Wilson v. State, 44872

• Decision Date: 15 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 44872,44872
• Citation: Wilson v. State, 306 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1975)
• Parties: Jimmy Lee WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 513

306 So.2d 513

Jimmy Lee WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 44872.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 15, 1975.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Bennett H. Brummer, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Stephen V. Rosin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

OVERTON, Justice.

This is a direct appeal concerning the constitutionality of this State's jury selection procedure. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b) (1), Florida Constitution.

The defendant-appellant was convicted on two counts of first degree murder and one count of robbery; he was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment and one term of 130 years, all to run consecutively. The first degree murder offenses were committed prior to the adoption of the present death penalty statute.

The appellant contests as unconstitutional the method of jury selection under Section 40.01, Florida Statutes 1972, and its implementation for the selection of jurors in this cause by Dade County, Florida. The trial court held the statute and procedure constitutional. Subsequent to the present appeal being filed, the same issues were considered and decided by this Court in Reed v. State, 292 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla.1974), where we held:

'Fla.Stat. § 40.01, F.S.A., provides regulation of the process of jury selection which is not, Pre se, violative of any provision of the Constitution of Florida or of the United States. Nor has the selection of jurors in Dade County created any constitutional infirmity.'

Similarly, we find nothing in the record of the case sub judice to establish a constitutional infirmity.

The appellant next contends that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to grant his motion for a seven- ten-day continuance. The record reflects that counsel for the appellant filed his motion for a continuance on December 4, the day the trial in chief was to commence. Counsel had stated, on the preceding November 17, that he would be prepared for trial on December 4, knowing full well there were numerous depositions to be taken. The depositions were taken but were not fully transcribed on the date of trial. Defense counsel had ascertained on the preceding November 29 that transcription of the depositions prior to the trial date would prove impossible. For its part, the State had flown in, at its expense, many out-of-state witnesses who could not remain in Miami pending the trial for the period of time requested by the defendant.

It is apparent that counsel for the appellant, in failing to timely submit the motion for continuance, was unconcerned about the court's time, the...