Winburn v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 19744,19744
• Citation: 261 S.C. 568,201 S.E.2d 372
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: William B. WINBURN, as Executor of the Estate of Olieva G. Winburn, Appellant, v. The MINNESOTA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

Page 372

201 S.E.2d 372

261 S.C. 568

William B. WINBURN, as Executor of the Estate of Olieva G Winburn, Appellant, v. The MINNESOTA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

No. 19744.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Dec. 18, 1973.

George W. Gregory, Jr., Cheraw, and Frank K. Sloan, Columbia, for appellant.

McKay, Sherrill, Walker, Townsend & Wilkins, Columbia, for respondent.

MOSS, Chief Justice:

This action was instituted by William B. Winburn, as executor of the estate of Olieva G. Winburn, deceased, the appellant herein, to recover under a policy of insurance with the Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, the respondent herein, on the life of Olieva G. Winburn.

It is alleged in the complaint that on November 18, 1969, in connection with a loan made to her by the Federal Land Bank of Columbia, South Carolina, Olieva G. Winburn made application for life insurance in the amount of $6,000.00; and on December 11, 1969, the application was approved and a policy of insurance issued with the proceeds, in the event of the death of the insured, payable to the Federal Land Bank of Columbia as its interest might appear; otherwise, to the legal representative of her estate. It was further alleged that on October 13, 1970, while the insurance was in full force and effect, the insured died as a result of an automobile accident. It is then alleged that the appellant, in his representative capacity, has made proof of death and due demand on the respondent for payment of the amount of insurance, which demand has been refused.

The respondent, by its answer, admits that it issued its policy upon the life of Olieva G. Winburn pursuant to her written application, dated November 18, 1969, with the primary beneficiary being the Federal Land Bank of Columbia, South Carolina, as its interest might appear; otherwise, to the legal representative of the insured. The respondent further alleged that it required no physical examination of the applicant for insurance and relied entirely on the statements contained in her application. As a defense, the respondent alleged that the policy was void from its inception and should be rescinded on account of fraudulent representations made by the insured. The answer alleged that the insured had falsely and negatively answered two questions contained in the application, which were as follows:

'1. Do you know of any impairment now existing in your health or physical condition?

'2. Have you consulted a physician for any illness during the last three years?'

This case came on for trial before The Honorable Dan F. Laney, Jr., Presiding Judge, and a jury, at the 1972 December Term of the Court of Common Pleas. At the close of all of the testimony, the motion of the respondent for a directed verdict was granted upon the ground that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from all of the testimony was that the policy was procured by false and fraudulent representation. This appeal followed.

The appellant asserts that the trial judge committed error in refusing to permit him to testify as to the authenticity of the insured's handwriting on the application for insurance.

The appellant alleges in his complaint that 'Olieva G. Winburn made application for insurance' and 'said application was approved' and the policy on which this action was based was issued. The respondent, by answer, admitted the truth of this allegation. At the beginning of the trial, the appellant offered in evidence as its first exhibit the application for insurance. William B. Winburn, the son of the insured and the executor of her will, was called as a witness. He was asked if he was familiar with his mother's handwriting and by his testimony an attempt was made to show that she did not fill out the application for insurance. Objection thereto was made by the respondent and sustained by the trial judge. During the course of the colloquy between the trial judge and counsel for the appellant, it was admitted that the insured signed the application, but he contended that she did not fill it out. In sustaining the objection the trial judge pointed out that it was alleged in the complaint that the insured made application for the insurance.

All parties to this action admit that the insured signed the application. Assuming, as is contended by the appellant, that someone other than the insured filled out the application, the insured ratified and approved the application by affixing her signature thereto. The appellant makes no contention that the insured, at the time of the making of the application, gave true and correct answers to the questions therein, nor does he offer any evidence that false answers were inserted in the application by any third person. We know of no requirement that an application for insurance be filled out in the handwriting of the insured, and testimony as to the authenticity of the handwriting on the insurance application would have no relevancy as to any issue in the case. It has been held that no evidence will ever be received unless it is relevant to some issue in the case being tried. In Francis v. Mauldin, 215 S.C. 374, 55 S.E.2d 337, we held all that is required to render evidence admissible is that the facts shown legally tend to establish, or to make more or less probable, some matter in issue, and to bear directly or indirectly thereon. Relevancy of evidence means the logical relation between the proposed evidence and a fact to be established. We concur with the view expressed by the trial judge that the proffered evidence had no relevancy to any issue in the case.

The appellant alleges that the trial judge was in error in refusing his counsel permission to cross-examine the underwriting manager of the respondent as to its agency relationship with the Federal Land Bank. Assuming, without deciding, that an agency relationship did exist, it did not relieve the insured of the consequences of her fraudulent representations unless, at the inception of the contract of insurance, the Federal Land Bank had knowledge of facts which would render the policy void at its option. If the Federal Land Bank had such knowledge and was an agent of the respondent, such knowledge would be imputable to the respondent.

There is a total absence of any testimony that the Federal Land Bank had any knowledge or had been informed of the insured's previous medical history or physical condition. The appellant suggests in his argument that the insured signed a blank application form at the time of the closing of the loan. This position is not supported by any evidence in the record. Under the factual showing in the record, we find no error on the part of the trial judge in refusing to allow cross-examination as to the respondent's agency relationship with the Federal Land Bank.

The appellant further contends that the trial judge erred in permitting one physician to read into the record from a medical report the opinion or diagnosis of another physician, the error being that the admission of such evidence would be a violation of both the best evidence and hearsay rules.

The contention of the appellant that the admission of the medical report violated the best evidence rule is without merit for the reason that no such objection was made at the time this report was offered in evidence; and further, there is no exception raising this question.

The appellant did object to the admission of the medical report upon the ground that such was hearsay and inadmissible. This contention is without merit for the reason that the report was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. However, it was offered solely to prove that the insured knew or had reason to know, at the time of her application, that she had heart disease, and not to prove the fact that she suffered from heart disease. Because the insured must have had notice that she was suffering from heart disease, the respondent offered this report as proof that she had perpetrated a fraud upon it when filling out the insurance application.

It would, therefore, not be improper for the respondent to offer proof that Olieva Winburn had obtained knowledge of her heart condition, inasmuch as the evidence was not offered to prove the existence of the heart disease, but solely to prove notice of such, which is a state of mind; and thus the hearsay rule does not apply. Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600, 193 S.E.2d 531.

The appellant charges the trial judge with error in admitting in evidence an unauthenticated Social Security application form.

It appears from the record that on July 25, 1968, the insured visited the office of Dr. Walter R. Wiley and gave him a Social Security 'Request for Reconsideration' application which stated: 'I feel I was totally disabled prior to October 30, 1967. I have had spells since 1961 and I do not feel I have been able to work since then. I think I should be entitled to Social Security benefits.' There was a statement in the request that the applicant was submitting additional evidence which was 'Dr. Wiley--Chesterfield S.C.' It appeared to Dr. Wiley that this request had been signed by Olieva Winburn even though he could not identify her handwriting. As a result thereof, Dr. Wiley examined the insured, completed his medical report, and mailed his findings with the insured's application to the Social Security office. There is no evidence contrary to Dr. Wiley's statement, and the only reasonable inference is that the insured brought to the office of Dr. Wiley a filled out 'Request for Reconsideration' of her Social Security application and that he, after his examination of the insured, filled out his medical...