Winfield v. State
| Citation | 191 P. 609,18 Okla.Crim. 257 |
| Decision Date | 16 August 1920 |
| Docket Number | A-3364. |
| Parties | WINFIELD v. STATE. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Syllabus by the Court.
It is not essential to the validity of an indictment or information that the name of the defendant be correctly stated. Any error in pleading the name of a defendant in an indictment or information must be corrected upon the arraignment of that particular defendant, and the record thus made is a protection to every defendant jointly indicted or informed against with such defendant, and would be a complete protection to either or all defendants against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Where there is a prosecution and conviction of robbery in the first degree, it is immaterial that the evidence would authorize a conviction of a codefendant of the commission of conjoint robbery, as robbery in either the first or second degree is necessarily included in the commission of a conjoint robbery and, where the evidence on the part of the state clearly establishes all the essential elements of robbery in the first degree against the defendant on trial, he may be prosecuted and convicted of that included offense; such conviction being a bar to any subsequent prosecution for robbery conjointly committed in the same transaction.
The admission of immaterial evidence is not ground for reversal unless the defendant was prejudiced by its admission.
A witness may not be asked, for the purpose of discrediting him, whether or not he has ever been charged with or arrested for crime.
When a defendant seeks a reversal on account of an alleged error of the trial court in refusing to admit evidence offered, the record must show what this offered evidence would have been so that this court may determine whether or not it was material and proper testimony, and as to whether or not the defendant was injured by its exclusion.
A witness may, on cross-examination, be asked whether or not he has ever been convicted of a felony, or any misdemeanor which involves moral turpitude.
The conviction of a witness of the crime of assault and battery is not the conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.
The scope of the cross-examination of a witness is largely a matter of discretion with the trial court, and the burden is upon the appellant to show that the trial court erred in excluding evidence offered in connection with the cross-examination of a witness.
Applications for a continuance are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a conviction will not be reversed because the trial court overruled such an application unless a manifest abuse of such discretion appears. For reasons holding no manifest abuse of discretion shown in overruling application for continuance in this case, see body of opinion.
It is discretionary with the trial court to reopen the case after both sides have closed for the purpose of introducing further evidence; and, unless a clear abuse of such discretion appears, no question is presented for review on appeal.
Evidence corroborating an accomplice and tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, need not be direct, but may be circumstantial only.
If the evidence offered in corroboration of an accomplice tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime, its sufficiency is for the jury to decide, where the law applicable to an accomplice's testimony is fully and fairly covered in the court's instructions.
Appeal from District Court, Pushmataha County; C. E. Dudley, Judge.
C. P Winfield was convicted of robbery in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Warren & Warren and John Cocke, all of Hugo, for plaintiff in error.
S. P. Freeling, Atty. Gen., and E. L. Fulton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
This is an appeal from the district court of Pushmataha county, wherein the defendant, C. P. Winfield, was jointly informed against together with Ida Rankin, A. Baer, and Henry McClair, charged with robbery in the first degree, in that on the 24th day of May, 1917, in Pushmataha county, the said defendant, by the use of certain deadly weapons, etc., put one A. H. Palmer and W. E. Bailey, who were respectively the president and cashier of the First State Bank of Tuskahoma, Okl., in fear of unlawful and immediate injury to their persons, and took from the possession of said parties $2,000 in money, the property of the First State Bank of Tuskahoma.
The defendant C. P. Winfield demanded a severance, and upon a separate trial was convicted, and the punishment assessed by the jury at five years' imprisonment in the state penitentiary. Upon this verdict, the court pronounced judgment of guilty of robbery in the first degree against the defendant, after overruling defendant's motion for a new trial, and sentenced the defendant to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the period of five years. From this judgment of conviction the defendant has appealed to this court, and assigns various errors, which will be hereafter considered.
The first error assigned and relied upon for reversal may be summed up succinctly as follows: Error of the court in refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty because of a fatal variance between the allegations in the information and the proof adduced. The information alleged that Ida Rankin, A. Baer, C. P. Winfield, and Henry McClair committed the alleged robbery. Upon the trial, the evidence disclosed that the true name of one of the defendants was not Henry McClair, but Henry Clair, and it is strenuously contended that the proof of the true name of the defendant jointly informed against was a material allegation of the offense, and the failure of the state to prove the true name of the codefendant to be identical as alleged in the information constituted a fatal variance between the allegations and the proof, and entitled the defendant to be acquitted because of said variance. With this contention, we are unable to agree. It is not essential to the validity of an indictment or information that the name of the defendant be correctly stated. If Henry Clair was informed against by a name other than his true name, section 5775, Revised Laws 1910, requires that when arraigned he must be informed of the name by which he is prosecuted, and if such name be not his true name he must then declare his true name, or be proceeded against by the name in the indictment or information; and section 5777, Revised Laws 1910, further provides that if upon arraignment the defendant alleges another name to be his true name, the subsequent proceedings on the indictment or in formation may be had against him by that name, referring also to the name by which he is indicted or informed against. It is apparent, therefore, that the defendant Henry Clair could not take advantage of the fact that the pleader had informed against him in the name of Henry McClair. Williams v. State, 14 Okl. Cr. 100, 167 P. 763.
If it was not material as to Henry Clair that he be informed against in his true name, by what process of reasoning may it be successfully contended that it was material to any other defendant jointly informed against with him, who was a principal in the same transaction? It was not essential, nor was the state required to prove, in order to convict this codefendant separately tried, that the true names of the other defendants were correctly pleaded in the information. Any error in pleading the name of a defendant in an indictment or information is required, under the Criminal Code of this state, to be corrected upon the arraignment of that particular defendant, and the record thus made is a protection to every defendant jointly indicted or informed against with such defendant, and would be a complete protection to either or all defendants against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
The conclusion is reached, therefore, that the variance between the allegations of the information and the proof adduced as to the name of the codefendant was immaterial, and not fatal to the conviction of this defendant, and that the trial court did not err in overruling the motion to direct a verdict or the motion for a new trial because of such alleged variance, as this defendant, under the foregoing protective provisions of the Penal Code, could not have been misled as to the identity of the person jointly informed against with him and charged with the commission of this alleged offense.
Furthermore, it is contended:
"A person, not present, aiding another to commit conjoint robbery, cannot be punished for conjoint robbery."
In this connection, counsel for the defendant contend that the offense, if any, charged against the defendant is that of conjoint robbery, and that section 2373, Revised Laws 1910, provides:
"Whenever two or more persons conjointly commit a robbery or where the whole number of persons conjointly committing a robbery and persons present and aiding such robbery amount to two or more, each and either of such persons is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than five years nor more than fifty years."
Had the defendant been charged with and convicted of conjoint robbery, there might possibly be some merit in this contention. The record, however, shows that the defendant was informed against for robbery in the first degree, and that the verdict and judgment rendered against him was for a conviction of robbery in the first degree. The contention is based, therefore, on the false assumption that the defendant was charged with and convicted of conjoint robbery, and the premise taken to that effect not being supported by the record, the contention must fall with it.
Before there can be a conviction of conjoint robbery, as provided for in section...
To continue reading
Request your trial