilson filed a motion to suppress seeking to exclude Wilson's statements to officers during the traffic stop and any evidence obtained through the search of the Tahoe. Wilson argued that the search, procured without a warrant or his consent, violated his federal and state rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. In support of his motion, Wilson attached a copy of Byrd v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1518, 200 L.Ed.2d 805 (2018).
[9] On October 15, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Wilson's suppression motion. Detective Schmitt testified that the marijuana odor that he and other officers perceived at the traffic stop did not provide probable cause to search the Tahoe because it could not be traced to the vehicle. When asked whose name was on the rental agreement, Detective Schmitt stated, "I do not recall; I believe it was Mr. Stovall." (Transcript p. 35). On cross-examination, Detective Schmitt confirmed that there was no indication prior to the search that the Tahoe had been stolen or that Wilson did not have permission to drive the Tahoe. Wilson's counsel argued, based on Byrd , that Wilson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rented Tahoe because there had been no evidence presented that Stovall had not given Wilson permission to drive the Tahoe or that Wilson had obtained the Tahoe by fraud or deceit.
[10] On January 8, 2021, without entering findings of fact or conclusions thereon, the trial court denied the portion of Wilson's motion seeking to suppress the evidence recovered from the rental car, but it suppressed any statements made by Wilson during the traffic stop prior to receiving his Miranda advisements. Wilson pursued an interlocutory appeal. On February 22, 2021, the trial court certified the matter for interlocutory appeal. On April 1, 2021, this Court accepted jurisdiction.
[11] Wilson now appeals. Additional facts will be presented as necessary.
[12] Wilson appeals following the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. We review a trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress with deference. Marshall v. State , 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019). We construe any conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, but we also consider any substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id. When the trial court's decision denying a defendant's motion to suppress concerns the constitutionality of a search and seizure, then it presents a legal question that we review de novo. Id. Where a trial court rules on a motion to suppress without entering findings, the general judgment standard controls, and we will uphold the trial court's ruling under any theory supported by the evidence. State v. Estep , 753 N.E.2d 22, 25 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ; see also Godby v. State , 736 N.E.2d 252, 258 (Ind. 2000) ()
[13] Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and they may not be asserted vicariously. Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). In order to challenge the constitutionality of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched. Peterson v. State , 674 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. 1996). The Supreme Court has observed that, although this concept is routinely referred to as standing, it is truly a matter of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine that "should not be confused with Article III standing, which is jurisdictional and must be assessed before reaching the merits." Byrd , 138 S.Ct. at 1530. Where the challenge is to the premises searched and not to any property1 seized, establishing standing under Article 1, Section 11, of the Indiana Constitution is essentially the same as under the Fourth Amendment, and federal precedent is "equally applicable under the Indiana Constitution." Campos v. State , 885 N.E.2d 590, 598 (Ind. 2008). The defendant bears the burden of proof to establish that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched. Harris v. State , 156 N.E.3d 728, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). There is no presumption that the driver of a car who is not the owner has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search of the car; rather, a defendant must present some evidence of permission to possess the vehicle in order to establish standing. See Campos , 885 N.E.2d at 599 ().
[14] Before we proceed to our substantive analysis, we address whether the issue of standing is properly before us. As part of his appellate argument that the State required his consent to search the Tahoe, Wilson argues that "[u]nder Byrd [,] Wilson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle he was driving[,]" and "[b]ecause this car was not owned by Wilson, the first inquiry must be whether Wilson has standing to challenge the search." (Appellant's Br. pp. 9, 11). Wilson develops his argument, based on Byrd , that he indeed had standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the search. In response, the State argues that Wilson does not have...
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Smith v. State
... ... witness credibility. Id ... When the trial court's ... decision denying a defendant's motion to suppress ... concerns the constitutionality of a search and seizure, then ... it presents a legal question that we review de novo ... Wilson v. State , 173 N.E.3d 1063, 1066 (Ind.Ct.App ... 2021), trans. denied ... [¶12] ... Smith claims that Sergeant Wood's search violated his ... rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution ... and Article 1, Section 11 of the ... ...