Wilson v. Williams
| Decision Date | 12 April 1939 |
| Docket Number | 317. |
| Parties | WILSON v. WILLIAMS et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Civil action for recovery of personal assets of the estate of Ernest W. Johnson, and of certain lands conveyed by deed to him, alleged to be wrongfully withheld by defendants, and for order directing proper distribution of personal assets and of proper disposition of proceeds of certain life insurance policies. Defendant Williams files cross action to declare that Ernest W. Johnson held said land as trustee for her under alleged resulting trust.
The record discloses that plaintiff Henrietta Wilson is the duly qualified administratrix of the estate of Ernest W. Johnson who died intestate, January 11, 1937, resident of Craven County, North Carolina; that she and Charity Murphy individually joined as plaintiffs in the institution of this action; that pending the action Charity Murphy died leaving a last will and testament in which she named Henrietta Wilson as executrix and, with others, beneficiary thereunder; and that Henrietta Wilson as such executrix became a party plaintiff in place of Charity Murphy.
Plaintiffs alleged that Ernest W. Johnson died seized and possessed of a certain lot of land situated and designated as No. 39 Green Street in the city of New Bern, N. C., leaving as his only heirs at law his sisters, the plaintiffs, Henrietta Wilson and Charity Murphy; that at the time of his death the defendants were residing with him in his residence on said lot, and that they have continued to reside there, and refuse to surrender possession.
Defendants deny that Henrietta Wilson is a sister of, or is of any kin to Ernest W. Johnson. Defendant Hannah Williams, while admitting possession of the lot in question, and that it was conveyed to Ernest W. Johnson by deed from her nieces who live in New York, denies that he was seized of same except in the capacity of trustee for her. In cross action and for affirmative relief, she avers that she furnished "the consideration paid for said deed and entrusted it to Ernest W. Johnson to be paid to the grantors with direction to have the deed made conveying the title to said defendant Hannah Williams, and thought it was so made until the night after the death of Ernest W. Johnson", and that "she furnished in addition to the amount paid for the lot at least $500 toward construction of the residence on the same ***".
On trial below defendant Hannah Williams, over defendant's objection, offered evidence tending to show that she negotiated with her nieces, who are now living, for the purchase of the lot, and agreed with them on the purchase price of $200; that the deed was thereafter made; that she furnished the money to buy the lot; that a dwelling was built on the lot with her money; and that she and her mother and Ernest W. Johnson and his wife, Nellie, who was her first cousin, all lived in the house. The court, over defendant's objection, admitted the further testimony of several disinterested witnesses as to conversations with Ernest W. Johnson in which he made statements that Hannah Williams suggested, "let's buy a place and build somewhere"; that she gave him the money to buy a lot that she furnished the money to buy the lot; that "her money built this house", and other statements of similar intendment. Plaintiffs object to part of the evidence en masse, and to parts specifically, for that same has no bearing on the question of parol trust, and on the question as to whether Ernest W. Johnson agreed to hold the property in trust.
The court below overruled motion of plaintiffs for judgment as in case of non-suit on the cross action of defendant Hannah Williams. Exception.
The plaintiffs, in their contention that he took as the beneficial owner rather than as trustee, relied on the record of the deed to Ernest W. Johnson and upon his acts and conduct in connection with control over and possession of the lot and mortgaging it.
Plaintiffs further allege that Ernest W. Johnson, at the time of his death, owned and possessed certain personal property, which defendants wrongfully withhold. Plaintiffs further allege that at the time of his death he was carrying certain insurance policies in each of which his wife, Nellie Johnson who predeceased him, was named as beneficiary.
As to these allegations the parties stipulated in open court that upon answers to issues submitted to the jury and admissions and agreed facts, the court should determine to whom the personal property should be distributed, and the proceeds of the insurance policies paid; but that the question of ownership of the personal property seized under claim and delivery in this action should be referred to L. E. Lancaster, as Referee.
Thereupon, the following issues were submitted to and answered by the jury:
The parties in open court agreed upon these facts, inter alia, with respect to question as to who is entitled to the proceeds of the life insurance policies: The evidence shows that Nellie Johnson was first cousin of defendant Hannah Williams.
The court below "on said stipulations and the verdict and certain admissions" *** adjudged (1)"That the plaintiffs and the beneficiaries under the will of Charity Murphy are the owners of the personal estate left by Ernest W. Johnson, including one half of the insurance money collected as administratrix of Ernest W. Johnson on the life of Ernest W. Johnson payable to Nellie Johnson, set forth in the stipulation filed, and one half of the personal property that shall be awarded to the estate of Nellie Johnson by L. E. Lancaster, Referee, under the stipulations filed, and that the nearest of kin of Nellie Johnson, including defendant Hannah Williams, are entitled to one half of the personal estate of Nellie Johnson, including one half of the insurance collected by the administratrix of Ernest W. Johnson, as set out in the stipulation and one half of the furniture that shall be awarded or found to have belonged to Nellie Johnson at the time of her death" and (2) That defendant Hannah Williams is the owner in fee simple and entitled to remain in possession of the land in question, described with certainty.
From the judgment plaintiffs appeal to the Supreme Court, and assign error.
Ward & Ward and R. O'Hara, all of New Bern, for appellee.
Henry P. Whitehurst and Charles L. Abernethy, Jr., both of New Bern, for appellants.
Two questions arise on this appeal:
1. Is there sufficient evidence of a resulting trust for submission of the case to the jury? We hold that there is.
"It is a well-established principle that where, upon a purchase of property, the conveyance of the legal title is taken in the name of one person, while the consideration is given or paid by another, at the same time or previously, and as part of the same transaction, the parties being strangers to each other, a resulting trust immediately arises from the transaction, and the person named in the conveyance will be a trustee for the party from whom the consideration proceeds." Shepherd, C. J., in Summers v. Moore, 113 N.C. 394, 18 S.E. 712; Gorrell v. Alspaugh, 120 N.C. 362, 27 S.E. 85; Norton v. McDevit, 122 N.C. 755, 30 S.E. 24; Harris v. Harris, 178 N.C. 7, 100 S.E. 125; Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester, 190 N.C. 411, 130 S.E. 45; Wilmington Furniture Co. v. Cole, 207 N.C. 840, 178 S.E. 579; Jackson v. Thompson, 214 N.C. 539, 200 S.E. 16, and other cases.
In Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester, supra, Varser, J., paraphrases [190 N.C. 411, 130 S.E. 48]: "The payment of the purchase money raises a resulting trust in favor of him who 'furnishes' or 'pays' or 'owns' the purchase money, unless a contrary intention, or a contrary presumption of law prevents".
Resulting trusts, arising by operation of law, do not come within the statute of frauds and may be...
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