Windham Community Memorial Hospital v. City of Willimantic

• Decision Date: 05 March 1974
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WINDHAM COMMUNITY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL v. CITY OF WILLIMANTIC.

Page 651

348 A.2d 651

166 Conn. 113

WINDHAM COMMUNITY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL v. CITY OF WILLIMANTIC.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

March 5, 1974.

Antoinette L. Dupont, New London, with whom, on the brief, was Ralph P. Dupont, New London, for appellant (plaintiff).

J. Vincent Hauser, Corp. Counsel, Willimantic, for appellee (defendant).

John Q. Tilson and William H. Prout, Jr., New Haven, as amici curiae.

Before SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD, BOGDANSKI and HEALEY, JJ.

SHAPIRO, Associate Justice.

This is an action brought by the plaintiff, the Windham Community Memorial Hospital, to recover from the defendant, the city of Willimantic, for hospital services rendered to Donald Loiseau, who had been shot and wounded by a police officer in Willimantic while Loiseau was attempting to flee after having been discovered in the act of committing a felony in that city. The officer summoned an ambulance and Loiseau was taken to the hospital, where he remained for a period of time. The plaintiff billed the city for the hospitalization which the defendant refused to pay. Following a trial in which a recovery was sought, the court rendered judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff has appealed.

The plaintiff assigns error in the trial court's refusal to find certain facts which it claims are admitted or undisputed, in finding certain facts in language of doubtful meaning, in reaching certain conclusions unsupported in the finding, in overruling its claims of law and in rendering judgment for the defendant.

The appeal is defective in form because it is taken from the court's memorandum of decision rather than from the final judgment. Practice Book § 600; General Statutes § 52-263; Howarth v. Northcott, 152 Conn. 460, 462, 208 A.2d 540; Levay v. Levay, 137 Conn. 92, 95, 75 A.2d 400; Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § 10. The defendant, however, by failing to move to dismiss the appeal, has waived the defect. Teitelman v. Bloomstein, 155 Conn. 653, 655, 236 A.2d 900; Desmarais v. Pinto, 147 Conn. 109, 110, 157 A.2d 596.

The plaintiff has assigned error in the refusal by the court to find certain facts which it claims are admitted or undisputed. Two of the paragraphs in dispute, containing material facts, are not contested by the defendant as stated in its counter finding, and also are supported by evidence printed in the appendix to the plaintiff's brief. These are added to the finding. ¹ Practice Book § 622(b); see also King v. Spencer, 115 Conn. 201, 204, 161 A. 103; Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § 158. As to the remaining paragraphs recited in the draft finding, we find no merit to the other corrections sought. We also find no merit to the claim that the facts found in two paragraphs of the court's finding of facts appear in language of doubtful meaning so that their real significance does not clearly appear.

The court's finding, as corrected, recites the following facts: On December 27, 1964, Edward Haddad, a police officer employed by the city of Willimantic, while in the course of performing his duties and in attempting to apprehend Donald Loiseau, shot and wounded Loiseau, who had been engaged in a felony within the city of Willimantic. After having been shot, Loiseau was in need of immediate medical and hospital care and Officer Haddad telephoned for an ambulance. The police department of the city of Willimantic had authorized Officer Haddad to exercise his discretion as to whether medical care should be sought for a prisoner. Loiseau was removed to the plaintiff hospital, where he was a patient for a period of twenty-five days, from December 27, 1964, to January 21, 1965. During that time he was guarded by the police of the defendant city on an around-the-clock basis. Calculated at private patient or published rates, the reasonable amount of the hospital bill for the necessary services rendered to Loiseau is $1261.95. The plaintiff, through its administrator, notified the defendant by letter dated December 29, 1964, that Loiseau was a patient in the hospital under police arrest and that the plaintiff looked to the defendant for payment of the hospital bill. The plaintiff also billed the towns of Windham and Columbia as well as Loiseau and his parents. The chief of police of the city of Willimantic has charge of a jail or station house which includes a lockup for prisoners and has charge of, custody and control of all persons committed to or confined in said station house. Meals and lodging for prisoners held in custody by the police department were customarily paid for by the city of Willimantic.

The court reached the following conclusions: The summoning of an ambulance by a police officer in order that a person wounded by him may have immediate medical care does not constitute an implied promise that the resulting hospital bill will be paid by the municipality; that there was no express or implied promise by the defendant to pay the bill; that a requirement of the charter and ordinances of the defendant city that its chief of police be responsible for any prisoner confined in the station house, or a policy of paying for meals for any person so confined, does not justify a conclusion as to responsibility for a hospital bill; that the rendering of hospital services with the expectation of payment does not impose responsibility on the defendant even though notified; and that the plaintiff has failed to show a promise by the defendant to pay the hospital bill or a duty to do so and has failed to establish the defendant's liability for payment.

The plaintiff assigns error in these conclusions of the court. The court's conclusions are to be tested by the finding. Walsh v. Turlick, 164 Conn. 75, 79, 316 A.2d 759; Brauer v. Freccia, 159 Conn. 289, 293, 268 A.2d 645. The conclusions which the court reached must stand unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case. Walsh v. Turlick, supra; Hames v. Hames, 163 Conn. 588, 592, 316 A.2d 379; Covino v. Pfeffer, 160 Conn. 212, 216, 276 A.2d 895.

Before discussing the claims of law made by the plaintiff, we note that a substantial part of the appendix to its brief, upon which it relies for support of its claims, consists of 'Opinions and Advices of Attorney General.' These opinions, covering the period from 1961 to 1970, set forth generally that there exists a town's legal responsibility for necessary medical and hospital bills for persons held under arrest by its police. In its brief, the plaintiff urges that these opinions are usually regarded by courts as highly persuasive and entitled to substantial weight. We have no reason to dispute this valid contention. We point, however, to General Statutes § 3-125, which sets forth the duties of the attorney general. The opinions of the attorney general have in no sense the effect of judicial utterances. Where a question of law is before a court for determination, an opinion previously rendered by the attorney general on that question, while entitled to careful consideration and quite generally regarded as highly persuasive, is not binding on the court. 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorney General, § 8. Accordingly, while we give due consideration to these opinions, we must be guided by the applicable law as it may relate to the issues on appeal.

The plaintiff makes the basic claim that the defendant had the duty to provide necessary medical care and hospitalization for one who has been arrested and is being held pending original presentment in court, and that it is bound to pay the reasonable value of necessaries, including necessary hospital and medical care, furnished to a prisoner awaiting trial and being held by the plaintiff's police department. ²

Prior to October 1, 1960, responsibility for certain care and treatment of prisoners in jail was imposed upon the various counties of the state. General Statutes § 18-40 required the furnishing of suitable bedding and fuel at the expense of the county. Section 18-41 required the county commissioners to provide a safe room within the jail building for the confinement of sick prisoners with provision for their proper care and nursing. Section 18-48 required jailers to procure suitable food, clothing and medical aid for prisoners committed on criminal process. By virtue of Public Acts 1959, No. 152, which abolished county government, the aforementioned statutes, among others, were repealed. The plaintiff contends, however, that in the adoption of §§ 7-134, ³ 7-135 ⁴ and § 7-135a, ⁵ the legislative intent was to place the expense of hospitalization, as in the case of Loiseau, prior to his presentment, upon the defendant city. The construction of a statute depends upon its expressed intent when it is taken as a whole. Connecticut Chiropody Society, Inc. v. Murray, 146 Conn. 613, 617, 153 A.2d 412; Fox v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 146 Conn. 70, 73, 147 A.2d 472; Clark v. Town Council, 145 Conn. 476, 485, 144 A.2d 327. 'The words used (in a statute) are to be construed according to their commonly approved usage. General Statutes § 1-1; Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Premo, 153 Conn. 465, 474, 217 A.2d 698; State v. Venson, 153 Conn. 209, 214, 214 A.2d 903; Baker v. Norwalk, 152 Conn. 312, 315, 206 A.2d 428. Or, stated another way, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Taylor, 153 Conn. 72, 82, 214 A.2d 362.' Klapproth v. Turner, 156 Conn. 276, 280, 240 A.2d 886, 888. We cannot agree with the claim that these statutes have any relevancy here. There is nothing in these statutes which in any way lends support to the plaintiff's claim of placing the expense of hospitalization upon the defendant. They touch in no way upon the claim made on a city, as a subdivision of government, in relation to the facts before us. We further point out that these statutes apply only to a town and in § 7-134 include a borough. They do not include a city and if the...