Wingate v. Mach
| Decision Date | 30 October 1934 |
| Citation | 117 Fla. 104,157 So. 421 |
| Parties | WINGATE et al. v. MACH et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Suit in equity by Joe Wingate and another against Otto Mach and another, as executors of the purported last will of Emil Mach, deceased, and Otto Mach and others individually. From four interlocutory orders, plaintiffs appeal. Statutory proceeding by the executors for an order authorizing them to continue business of the estate, opposed by plaintiffs in equity suit, who petitioned to intervene pro interesse suo and to vacate order authorizing continuance of the business. To review four interlocutory orders, plaintiffs in equity suit bring error, and both causes were consolidated in the Supreme Court.
Affirmed.
See also (Fla.) 154 So. 192. Appeal from Circuit Court, Osceola County; Frank A. Smith, judge.
Johnston & Rogers, of Kissimmee, and George P. Garrett, of Orlando for appellants.
Hugh Akerman and Allison E. Palmer, both of Orlando, for appellees.
Emil Mach died testate at Kissimmee, Fla., May 7, 1933. Among other properties he left a going business consisting of a lumber and crate mill which was the major portion of his estate. The decedent was a bachelor without dependents. By his will he bequeathed all his estate to his brothers, Otto and Ernest Mach, and Mary Selina Mosgrove, his housekeeper. He designated Otto Mach and Mary Selina Mosgrove as his executors and authorized them to operate the lumber and crate mill so long as they deem it practical.
In December, 1933, appellants, claiming to be creditors of Emil Mach, brought a suit in equity against the executors of his estate, alleging themselves to be creditors of said estate and alleging that the executors are insolvent and not competent to conduct the Mach lumber and crate business. The bill of complaint prays for accounting, receivership, a declaration of the rights of the parties, and for other appropriate relief. The bill was subsequently amended and a concourse of pleadings was in due course filed which are unnecessary to detail in this opinion. Appeal was ultimately taken from four interlocutory orders, viz.: (1) Denying receiver December 21, 1933; (2) application to file amended bill of complaint January 4, 1934; (3) suggesting disqualification of the trial judge December 12, 1933; and (4) application for appointment of administrator pendente lite and for injunction.
In December, 1933, the trial judge on petition of the executors of the Emil Mach estate, under and pursuant to sections 3741 to 3745, R. G. S. of 1920, sections 5614 to 5618, C. G. L. of 1927, entered an order authorizing the said executors to continue the lumber and crate business of the said estate. Appellants Joe Wingate and Ernest Mach petitioned to intervene pro interesse suo in this cause and then to vacate the order authorizing the continuance of the business; both petitions were denied; a second concourse of pleadings followed resulting in writ of error to this court directed to: (1) The petition of December 22, 1933, authorizing the continuance by the executors of the lumber and crate business; (2) order on petition to intervene pro interesse suo of January 4, 1934; (3) order on suggestion of disqualification of the trial judge; and (4) order on application of appellants to discontinue the lumber and crate business.
The foregoing contains what we deem to be the material facts with reference to the pleadings in the chancery and the statutory causes herein. To set them out in detail would be labored and would serve no useful purpose. Both causes were consolidated and briefed together in this court and will be accordingly treated in this opinion.
The appellants in the chancery cause who are also plaintiffs in error in the statutory action argue seven alleged errors committed by the trial court, viz.: (1) The trial court erred in his order continuing the lumber and crate business of the deceased during the pendency of the equity cause in this court; (2) were the creditors of the Emil Mach estate entitled to notice of the application for the order to continue the lumber and crate business; (3) if the trial court had power to enter the order of continuance, did he have the right to do so against the wishes of the creditors and the heirs of the estate; (4) it was error in the trial court to refuse to discontinue the operation of the lumber and crate business of the estate under the showing made by the creditors and heirs; (5) it was error in the trial court to refuse to consolidate the chancery and the statutory causes on the motion of the creditors; (6) that the trial court erred in not holding himself disqualified under the facts as related in these causes; and (7) if the trial court was in fact...
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Callahan v. State
...gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify." Wingate v. Mach, 117 Fla. 104, 157 So. 421, 422 (1934) (emphasis added). From Wingate, it follows that where the trial judge is not a material witness under this definition,......
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Rodriguez v. State
...gives testimony going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify." Wingate v. Mach, 117 Fla. 104, 157 So. 421, 422 (1934) (defining "material witness" as contemplated by chapter 16053, Laws of Florida (1933), the predecessor to section 38.0......
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McLeod v. State
...going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.' " (Quoting Wingate v. Mach, 117 Fla. 104, 157 So. 421, 422 (1934).) It is clear that Judge Jackson did not fall within this definition. Thus, there was no reason for Judge Jackson to disqua......
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Callahan v. Campbell
...fact affecting the merits of the cause and about which no other witness might testify.'" Id. at 1307-08 (quoting Wingate v. Mach, 117 Fla. 104, 157 So. 421, 422 (Fla.1934)). The court noted that Assistant District Attorney Hubbard, who was present in the interrogation room when Judge Monk e......
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Certiorari Review of Orders Denying Discovery in Civil Cases.
...from obtaining discovery from" witness). (3) Sardinas v. Lagares, 805 So. 2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (quoting Wingate v. Mach, 157 So. 421, 422 (Fla. 1934) (emphasis in (4) Kesler v. Brown, 637 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (plaintiff former client in legal-malpractice case); Shindorf......