Wilson v. State
| Decision Date | 26 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 106567,ED 106567 |
| Citation | 568 S.W.3d 924 |
| Parties | Jeremiah WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Matthew J. Bell, 1010 Market St., Suite 1100, St. Louis, MO 63101, for appellant.
Justin Moody, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for respondent.
Jeremiah Wilson ("Wilson") appeals the motion court’s denial of his motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to Rule 24.0351 without an evidentiary hearing. In his sole point on appeal, Wilson contends that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing because plea counsel inaccurately advised him that he would receive credit for prison time he served in Illinois during the pendency of his case. Because the record conclusively refutes Wilson’s allegation of prejudice, we affirm.
On January 9, 2014, Wilson pleaded guilty to the charge of theft in Illinois. The Illinois sentencing court sentenced Wilson to three years in prison. While Wilson was serving time in Illinois for the Illinois theft charge, the State of Missouri charged Wilson with first-degree robbery for an incident occurring during June 2013. On August 25, 2016, Wilson pleaded guilty to the charged offense not pursuant to any recommendation from the State.2
At the plea hearing, the State outlined its evidence against Wilson: Wilson, acting with another, forcibly stole $41,435.00 in merchandise at gunpoint from an AT&T store and fled the scene in a gray SUV. Law enforcement later found the gray SUV, which contained DNA and fingerprint evidence linking Wilson to the vehicle. Wilson confirmed the truth of these allegations and admitted to participating in the robbery. The State outlined the range of punishment as ten years to thirty years or life in prison. Wilson confirmed that he understood the range of punishment.
Wilson further assured the court that he also understood the nature of his blind guilty plea. Wilson stated that he had sufficient time to speak with plea counsel, plea counsel advised him of the consequences of his blind guilty plea, and plea counsel adequately investigated his case. Wilson had no general complaints or criticisms of plea counsel's services. Additionally, Wilson said that no one made him any promises about the outcome of the plea and that no one told him how long he would be confined or have to serve as a result. Specifically:
The plea court subsequently accepted Wilson’s guilty plea and scheduled the sentencing hearing.
At the sentencing hearing, the sentencing court acknowledged reviewing letters written by Wilson’s family members. Upon sentencing Wilson to twenty years in prison, the sentencing court affirmatively stated that Wilson would receive "credit for time served on [his] Illinois case ... and [his] time will be run concurrent with any sentence [he has] in Illinois." The written sentence entered by the sentencing court stated that Wilson’s sentence was twenty years, "to be served concurrent with credit for time served" with 13CF1626 (the Illinois conviction). Subsequently, the sentencing court inquired about Wilson’s satisfaction with plea counsel:3
Wilson moved for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035, claiming that he was induced to plead guilty based on plea counsel’s erroneous advice that he would receive credit for the time he served on the Illinois theft charge when in fact Missouri law does not permit the Department of Corrections to award Wilson such credit. The motion court denied Wilson’s Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the record refuted Wilson’s claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.4 The motion court further found that Wilson failed to show that he would have proceeded to trial but for counsel’s misinformation. Despite expressly denying Wilson’s motion, the motion court, which was also the sentencing court, resentenced Wilson to seventeen years, eight months, and twenty-four days. Wilson now appeals.
In his sole point on appeal, Wilson argues that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing because plea counsel erroneously advised Wilson that he would receive credit on his Missouri sentence for time Wilson was incarcerated in Illinois prison during the pendency of this case, thereby rendering his plea involuntary.
We limit our review of the motion court’s denial of a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k); Milner v. State, 551 S.W.3d 476, 479 (Mo. banc 2018). The motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous if, when viewing the record as a whole, we are "left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Id.
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Rule 24.035 motions under the Strickland standard. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Strickland established the test wherein a defendant claiming a violation of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice stemming from that deficiency. Id."To satisfy the prejudice requirement when challenging a guilty plea, the movant must allege facts showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 128 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotations omitted).
Following a guilty plea, we consider any ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim only as to the extent that the alleged ineffectiveness "affected the voluntariness and knowledge with which the plea was made." Barnes v. State, 385 S.W.3d 517, 522 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012). "If the accused has been misled or induced to plead guilty by fraud, mistake, misapprehension, fear, coercion, or promises, the defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea." Samuel v. State, 284 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (quoting Hampton v. State, 877 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994) ); see also Johnson v. State, 318 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). "In cases where counsel affirmatively misinforms a client about any consequence of pleading guilty, direct or collateral, and thereby causes such client to possess a mistaken belief regarding his sentence, the critical test is whether a reasonable basis exists in the record for such a mistaken belief." Johnson, 318 S.W.3d at 318 (internal quotation omitted).
In cases where both the movant claims ineffective assistance of counsel and the motion court did not grant an evidentiary hearing, the movant must also prove he or she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. "To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, (1) the movant must allege facts, not conclusions, warranting relief; (2) the facts alleged must not be refuted conclusively by the record; and (3) the matters complained of must have resulted in prejudice to the movant." Ryan v. State, 547 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Mo. banc 2018).
Wilson maintains that plea counsel was ineffective and he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction motion because his factual allegations, if true, show that plea counsel inaccurately advised Wilson that he would receive credit for the time he served in Illinois prison, Missouri law is clear that a "person shall receive credit toward the service of a sentence of imprisonment for all time in prison, jail or custody after the offense occurred and before the commencement of the sentence, when the time in custody was related to that offense[.]" Section 558.031 RSMo (2016). However, "[t]ime in custody is not ‘related to’ an offense if the prisoner would have been in custody regardless of the offense." Farish v. Mo. Dep't. of Corr., 416 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Mo. banc 2013) (citing State ex rel. Nixon v. Kelly, 58 S.W.3d 513, 518-19 (Mo. banc 2001) ). Here, the sentencing court noted on the sentencing report that Wilson’s Missouri sentence was to run concurrent with "credit for time served" on his Illinois sentence. However, the record before us contains no finding to satisfy the Section 558.031 statutory requirement that the time Wilson spent in Illinois custody before he entered his blind guilty plea in Missouri be related to the Missouri offense. Without such a determination, the motion court lacked authority to grant Wilson credit for the time Wilson served on the Illinois charge.
Wilson alleges that he relied on plea counse...
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