Winegeart v. State
Decision Date | 15 December 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 20A04-9403-CR-96,20A04-9403-CR-96 |
Citation | 644 N.E.2d 180 |
Parties | Steve WINEGEART, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Steve Winegeart appeals from his conviction of burglary, a class B felony.
We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Whether the jury instruction defining "reasonable doubt" constitutes fundamental error?
On the evening of April 30, 1993, Winegeart was in the company of two friends. The trio went to an apartment and forced the front door open. A neighbor, who was looking through the peephole of her door, notified the police of the break-in. When the police arrived at the scene, Winegeart and his friends ran from the apartment, but were apprehended within a short time. The police found a stereo speaker just inside the front door of the apartment. On October 26, 1993, a jury found Winegeart guilty of burglary. On December 9, 1993, the trial court sentenced him to ten years imprisonment.
The trial court instructed the jury, in both preliminary and final instructions, upon the definition of reasonable doubt as follows:
R. at 56-7 (emphasis added).
Winegeart did not object to this instruction at trial. However, he now contends that it constitutes fundamental error. Fundamental error is error so blatant and prejudicial that, if not corrected, it would deny the defendant due process. Faulisi v. State (1992), Ind.App., 602 N.E.2d 1032, 1038, trans. denied.
Specifically, Winegeart challenges the words "fair" and "actual" in defining reasonable doubt. He also takes issue with the phrase "moral certainty." He contends this language required a degree of doubt much higher than that required for an acquittal and, as a result, violated the Due Process Clause. In support of his argument, he directs us to Cage v. Louisiana (1990), 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339, wherein the Supreme Court condemned a portion of the language found in the following "reasonable doubt" instruction:
Id. at 40, 111 S.Ct. at 329 (emphasis in original).
In holding that the emphasized language violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court explained:
Id. at 41, 111 S.Ct. at 329-30.
In Bell v. State (1993), Ind., 610 N.E.2d 229, reh'g denied, our supreme court considered a Cage challenge to a "reasonable doubt" instruction which stated:
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Winegeart v. State, CR-344
...upon a degree of proof below the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard ... required by the Due Process Clause." Winegeart v. State, 644 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). In other Court of Appeals opinions reviewing identical or substantively identical "moral certainty" instructions, this ho......
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Malone v. State
...the State of its constitutionally-imposed burden of proof by equating reasonable doubt with moral certainty. Winegeart v. State (1994), Ind.App., 644 N.E.2d 180, 183, transfer granted, opinion pending. Another panel upheld the instruction, maintaining that the "moral certainty" phrase was n......
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Jackson v. State
...has already examined a case concerning a moral certainty instruction identical to final instruction number 14. See Winegeart v. State (1994), Ind.App., 644 N.E.2d 180, trans. granted. The holding in that case stated that the instruction's carried with it the distinct potential of impermissi......
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Tobias v. State, 72S05-9605-CR-395
...error in an instruction to the jury as to the definition of reasonable doubt. Faced with conflicting precedent in Winegeart v. State, 644 N.E.2d 180 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), and Jackson v. State, 657 N.E.2d 131 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), the Court of Appeals elected to follow Winegeart, a case in which w......