Winder v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div.

• Decision Date: 29 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 93A02-8705-EX-193,93A02-8705-EX-193
• Citation: 528 N.E.2d 854
• Parties: Dorothy WINDER, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, John C. Mowrer, Chairman, and Joe A. Harris, Member, as Constituting the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, and Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 854

528 N.E.2d 854

Dorothy WINDER, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, John C. Mowrer, Chairman, and Joe A. Harris, Member, as

Constituting the Review Board of the Indiana Employment

Security Division, and Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc., Appellees.

No. 93A02-8705-EX-193.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Second District.

Sept. 29, 1988.

Kathryn M. Williams, Christopher B. Haile, Legal Services Organization of Indiana, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Cheryl Lynn Greiner, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellees.

SULLIVAN, Judge.

Claimant-appellant Dorothy Winder appeals the decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division denying unemployment compensation benefits.

We reverse.

Winder began working as a full-time caseworker for the Center Township Trustee in October of 1985. In September of 1986, she accepted additional employment as a seasonal part-time cashier for Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc. She terminated this part-time employment on December 22, 1986, because her legs, ankles and feet were swollen from the standing required by the job. Eleven days later, the Trustee's office terminated Winder.

The Board denied Winder's claim for unemployment compensation benefits, concluding that she terminated her part-time employment with Frank's without good cause and that I.C. 22-4-15-1(c)(1) (Burns Code Ed.Repl.1986) disqualified her. The statute provides:

"An individual shall not be subject to disqualification because of separation from his prior employment if he left to accept with another employer previously secured permanent full-time work which offered reasonable expectation of betterment of wages or working conditions and thereafter was employed on said job for not less than ten (10) weeks or if, having been simultaneously employed by two (2) employers, he leaves one (1) such employer voluntarily without good cause in connection with the work but remains in employment with the second employer for at least ten (10) weeks subsequent to leaving the first employer, or if he left to accept recall made by a base-period employer." I.C. 22-4-15-1(c)(1).

Winder contends upon appeal that she terminated her job with Frank's with good cause and that I.C. 22-4-15-1(c)(1) denies her equal protection.

The Board's findings of fact are generally conclusive and binding upon this court. York v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1981) 1st Dist. Ind.App., 425 N.E.2d 707. We may not reweigh the evidence and may only consider the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom most favorable to the Board's decision. Gathering v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1986) 4th Dist. Ind.App., 495 N.E.2d 207; Quillen v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1984) 4th Dist. Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 238. Only if reasonable persons would be bound to reach a different conclusion upon the evidence will we disturb the decision of the Board. Gathering, supra; Moore v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1984) 3d Dist. Ind.App., 461 N.E.2d 737.

Upon reviewing the Board's findings, we refuse to disturb their conclusion that Winder terminated her employment with Frank's without good cause. Her sole reason for abandoning this employment was that her feet, ankles, and legs became swollen from having to stand on the job. Yet, Winder neither informed Frank's that she was suffering from having to stand nor asked to work fewer hours. A reasonable person could conclude that Winder abandoned this employment for personal and subjective reasons, without good cause. Furthermore, Raham v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1980) 4th Dist. Ind.App., 405 N.E.2d 606, states that for a medical reason to constitute good cause for quitting, an employee must substantiate the medical problem by showing the employer a doctor's statement. Winder failed to do so.

Although we refuse to disturb the Board's finding with regard to good cause, we agree with Winder's second argument that I.C. 22-4-15-1(c)(1) has been applied so as to deny her equal protection. Indiana Code 22-4-15-1 treats persons who qualify for benefits after voluntarily quitting one job, and who subsequently lose a second job, differently from those who qualify for benefits after involuntarily losing their only job. The standard by which we must evaluate this differentiation in treatment is the rational relationship test. Differentiation under the statute must be related to legitimate state goals. Jenkins v. Hayes (1983) S.D. Ind., 560 F.Supp. 918 (Indiana law).

The purpose of the Indiana Employment Security Act is as follows:

"Economic insecurity due to unemployment is declared hereby to be a serious menace to the health, morale and welfare of the people of this state and to the maintenance of public order within this state. Protection against this great hazard of our economic life can be provided in some measure by the required and systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits to the unemployed during periods of unemployment and by encouragement of desirable stable employment. The enactment of this article to...