Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves
| Decision Date | 28 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-16278,No. 13-16259,13-16259 |
| Citation | 861 F.3d 894 |
| Parties | WINDOW ROCK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT ; Pinon Unified School District, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ann REEVES; Kevin Reeves ; Loretta Brutz; Mae Y. John; Clarissa Hale; Michael Coonsis; Barbara Beall, Defendants, and Richie Nez; Casey Watchman; Ben Smith; Woody Lee; Jerry Bodie; Evelyn Meadows; Unknown Parties, named as John and Jane Does I–V (Current or former members of the Navajo Nation Labor Counsel), Defendants-Appellants. Window Rock Unified School District ; Pinon Unified School District, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ann Reeves; Kevin Reeves ; Loretta Brutz; Mae Y. John; Clarissa Hale; Michael Coonsis; Barbara Beall, Defendants-Appellants, and Richie Nez; Casey Watchman; Ben Smith; Woody Lee; Jerry Bodie; Evelyn Meadows; Unknown Parties, named as John and Jane Does I–V (Current or former members of the Navajo Nation Labor Counsel), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Paul Spruhan (argued), Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, Arizona, for Defendants-Appellants Richie Nez, Casey Watchman, Ben Smith, Woody Lee, Jerry Bodie, and Evelyn Meadows.
David R. Jordan, Law Offices of David R. Jordan P.C., Gallup, New Mexico, for Defendants-Appellants Ann Reeves, Kevin Reeves, Loretta Brutz, Mae Y. John, Clarissa Hale, Michael Coonsis, and Barbara Beall.
Eileen Dennis GilBride (argued) and Georgia A. Staton, Jones Skelton & Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix, Arizona; Patrice M. Horstman, Hufford Horstman Mongini Parnell & Tucker P.C., Flagstaff, Arizona; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Josephine Foo, Office of the Chief Justice, Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation, Window Rock, Arizona, for Amicus Curiae Navajo Nation Supreme Court.
Before: Consuelo M. Callahan, Morgan Christen, and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
This appeal requires us to decide whether it is "colorable or plausible" that a tribal adjudicative forum has jurisdiction over employment-related claims against two public school districts operating schools on leased tribal land. Because the claims arise from conduct on tribal land and implicate no state criminal law enforcement interests, we conclude that tribal jurisdiction is colorable or plausible under our court's interpretation of Nevada v. Hicks , 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001). Well-established exhaustion principles therefore require that the tribal forum have the first opportunity to evaluate its own jurisdiction over this case, including the nature of the state and tribal interests involved. We thus reverse the district court's decision enjoining tribal forum proceedings.
The question of tribal jurisdiction arose when a group of current and former employees (the "Employees") of two Arizona public school districts, Window Rock Unified School District and Pinon Unified School District (the "Districts"), filed complaints with the Navajo Nation Labor Commission (the "Commission").
The Districts both operate schools on land leased from the Navajo Nation (the "Nation"). Window Rock's lease requires the school district to abide by Navajo laws, to the extent that they do not conflict with Arizona or federal law, and it further provides that the agreement to abide by Navajo laws does not forfeit any rights under state or federal laws. Pinon's lease with the Nation does not mention Navajo law.
In their complaints before the Commission, some of the Employees alleged that the Districts owed them merit pay under Arizona law and others alleged that the Districts had violated their rights under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act.1 The Commission eventually consolidated all of the Employees' complaints.
The Districts moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over personnel decisions made by Arizona public school districts. Following a motion hearing, the Commission ordered additional discovery on the relationship between the Nation and the Districts.
Before the Commission could hold an evidentiary hearing on the additional discovery, the Districts filed suit in federal district court seeking a declaration that "the [Commission] and the Navajo tribal courts lack jurisdiction over public school districts' employment decisions and practices conducted on the Navajo Reservation." The Districts also sought an injunction "to bar further prosecution of those claims in the tribal courts due to the lack of jurisdiction." The Commission, joined by the Employees, moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust tribal remedies. The Districts countered with a motion for summary judgment, asserting that tribal jurisdiction was so plainly lacking that the Districts did not need to exhaust tribal remedies. The Commission responded that summary judgment was unwarranted, particularly in the absence of fact-finding by the Commission. The Employees similarly argued that summary judgment was improper, and they also filed a Rule 56(f) motion to stay summary judgment proceedings to allow discovery.
The district court held that tribal jurisdiction was so plainly lacking that exhaustion in the tribal forum was not required. Accordingly, it denied the Commission and Employees' motion to dismiss and the Employees' motion to stay summary judgment proceedings. It also granted summary judgment to the Districts and enjoined further tribal proceedings. The Commission and Employees timely appealed.
"We review questions of tribal court jurisdiction and exhaustion of tribal court remedies de novo and factual findings for clear error." Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., LLC v. ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa Inc. , 715 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., LLC v. Grand Canyon Resort Corp. , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 825, 187 L.Ed.2d 686 (2013). The merits of the Employees' complaints were not before the district court, nor are they before us—the only question presented here is whether tribal jurisdiction is so plainly lacking that the district court properly enjoined tribal proceedings.2
A tribal adjudicative body generally must have the first opportunity to evaluate its jurisdiction over a matter pending before it. In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians , 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985), the Supreme Court explained the importance of this exhaustion requirement: "[Congress's] policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination ... favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge." Id. at 856, 105 S.Ct. 2447. The Court reasoned that requiring exhaustion of jurisdictional questions in a tribal forum would not only appropriately respect "tribal self-government and self-determination," but would also serve "the orderly administration of justice in the federal court ... by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed." Id. Moreover, "[e]xhaustion of tribal court remedies ... will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review." Id. at 857, 105 S.Ct. 2447.3
In light of the importance of exhaustion, federal courts will excuse the failure to exhaust in only four circumstances. See Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court , 566 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2009). The Districts argue that one of these circumstances exists here: "when it is ‘plain’ that tribal court jurisdiction is lacking, so that the exhaustion requirement ‘would serve no purpose other than delay.’ " Id. (quoting Nevada v. Hicks , 533 U.S. 353, 369, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001) ). We have explained that the "plainly lacking" exception to the exhaustion requirement does not apply when "jurisdiction is ‘colorable’ or ‘plausible.’ " Id. at 848 (quoting Atwood v. Fort Peck Tribal Court Assiniboine , 513 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2008) ). We must therefore decide whether tribal jurisdiction in this case is colorable or plausible.
Our caselaw has long recognized two distinct frameworks for determining whether a tribe has jurisdiction over a case involving a non-tribal-member defendant: (1) the right to exclude, which generally applies to nonmember conduct on tribal land; and (2) the exceptions articulated in Montana v. United States , 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), which generally apply to nonmember conduct on non-tribal land. The Commission and Employees argue that tribal jurisdiction is colorable in this case under either framework. The Districts respond that Nevada v. Hicks , 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001), eliminated the first framework such that jurisdiction over a nonmember exists only if a Montana exception applies, regardless of whether the relevant conduct occurred on tribal or non-tribal land.
We have repeatedly rejected the Districts' reading of Hicks , and today we reaffirm that the right-to-exclude framework continues to exist. Our court has read Hicks as creating only a narrow exception to the general rule that, absent contrary provisions in treaties or federal statutes, tribes retain adjudicative authority over nonmember conduct on tribal land—land over which the tribe has the right to exclude. We have held that Hicks applies "only when the specific concerns at issue in that case exist." Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance , 642 F.3d 802, 813 (9th Cir. 2011). The specific concerns at issue in Hicks related to enabling state officers to enforce state criminal laws for crimes that occurred off the reservation. 533 U.S. at 358...
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