Wilson v. State

• Decision Date: 05 November 1952
• Docket Number: No. A-11632,A-11632
• Citation: 96 Okla.Crim. 137,250 P.2d 72
• Parties: WILSON v. STATE.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 72

250 P.2d 72

96 Okla.Crim. 137

WILSON v. STATE.

No. A-11632.

Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma.

Nov. 5, 1952.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The term 'flight' signifies, in legal parlance, not merely a leaving, but a leaving or concealment under a consciousness of guilt and for the purpose of evading arrest. Such consciousness and purpose is that which gives to the act of leaving its real incriminating character.

2. Evidence of flight, concealment and analogous conduct is admissible as evidence because it is a circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt.

3. The question of flight is one of fact and not of law, and, where the question is controverted, the court in its instructions should not assume that defendant fled, but, if any instruction upon the question of flight is given, it should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact.

4. Court erred in submitting instruction to jury which assumed that defendant fled from the scene of the difficulty when the evidene of the state as to whether defendant left the scene of the altercation was weak and defendant's evidence controverted the question.

5. See opinion for model instruction where the question of flight is submitted to the jury.

6. Defendant who testified he was unconscious at time fatal blow was struck in altercation with deceased, that he had no recollection of having a fight with the deceased, and presents no theory that he struck blow in defending himself from an attack, would not be entitled to an instruction on self-defense.

7. Where court submits the issue of self-defense the instruction should be clear and concise and not so ambiguously worded as to cast an undue burden on the accused.

W. G. Long, J. B. Gilbreath, Ada, for plaintiff in error.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

JONES, Judge.

The defendant, Charles C. Wilson, was charged in the District Court of Pontotoc County with the crime of murder, allegedly committed on January 11, 1951 by assaulting one James Myers with a large pocket knife and stabbing and cutting the said James Myers with said knife until the defendant caused Myers death; was tried, convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and pursuant to the verdict of the jury was sentenced to serve seven years imprisonment in the penitentiary, and has appealed.

The undisputed evidence showed that defendant Wilson and the deceased Myers were unmarried young men who had been close personal friends for many years. On the night of the homicide they, together with Myers' girl friend, Corine Huffman, were engaged in drinking beer at the town tavern in Ada.

The state's proof showed that during the evening defendant asked Myers to lend him three dollars and Myers stated that he did not have the money. Later Myers handed a twenty dollar bill to Corine Huffman and directed her to pay for some beer which the three had drunk. The defendant Wilson then accused Myers of lying when he said he did not have three dollars to lend him. The argument became quite heated and Wilson left the group temporarily and sat at a nearby counter. In a few minutes the argument started again and a recruiting sergeant for the Marines directed them to go outside and settle the argument. On the outside several blows were struck and apparently the deceased was whipping the defendant. Myers struck the defendant some severe blows on the head and had knocked him down and was on top of him. The defendant had a jackknife with a blade about four inches long. During the struggle he pulled this knife and slashed deceased three times. One of the wounds so inflicted was a stab into his heart, which caused his death a few minutes later. At the time the blows from the knife were struck the parties were rising to their feet and when Myers was struck by the knife he slumped and fell over. The defendant left with some boys in an automobile, went home and was in bed when he was arrested a short while later by the officers.

The defendant testified that the argument in the tavern started over five dollars that the deceased owed him; that the deceased and his girl friend had a quarrel and the deceased struck her a time or two; that the house man threw the whole bunch out the back door, and just as he went out the door some one hit him in the back of the head. Then he was struck two more licks, knocking him into a car; that some one was on top of him giving him a severe beating when he blacked out; that he did not remember anything after that blow was struck. After he came to he was in an automobile with three Indians and his nose was bleeding severely and he had several scratched places about his face. The Indians let him out of the car near the milk plant and he walked home. The next day while he was in jail he was taken to a Doctor for treatment. He had several severe bruises and scratches on him and his nose was broken; that he did not remember striking anybody with a knife.

The officers verified the story related by the defendant as to his physical appearance after the fight. The Doctor who treated him also stated that he had sustained a fractured nose and other lesser injuries.

The defendant through his counsel has presented many assignments of error in his brief. In the opinion of the Court there are only two of these assignments of error which are of sufficient merit to require a reversal of the case. It is contended that the trial court committed reversible error in submitting Instructions Nos. 19 and 15 to the jury. Instruction No. 19 reads:

'You are instructed that flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance tending to prove consciousness of guilt, and when taken in connection with all the other evidence in the case, its significance is to be determined by the jury; and you may consider the flight of the defendant in connection with all the other facts and circumstances in evidence in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence.' (Italics ours.)

The Court erred in this Instruction. Witnesses for the state testified that immediately after the altercation defendant walked to the automobile of Charles Price and sat down. Later he got out of this automobile and entered another automobile and left the scene of the difficulty. The officers testified they arrested him a short while later at his home while he was in bed. Defendant testified that he blacked out during the altercation and when he came to his senses he was near the Ada milk plant in an automobile; that he saw that his nose was bleeding and was hurting and asked to be let out of the car; that he then went home and went to bed not knowing who had caused his injuries; that he had no recollection of striking the deceased or of leaving the scene of the difficulty.

This court has held in many cases that evidence of flight, concealment and analogous conduct is admissible as evidence because it is a circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt. Littrell v. State, 21 Okl.Cr. 466, 208 P. 1048; Colglazier v. State, 23 Okl.Cr. 23, 212 P. 332; Compton v. State, 74 Okl.Cr. 48, 122 P.2d 819; Broyles v. State, 83 Okl.Cr. 83, 173 P.2d 235.

However the error of the Court consists in his assumption that the defendant fled from the scene of the difficulty. The evidence of the state tending to show a flight was very weak. Counsel for the accused contended that there was no evidence at all even showing in the slightest degree that defendant fled from the scene of the difficulty. We cannot agree that there is a total absence of any evidence showing a flight but the most that can be said of the state's case is that the evidence presented an issue of fact for the determination by the jury as to whether the defendant fled from the scene of the crime under a consciousness of guilt in order to evade arrest and detection.

In the case of Sprouse v. State, 52 Okl.Cr. 184, 3 P.2d 918, 919, this court stated:

'It is argued that the instruction assumes defendant fled. The instruction complained of is somewhat involved. In the first sentence it appears to assume that defendant fled; in the latter part it appears to leave the question to the jury. The instruction, in the form in which it appears, is erroneous, and should not have been given. Where there is evidence of flight which is denied or what appears to be a flight is explained, the court, if it instructs on the matter of flight, should be guarded in its language and not assume the conduct of accused is a flight. Robinson v. State, 8 Okl.Cr. 667, 130 P. 121; Cox v. State, 25 Okl.Cr. 252, 220 P. 70; Bruner v. State, 31 Okl.Cr. 351, 238 P. 1000'.

In Bruner v. State, 31 Okl.Cr. 351, 238 P. 1000, it was held:

'Flight of a defendant is a circumstance tending to prove guilt, and where the state offers evidence of the conduct of defendant tending to prove flight, and the defendant offers evidence in explanation of such conduct, it is proper to submit the question of flight to the jury as a matter of fact for their determination, and to instruct them that, if they find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant fled, it may be considered as a circumstance tending to prove guilt.'

A case with great similarity to the case at bar is Lunsford v. State, 53 Okl.Cr. 305, 11 P.2d 539. That case was reversed because of an erroneous instruction upon the question of flight. This court there held:

'The question of flight is one of fact and not of law, and, where the question is controverted, the court in its instructions should not assume that defendant fled, but if any instruction upon the question of flight is given, it should be submitted to the jury as a question of fact.'

In the case of Compton v. State, 74 Okl.Cr. 48, 122 P.2d 819, 821, supra, flight was defined as follows:

'The term signifies, in legal parlance, not merely a leaving, but a leaving or concealment under a consciousness of guilt and for the purpose of evading arrest. Such consciousness and purpose is that which gives to the act of...