Wilson v. Wilson, 34624

• Decision Date: 02 October 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34624,34624
• Citation: 53 Wn.2d 13,330 P.2d 178
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Harry WILSON and Vienna Wilson, his wife, Respondents, v. William H. WILSON and Jane Doe Wilson, his wife, d/b/a Wilson's Cottages; O. W. Petersen and Jane Doe Petersen, his wife, d/b/a Pete's Towing and Richfield Service, Appellants.

Page 13

53 Wn.2d 13

330 P.2d 178

Harry WILSON and Vienna Wilson, his wife, Respondents, v. William H. WILSON and Jane Doe Wilson, his wife, d/b/a Wilson's Cottages; O. W. Petersen and Jane Doe Petersen, his wife, d/b/a Pete's Towing and Richfield Service, Appellants.

No. 34624.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 1.

Oct. 2, 1958.

As Amended Dec. 3, 1958.

Wright & Wright, Seattle, for appellants.

Neal Clark, Kent, for respondents.

FINLEY, Justice.

This is an action brought against the defendants to recover for the alleged conversion of certain property belonging to the plaintiffs. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants have appealed. For clarity, we will hereafter refer to Harry Wilson as respondent, William H. Wilson as appellant, and O. W. Petersen as Petersen.

In October of 1955, respondent rented one of appellant's eighteen cottages on a month-to-month basis. Respondent paid the rent up to and including April 16, 1957. During the term of his tenancy, he was allowed to use the parking lot which appellant provided for the convenience of all of his tenants, and which was located on appellant's property. When respondent moved out of his rented cottage on April 14, 1957, he left a 1946 Chevrolet pickup truck and some miscellaneous automotive equipment and tools in the parking lot.

On April 17, 1957, appellant's son, pursuant to instructions from his father, telephoned Petersen, who was engaged in the towing business, and requested him to remove respondent's truck and other property from the parking lot. Petersen sent his son Gary to the lot, and appellant told Gary which property to haul away. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Gary was told who owned the property. However, as he was towing the truck to his father's place of business, he met the respondent.

Respondent demanded that his truck be returned. Gary refused to return it unless respondent would produce some evidence of ownership and would agree to pay the towing bill. This respondent was unable to do. Shortly thereafter, on the evening of the same day, respondent went to appellant's home and insisted that his truck be returned. This demand was met with a threat by appellant to call the sheriff unless respondent left his premises immediately. Three days later, on April 20, 1957, respondent went to Petersen's place of business and again demanded his truck. Petersen would not deliver the truck unless the respondent could produce a registration certificate as evidence of ownership, and, because respondent did not have this certificate, Petersen kept the truck.

This action for conversion was commenced shortly thereafter.

Appellant contends that he had a right to have respondent's property removed from his premises, because a reasonable time had elapsed since the termination of the tenancy. However, the trial court did not find it necessary to determine whether a reasonable time had in fact elapsed. In Smith v. Boyle, 1902, 66 Neb. 823, 92 N.W. 1018, the Nebraska court said that, if the landlord does remove a tenant's property, he must exercise 'such care in so doing as the nature of the property demands, * * *' and he must leave 'it in such condition that the owner by reasonable diligence can take it uninjured; * * *' In the instant case the appellant, when he determined that he was going to have the goods removed, simply called Petersen and said, 'A tenant has left a truck on my premises. I want you to come and get it.' And, under the...