Wilson v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 24 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 1--276A18,1--276A18
• Parties: Elizabeth L. WILSON, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Donald G. WILSON, Appellee (Defendant below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 277

349 N.E.2d 277

169 Ind.App. 530

Elizabeth L. WILSON, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Donald G. WILSON, Appellee (Defendant below).

No. 1--276A18.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

June 24, 1976.

Melville E. Watson, Greenfield, C. Wendell Martin, Bredell, Martin & McTurnan, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Lineback & Lewis, Greenfield, William A. Freihofer, Freihofer & Schmidt, Indianapolis, for appellee.

LOWDERMILK, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

This case is an appeal from the Hancock Superior Court which granted the appellant Elizabeth L. Wilson (Elizabeth) her petition seeking to have her marriage with her husband Donald G. Wilson (Donald) dissolved.

We affirm.

FACTS:

The facts necessary for our disposition of this appeal are as follows: On June 15, 1970, Elizabeth filed a petition seeking temporary support and attorney fees in her action for Separation from Bed and Board against Donald. This petition was granted on or about July 10, 1970, the court awarding Elizabeth $1,000.00 as preliminary attorney fees. (By trial Elizabeth had filed a second paragraph of complaint for absolute divorce on which the decree hereinafter set forth was made.)

The pertinent portions of the decree were as follows:

'Decree for Divorce

Come now Plaintiff, Elizabeth L. Wilson, in person and by her attorneys, C. Wendell Martin and Melville E. Watson . . .

The court, having heard evidence and being otherwise duly advised, now finds that:

5. Defendant should pay to attorneys for Plaintiff, the sum of $6,500.00, as and for total attorneys' fees for services rendered in this matter and said sum is reasonable.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the court that:

4. Defendant shall pay to attorneys for Plaintiff, as and for attorneys' fees for prosecuting Plaintiff's cause of action herein, the sum of $6,500.00 and said sum shall be paid within sixty (60) days from the date of this Decree. Said amount is a reasonable fee for the services rendered by said attorneys to Plaintiff herein.

* * *'

Following the divorce Donald tendered to Elizabeth's attorneys the sum of $5,500.00 believing this was what the court meant by its decree of March 6, 1971, since he had already on July 10, 1970, paid Elizabeth's attorneys a $1,000.00 preliminary fee.

On July 24, 1975, Donald filed a Petition for Interpretation of Decree for Divorce which provided in relevant part the following:

'Donald G. Wilson, by counsel, states that:

1. On March 6, 1971, this court entered a Decree for Divorce in the above styled cause of action.

2. Said Decree provided, among other things, that Donald G. Wilson should pay to attorneys for Elizabeth L. Wilson the sum of $6,500.00 'as and for total attorneys' fees for services rendered in this matter.' Said Donald G. Wilson has paid to the attorneys for Plaintiff the sum of $6,500.00.

WHEREFORE, Donald G. Wilson prays that this court set this Petition for Hearing, that the Decree for Divorce heretofore entered herein on March 6, 1971, be construed by the court, that the court make a finding that all attorneys' fees have been paid to or for the benefit of Plaintiff's attorneys, and that the Lis Pendens Notice described in this Petition be ordered satisfied or stricken from the records of the Marion County Clerk, and that Petitioner herein be granted all other proper relief.'

The court on October 9, 1975, entered the following order:

'* * *

The Court now therefore finds, adjudges, decrees and orders that the decree of divorce entered in this cause provided that the sum of $6,500.00 was a reasonable fee for the services rendered to plaintiff by her attorneys in this cause and that such fee as awarded by the decree in this cause was for all services rendered plaintiff by such attorneys during the pendency of this cause. The Court Further finds, adjudges, decrees and orders that defendant has paid plaintiff's attorney in full for the services rendered plaintiff in this cause to and including March 6, 1971.

All of which is found, adjudged, ordered and decreed this 9th day of October, 1975.'

ISSUES:

1. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to entertain Donald Wilson's petition to interpret the divorce decree?

2. Did the trial court err in allowing Donald credit for the $1,000.00 preliminary attorney fee?

DISCUSSION AND DECISION:

ISSUE ONE:

On March 6, 1971, the Hancock Superior Court ordered the marriage of Elizabeth and Donald Wilson dissolved. On July 24, 1975, Donald filed a petition which sought to have the court construe its judgment and decree tot he effect that he had paid Elizabeth's attorney fees in full. On October 9, 1975, the court granted Donald the relief prayed for in his petition.

Elizabeth contends that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain this petition. As authority for this appellant cites IC 1971, 33--1--6--3 (Burns Code Ed.) which provides:

'All courts shall retain power and control over their judgments for a period of ninety (90) days after the rendering thereof in the same manner and under the same conditions as they heretofore retained such power and control during the term of court in which the judgments were rendered.'

We do not find this argument persuasive. Courts of this State have long had power, both inherent and statutory, to entertain actions to determine whether a judgment has been carried out and satisfied. In McOuat et al. v. Cathcart (1882), 84 Ind. 567, 571, appellant did not follow the statutory procedure then existing to invoke the court's power to render a decision that his judgment had been satisfied. Nevertheless, the court afforded relief and held:

'That section gives a convenient and summary remedy by notice and motion, but it does not impair the established power of courts of general jurisdiction to afford relief, in the proper cases, by decreeing satisfaction, upon a complaint for that purpose.'

The inherent power of our courts to issue orders to assist in the enforcement of their judgments was recognized in Wabash Railway Co. v. Todd (1916), 186 Ind. 72, 113 N.E. 997. In that case, Wabash was ordered to begin constructing a bridge on November 22, 1911. On January 10, 1916, more than four years later, a petition was filed seeking an order setting a completion date and alleging the refusal of the railroad to build the bridge. Our Supreme Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction and stated:

'. . . It (the petition) sought only the entry of an order supplementary to, and fixing the time within which appellant (railroad) should comply with a previous order in the proceeding and thus invoked the exercise of an inherent power which a court possesses to make such orders and to issue such writs as may be necessary and essential to carry a previous judgment into effect and render it binding and operative.'

186 Ind. at 78, 113 N.E. at 998. (Our emphasis.)

See also Linton v. Linton (1975), Ind.App., 339 N.E.2d 96, 97.

Our Indiana Trial Rules also provide vehicles by which a litigant can obtain relief from a judgment. Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 60(B) gives eight grounds upon which a court can relieve a party from the hardships of a final judgment. TR. 60(B)(7) allows a party to obtain relief from a judgment upon a showing that:

'the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged . . .'

The substance of Donald's Petition for Interpretation was that he had paid Elizabeth's attorneys in full and had in all further respects satisfied the court's judgment of March 6, 1971. The fact that Donald filed a 'petition' rather than a 'motion' as it is called by TR. 60(B) is not controlling. A motion is just an application to a court for an order particularly describing the relief sought and the grounds therefor. Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 7(B). See also Hooker v. Terre Haute Gas Corporation (1974), Ind.App., 317 N.E.2d 878, 880. It is not necessary for us to consider the sufficiency of the petition for we are only concerned with the jurisdiction of the trial court.

The...