Wilt v. Buracker

• Decision Date: 31 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. 21708,21708
• Citation: 443 S.E.2d 196,191 W.Va. 39
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Glenn M. WILT and Sandra B. Wilt, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, v. Robert BURACKER, Sheriff as Successor in Interest to Roy E. Thompson, Administrator to the Estate of Charles W. Nickelson, Jr., Defendant Below, Appellant.

Page 196

443 S.E.2d 196

191 W.Va. 39

Glenn M. WILT and Sandra B. Wilt, Plaintiffs Below, Appellees, v. Robert BURACKER, Sheriff as Successor in Interest to Roy E Thompson, Administrator to the Estate of Charles W. Nickelson, Jr., Defendant Below, Appellant.

No. 21708.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 28, 1993.

Decided Dec. 13, 1993.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Neely April 20, 1994.

Certiorari Denied May 31, 1994.

See 114 S.Ct. 2137.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, there is a category of expert testimony based on scientific methodology that is so longstanding and generally recognized that it may be judicially noticed and, a trial court need not ascertain the basis for its reliability.

2. In analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the trial court's initial inquiry must consider whether the testimony is based on an assertion or inference derived from the scientific methodology. Moreover, the testimony must be relevant to a fact at issue. Further assessment should then be made in regard to the expert testimony's reliability by considering its underlying scientific methodology and reasoning. This includes an assessment of (a) whether the scientific theory and its conclusion can be and have been tested; (b) whether the scientific theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (c) whether the scientific theory's actual or potential rate of error is known; and (d) whether the scientific theory is generally accepted within the scientific community.

3. " ' "Whether a witness is qualified to state an opinion is a matter which rests within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling on that point will not ordinarily be disturbed unless it clearly appears that its discretion has been abused." Point 5, syllabus, Overton v. Fields, 145 W.Va. 797 [117 S.E.2d 598 (1960) ].' Syllabus Point 4, Hall v. Nello Teer Co., 157 W.Va. 582, 203 S.E.2d 145 (1974)." Syllabus Point 12, Board of Education v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, 182 W.Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796 (1990).

4. The loss of enjoyment of life resulting from a permanent injury is part of the general measure of damages flowing from the permanent injury and is not subject to an economic calculation.

5. "In an injury case where the manifestations of the permanent injury may be obscure and the extent of the injury itself may be obscure because of its character, positive medical evidence to a degree of reasonable certainty that the injury is permanent is sufficient to take the question to the jury and to support an award of damages for the future effects of such injury." Syllabus Point 13, Jordan v. Bero, 158 W.Va. 28, 210 S.E.2d 618 (1974).

6. " 'If there be evidence tending in some appreciable degree to support the theory of proposed instructions, it is not error to give such instructions to the jury, though the evidence be slight, or even insufficient to support a verdict based entirely on such theory.' Syllabus Point 2, Snedecker v. Rulong, 69 W.Va. 223, 71 S.E. 180 (1911)." Syllabus Point 4, Catlett v. MacQueen, 180 W.Va. 6, 375 S.E.2d 184 (1988).

7. "Prejudgment interest, according to West Virginia Code § 56-6-31 (1981) and the decisions of this Court interpreting that statute, is not a cost, but is a form of compensatory damages intended to make an injured plaintiff whole as far as loss of use of funds is concerned." Syllabus Point 1, Buckhannon-Upshur County Airport Authority v. R & R Coal Contracting, Inc., 186 W.Va. 583, 413 S.E.2d 404 (1991).

8. Expenditures for household services are included within the phrase "similar out-of-pocket expenditures" used in W.Va.Code, 56-6-31 (1981), and prejudgment interest may be awarded under that section.

9. " 'Rule 59(a), [West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure], provides that a new trial may be granted to any of the parties on all or part of the issues, and in a case where the question of liability has been resolved in favor of the plaintiff leaving only the issue of damages, the verdict of the jury may be set aside and a new trial granted on the single issue of damages.' Syl. pt. 4, Richmond v. Campbell, 148 W.Va. 595, 136 S.E.2d 877 (1964)." Syllabus Point 3, Gebhardt v. Smith, 187 W.Va. 515, 420 S.E.2d 275 (1992).

10. Where liability is clearly established and the jury has made an erroneous over-calculation of damages, a remittitur may be directed on remand. If the plaintiff declines to accept the remittitur, then a new trial will be ordered solely on the issue of damages.

John C. Skinner, Jr., F. Samuel Byrer, Deborah L. Barr, Nichols & Skinner, Charles Town, for appellees.

Walter M. Jones III, E. Kay Fuller, Martin & Seibert, Martinsburg, for appellant.

MILLER, Justice:

This appeal is from a jury verdict and final order of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County entered November 18, 1992, in favor of the appellees and plaintiffs below, Glenn M. Wilt and Sandra B. Wilt. The plaintiffs sustained permanent injuries when the automobile in which they were riding was struck by a vehicle driven by Charles W. Nickelson, Jr. Mr. Nickelson was killed in the collision, and this action was brought against his estate.

At trial, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of several police officers who testified that Mr. Nickelson had an empty bottle of "Wild Turkey" whiskey between his legs when they removed his body from the accident scene. The officers also testified that there were several other empty alcoholic beverage containers found in the vehicle and that the smell of alcohol coming from the vehicle was "extreme." Moreover, the deposition testimony of Lori Hall, a passenger in Mr. Nickelson's car, was read to the jury. It was to the effect that she and Mr. Nickelson had been drinking "Wild Turkey" whiskey earlier in the day, although she could not remember the quantity they had consumed.

The plaintiffs also presented the testimony of John Kaputska, who observed the Nickelson vehicle for several minutes immediately prior to the accident. ¹ Mr. Kaputska testified that the Nickelson vehicle caught his attention because it was being driven erratically, was following his vehicle too closely, and was not being driven in a straight line. The Nickelson vehicle then passed Mr. Kaputska at a high rate of speed, and Mr. Kaputska lost sight of the Nickelson vehicle as it went around a curve in the road. As Mr. Kaputska came around the curve, he saw that the Nickelson vehicle had struck the Wilt vehicle.

I.

The primary reason we accepted this appeal was to determine whether the testimony of an economist calculating a monetary amount of damages for the loss of enjoyment of life, often called hedonic damages, is admissible evidence. This Court held in Flannery v. United States, 171 W.Va. 27, 297 S.E.2d 433 (1982), that damages for the loss of enjoyment of life are a valid element of recovery when a plaintiff has suffered a permanent injury. ² "[O]nce a permanent injury has been established ... the plaintiff is entitled to additional damages ... for the permanent effect of the injury itself on 'the capability of an individual to function as a whole man.' " 171 W.Va. at 30, 297 S.E.2d at 436, quoting Jordan v. Bero, 158 W.Va. 28, 51, 210 S.E.2d 618, 634 (1974). We went on to explain in Flannery:

"[T]he loss of enjoyment of life is encompassed within and is an element of the permanency of the plaintiff's injury. To state the matter in a slightly different manner, the degree of permanent injury is measured by ascertaining how the injury has deprived the plaintiff of his customary activities as a whole person. The loss of customary activities constitutes the loss of enjoyment of life." 171 W.Va. at 30, 297 S.E.2d at 436.

A.

Before we embark on a discussion of hedonic damages, it is necessary to establish the test for admissibility of expert testimony. Our cases contain some variation on this issue, particularly after our adoption of Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. ³ We note that our Rule 702 is identical to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Of some significance, then, is the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), that discussed the relationship of Rule 702 with the traditional federal evidentiary rule on expert testimony that was first articulated in Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923). ⁴

Before we adopted Rule 702, we recognized the Frye test and set out our version of it in Syllabus Points 7 and 8 of State v. Clawson, 165 W.Va. 588, 270 S.E.2d 659 (1980):

"7. In order for a scientific test to be initially admissible, there must be general acceptance of the scientific principle which underlies the test.

"8. There are certain scientific tests that have been widely used over a long period of time, such that their general acceptance in the scientific community can be judicially noticed."

See also State v. Armstrong, 179 W.Va. 435, 369 S.E.2d 870 (1988); State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194, 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988). As we stated in Syllabus Point 8 of Clawson, where the scientific test is generally accepted, it can be judicially noticed and the expert need not demonstrate its scientific validity. ⁵ We also stated in note 4 of State v. Armstrong, 179 W.Va. at 439-40, 369 S.E.2d at 874-75 (1988), that there is a general trend under Rule 702 to liberalize the Frye rule:

"An increasing number of the courts and many of the leading commentators interpret Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which is identical to our Rule 702, as limiting the Frye 'general acceptance' test to a test solely for determining whether judicial notice can be taken of the scientific test's general reliability. See P. Giannelli and E. Imwinkelreid, Scientific Evidence §§ 1-5, 1-5(E)-(F), 1-6, 1-6(A)-(D) (1986) (collecting authorities); Giannelli, General...