Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento

• Decision Date: 31 January 1962
• Docket Number: No. 256,P,A,256
• Citation: 19 Cal.Rptr. 59,199 Cal.App.2d 716
• Parties: Francis K. WILSON and A. E. DuBois, President and Secretary of Local Division ofmalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, Who Sue as Officers of Said Local Division for and on behalf of themselves and all other Members of Locallaintiffs and Appellants, v. The TRANSIT AUTHORITY OF The CITY OF SACRAMENTO and the City of Sacramento, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 10121.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 59

19 Cal.Rptr. 59

199 Cal.App.2d 716

Francis K. WILSON and A. E. DuBois, President and Secretary of Local Division of No. 256, Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, Who Sue as Officers of Said Local Division for and on behalf of themselves and all other Members of Local No. 256, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The TRANSIT AUTHORITY OF The CITY OF SACRAMENTO and the City of Sacramento, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 10121.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Jan. 31, 1962.

Lawrence M. Goldstein, Sacramento, for appellants.

Everett M. Glenn and E. R. Vaughn, Sacramento, for respondents.

SPARKS, Justice pro tem.

Appeal is taken by plaintiffs from a judgment in favor of defendants after the entry of an order sustaining defendants' demurrer without leave to amend.

Plaintiffs, Wilson and DuBois, are the President and Secretary, respectively, of Local Division No. 256, Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, a labor union. Defendant, Transit Authority of the City of Sacramento, was created by charter of said city for the purpose of acquiring and operating a public transportation system. The members of Local No. 256 are the employees of the defendants with relation to the buses owned and operated by said defendants. By specific charter provision, plaintiffs are not constituted members of the civil service system of the City of Sacramento. Appellant local purports to be, and is recognized by defendants, as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all members of the local. Since the year 1955 the hours, wages and working conditions of plaintiffs have been determined by an agreement entered into on a yearly basis by and between said Local Division and defendant Transit Authority. In the agreement dated November 14, 1955, thus negotiated and entered into, there was included a clause which provided for the compulsory arbitration of grievances in the event of an impasse between plaintiffs and defendant Authority. At the close of the 1955 agreement (November 1956) the Union was told by the Authority that the arbitration clause could no longer be included in the contract. The reason given for its exclusion was the opinion of the city attorney that the inclusion of such clause would be illegal. Since November 1956 the yearly contracts between the Union and the Authority, and including the one now in force, have contained no arbitration clause.

Prior to the negotiation of the contract presently in force, appellants obtained opinions from both independent counsel and also from the office of the Legislative Counsel of the State of California, advising that the Authority might lawfully include such an arbitration provision in its contract with the Union. The Authority has nevertheless consistently maintained that it is bound to follow the opinion of the city attorney and has refused to include in the said agreement any provision for the arbitration of disputes. Plaintiffs alleged the existence of a justiciable controversy within the purview of Section 1060 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, if not settled 'by this Honorable Court will result in the disruption of the peaceful and cooperative relationship between the parties all to the detriment of the parties and the public at large.' The complaint then presented the following specific question to the court for adjudication:

'Can the said Transit Authority of The City of Sacramento lawfully include in an agreement entered into between it and the Plaintiffs a legally effective arbitration clause similar to Exhibit A covering the interpretation of the said contract and the resolution of grievances thereunder?' ¹

The demurrer denied the existence of a cause of action for declaratory relief principally because of an alleged lack of justiciable case or actual controversy.

After considering the problems presented by said demurrer, the trial court advised the parties by letter that in its opinion the crucial question was whether or not the defendant owed a duty to bargain collectively with the Union. ²

The matter was then submitted to the court upon written briefs, and after reviewing the points and authorities presented the court decided that the respondent did not have such a duty. In a written memorandum of opinion the court said, in part: 'In the Court's letter of June 17, 1960, it was suggested that if the defendant owed no duty to bargain collectively with the bus operators' union then, even though defendant may voluntarily (and legally) have undertaken so to bargain, no Court would have a right to dictate the specific subjects of collective bargaining negotiations; that so to do would be judicial usurpation of the administrative function. The Court has not changed its thinking in this regard.' The trial court's conclusion on the matter was predicated primarily on the holding in Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 168 P.2d 741, to the effect that Section 923 of the Labor Code does not apply to public employees and that there was therefore no duty on the part of the Transit Authority to bargain collectively with Local No. 256. The court reasoned that since the execution of the contract in the first instance was entirely voluntary and optional on the part of the Transit Authority, that there could be no legal compulsion as to the inclusion or exclusion of any particular clause or term thereof.

Thereafter plaintiffs moved the court for permission to amend their complaint, alleging, among other things, that the Transit Authority was an independent proprietary enterprise. The request to amend was denied.

As against a general demurrer, a complaint, of course, must be liberally construed in order to determine if it states a cause entitling plaintiffs to any relief, legal, equitable or extraordinary. (Augustine v. Trucco, 124 Cal.App.2d 229, 268 P.2d 780; Buxbom v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 535, 145 P.2d 305; Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 172 P.2d 867; Tristam v. Marques, 117 Cal.App. 393, 3 P.2d 947.) All facts of the complaint which are well pleaded must be deemed admitted for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Boren v. State Personnel Board, 37 Cal.2d 634, 234 P.2d 981; Crescent Inv. Co. v. Lake County Inv. Co., 38 Cal.App. 642, 177 P. 167; Simmons v. Briggs, 69 Cal.App. 447, 231 P. 604.) The policy of liberal construction is particularly appropriate to complaints in actions for declaratory relief. (Foster v. Masters Pontiac Co., 158 Cal.App.2d 481, 322 P.2d 592.)

In order to apply these general rules of construction to the matter before us, and however much we may agree with the logic of the trial court in its approach to the problem, we are nevertheless of the opinion that its decision must be considered either as the refusal to exercise the power of declaratory relief under section 1061 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or a determination that the complaint failed to show an actual controversy involving a justiciable question.

Section 1061 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

'The court may refuse to exercise the power granted by this chapter in any case where its declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.'

It has long been recognized that the prerogative of granting or of denying declaratory relief rests in the discretion of the court. (2 Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments, sec. 383, p. 913.) This discretion is, of course, not unlimited but must be exercised in a legal or judicial manner. (Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, 26 Cal.2d 753, 161 P.2d 217, 162 A.L.R. 747; Kessloff v. Pearson, 37 Cal.2d 609, 233 P.2d 899.) It has been suggested that it is perhaps better practice for a trial court to exercise its discretion in refusing declaratory relief by some procedure other than by sustaining a general demurrer, such as, upon a motion to dismiss the complaint. (Moss v. Moss, 20 Cal.2d 640, 128 P.2d 526, 141 A.L.R. 1422; Simpson v. Security First Nat. Bank, 71 Cal.App.2d 154, 162 P.2d 494.) Nevertheless, where the complaint is devoid of essential facts showing the necessity or propriety of a declaration, it is not reversible error per se to refuse declaratory relief by an order sustaining a general demurrer without leave to amend. (Moss v. Moss, supra; Lord v. Garland, 27 Cal.2d 840, 852, 168 P.2d 5; Simpson v. Security First Nat. Bank, supra; Dunitz v. City of Los Angeles, 170 Cal.App.2d 399, 338 P.2d 1001; Schessler v. Keck, 125 Cal.App.2d 827, 271 P.2d 588; Caldwell v. Gem Packing Co., 52 Cal.App.2d 80, 125 P.2d 901; A. Hamburger & Sons, Inc. v. Kice, 129 Cal.App. 68, 18 P.2d 115; Rapaport v. Forer, 20 Cal.App.2d 271, 66 P.2d 1242.)

Irrespective of the applicability of said section 1061, the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend was clearly correct upon the second ground, namely, that the complaint failed to show an actual controversy between the parties. The highly useful function of declaratory relief actions, when employed within proper limits, cannot be minimized. The frequency with which the pleading form is utilized attests to its value in disposing of controversies and in stabilizing doubtful or disputed jural relationships. (Columbia Pictures v. DeToth, supra.) An essential requirement of the procedure, however, is that there be a real controversy between parties, involving justiciable questions relating to their rights and obligations. Facts and not conclusions of law must be pleaded which show a controversy of concrete actuality as opposed to one which is merely academic or hypothetical (City of Alturas v. Closter, 16 Cal.2d 46, 104 P.2d 810; American Mission Army v. City of Lynwood, 138 Cal.App.2d 817, 292 P.2d 533); for, as has been aptly said, a statute providing for a declaration of rights 'does not constitute a court a fountain of legal advice.' (...