Wilson v. United States

• Decision Date: 20 January 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-10004 (JXN)(JBC)
• Parties: BRYANT WILSON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

BRYANT WILSON, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-10004 (JXN)(JBC)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

January 20, 2022

OPINION

JULIEN XAVIER NEALS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before this Court is pro se Plaintiff Bryant Wilson's (“Plaintiff”) civil rights complaint (“Complaint”) filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^[1] (ECF No. 1.) Based on his affidavit of indigence (ECF No. 2), the Court previously granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered the Clerk of Court to file the Complaint. (ECF No. 3.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts several causes of action, alleging violations of his speedy trial rights resulting from this Court's coronavirus (“COVID-19”) related Standing Orders, as well as various restrictive jail conditions claims, against the United States, the United States Department of Justice, the United States Marshals Service, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Chief Judge Freda Wolfson, Governor Phil Murphy, Essex County, Director Alfaro Ortiz, Warden Guy Cirillo, and CFG Medical Services.

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At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he is a federal detainee, housed at the Essex County Correctional Facility, in Newark, New Jersey. (ECF No. 1, at ¶ 1.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff lists various federal and state law claims.^[2] As best the Court can interpret, Plaintiff alleges that his right to a speedy trial was violated by this Court's coronavirus (“COVID-19”) Standing Orders. (ECF No. 1, at 10-11.) On March 16, 2020, the Chief Judge of this Court issued Standing Order 2020-02.^[3]Pursuant to Standing Order 2020-02, “[t]he time period of March 16, 2020 through April 30, 2020 shall be ‘excluded time' under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) . . . .” (See Standing Order 20-02 at ¶ 6.) In so ordering, the Chief Judge noted the challenges and serious health risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the guidance of federal and state public health officials, and the burgeoning effort to further public health, and the health and safety of Court personnel, litigants, and other case participants. Id. at 1.

Plaintiff also asserts several claims against state government official and the United States and its agencies. More specifically, Plaintiff claims Governor Murphy issued “Covid-19 emergency orders that were used by defendants to deprive plaintiff of constitutional rights.” (ECF

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No. 1, at 6.) Plaintiff asserts Director Ortiz issued the “Twenty Fifth Amended Declaration.” (Id., at 15.) Plaintiff alleges that this Court, and the United States employ some of the Defendants and should be responsible based on that employment and that the Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his rights. Plaintiff complains about various pandemic related restrictions at the jail such as limited visitation, religious services, discovery access, legal research time, and medical care, as well as slow mail, lockdowns, extreme quarantines, and a lack of access to attorneys. (Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff seeks monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. In particular, he seeks to vacate unspecified pandemic related orders and declarations and requests four days of jail credit for every day in detention “during the period of March 15, 2020 to present.” (Id. at 23-24.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a government employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner who is proceeding as indigent.

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing

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Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .

Therefore, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

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Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is the federal counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Walker v. Zenk, 323 Fed. App'x. 144, 145 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 246 (3d Cir. 2004)). To state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation of the right was caused by a person acting under color of federal law. See Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing that Bivens created a right against federal officials parallel to Section 1983's right to assert a claim against state officials); see also Collins v. F.B.I., No. 10-3470, 2011 WL 1627025, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2011) (“The Third Circuit has recognized that Bivens actions are simply the federal counterpart to § 1983 claims brought against state officials and thus the analysis established under one type of claim is applicable under the other.”).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Immune Defendants

As an initial matter, the Court will determine whether any of the Defendants are immune from suit.

1. The United States, the United States Department of Justice, The United States Marshals Service, and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

“It is well-settled that the United States has sovereign immunity except where it consents to be sued.” Brobst v. United States, 659 Fed.Appx. 135, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)). Stated differently, “the United States is not subject to suit for constitutional torts, including the civil rights claims Plaintiff seeks to raise, and is entitled to absolute sovereign immunity in this matter.” See, e.g., Edward Pittman, v. United States, No. 21-10123, 2021 WL 2260518, at *2 (D.N.J. June 2, 2021) (footnote omitted). Sovereign immunity constitutes a jurisdictional bar to claims against the United States and its agencies unless Congress

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has specifically waived such immunity. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687 (1949) (sovereign immunity bars suit against the United States either for damages or for injunctive relief requiring government action.) Indeed, “[a]n action against government officials in their official capacities constitutes an action against the United States [and is] barred by sovereign immunity, absent an explicit waiver.” Lewal v. Ali, 289 Fed.Appx. 515, 516 (3d Cir. 2008); Webb v. Desan, 250 Fed.Appx. 468, 471 (3d Cir. 2007).

Here, there is no evidence that Congress waived sovereign immunity for the asserted claims against the United States. Thus, Plaintiff claims against the United States are barred by sovereign immunity. See Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 717-18 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding sovereign immunity bars claims against the United States and its federal agencies and officials, unless the United States explicitly waives...