Wilson v. United States

• Decision Date: 19 August 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:18-cv-00890
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: TAMMY SHERRELL WILSON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES; WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS; WEXFORD MEDICAL and ADMINISTRATION/STAFF AT FAULT, (1990 through present); et al., Defendants.

TAMMY SHERRELL WILSON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES;

WEST VIRGINIA DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS;

WEXFORD MEDICAL

and ADMINISTRATION/STAFF AT FAULT,

(1990 through present); et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:18-cv-00890

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA HUNTINGTON DIVISION

August 19, 2019

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Pending is Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and Join Additional Parties. (ECF No. 68). The defendants have filed memoranda in opposition to the Motion, (ECF Nos. 70, 72), and Plaintiff has replied. (ECF No. 75). This matter is assigned to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States District Judge, and by standing order has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for total pretrial management and submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 5).

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned FINDS that, in regard to certain of the proposed defendants, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts in her amended complaint that are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss; thus, rendering the amended complaint futile as to these defendants. As such, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the presiding District Judge DENY Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and Join Additional Parties Motion to the extent it seeks to join the following proposed defendants: Sherry Clatworthy, Paul Stump, Julie Price, Nurse Amanda Ford, and Dr. Sherri Johnson. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the motion for leave to join John Doe and Jane Doe defendants be DENIED, because Plaintiff has had sufficient time to identify the relevant individuals. The remaining proposed defendants included in Plaintiff's Motion to Amend are addressed in the Memorandum Opinion and Order¹ filed contemporaneously with the Proposed Findings & Recommendations.

I. Standard of Review for Motions for Leave to Amend

Amendments to the complaint are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Rule 15(a)(1) addresses amendments as a matter of course, allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint within twenty-one days after serving it on the defendants, or within twenty-one days after a responsive pleading or motion to dismiss is filed under Rule 12(b),(e), or (f), whichever is earlier. F. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). In all other cases—such as the instant case—the plaintiff may only amend the complaint with the opposing party's written consent, or with leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Here, the opposing parties do not consent; therefore, an amendment to the complaint requires leave of court. Rule 15(a)(2) provides guidance to the court when considering a motion for leave to amend the complaint. Rule 15(a)(2) directs that the court should "freely give leave" to file an amended complaint "when justice so requires." See also Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) ("This liberal rule gives effect to the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on technicalities.").

Generally, leave to amend should be denied "only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been futile." Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986). An amendment is futile "if the proposed amended complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of the federal rules." U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark RX, LLC, 496 F.3d 730, 740 (7th Cir. 2007) overruled on other grounds by Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2009)). "In determining whether a proposed amendment is futile, a court may consider whether the proposed amendment could withstand a motion to dismiss." Middlebrooks v. St. Coletta of Greater Wash., Inc., No. 1:10CV653, 2010 WL 3522084, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 1, 2010) (citing Perkins v. United States, 55. F .3d 910, 917 (4th Cir. 1995)) (affirming denial of plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her complaint as futile because "the proposed amendments could not withstand a motion to dismiss."); also Johnson, 785 F.2d at 510 (holding that a motion for leave to amend should be denied "when the proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.") (citing Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir. 1980); Jones v. N.Y. Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, 166 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that amendments subject to "immediate dismissal" for failure to state a claim are "futile" and should not be allowed).

II. Relevant Legal Principles

The West Virginia Division of Corrections ("DCR") and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. ("Wexford") argue that the proposed amended complaint, which adds new defendants, but not new claims, should be rejected as futile. The defendants raise a number of legal arguments in opposition to Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint;accordingly, the relevant legal principles are discussed below.

A. Pleading and Plausibility

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a pleading to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This mandate "does not require 'detailed factual allegations' but 'it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, when a prisoner seeks to prosecute a complaint against a government entity or its officers or employees, the court must screen the pleading and dismiss it, or any part of it, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant "who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A "frivolous" case has been defined as one which is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), or lacks "an arguable basis either in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Likewise, a complaint fails to state a compensable claim, and therefore should be dismissed, when viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint does not contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

The Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") further clarified the "plausibility" standard in Iqbal, stating that the court is required to accept as true the factual allegations asserted in a complaint, but is not required to accept the legitimacy of legal conclusions that are "couched as ... factual allegation[s]." Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause ofaction, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Plaintiff submits the proposed amended complaint pro se, and courts are required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the complaint still must contain sufficient factual allegations to support a valid legal cause of action. Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003). The court may not rewrite the pleading to include claims that were never presented, Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998), construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

B. Personal Capacity Versus Official Capacity Claims Under § 1983

An individual acting under color of state law can be sued for violations of a prisoner's constitutional rights in either the individual's official or personal capacity. A prison official may be sued in her personal capacity for the official's own acts or omissions occurring under color of state law. When sued in her personal capacity, the prison official may be liable for money damages.

In contrast, a prison official may not be sued in her official capacity for money damages, because the official is entitled to sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of anotherState, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. art. XI. Although the Eleventh Amendment refers only to suits by citizens of other states, the Supreme Court has construed the Amendment to "establish that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal court by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Port. Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (2009) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)) (markings omitted). The immunity created by the Amendment protects both the State itself and its agencies, divisions, departments, officials, and other "arms of the State." Taylor v. Ozmint, Case No. 0:10-50-HMH-PJG, 2011 WL 286133, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2011) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1977) ("[I]t has long been settled that the reference [in the Eleventh Amendment] to...