Winingear v. City of Norfolk
| Decision Date | 16 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:12cv560 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | WILLIAM KEITH WININGEAR, ET AL. Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant City of Norfolk's ("Defendant" or "Norfolk") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' State Law Claims and Hybrid Class Action Allegations for Failure to State a Claim and For Lack of Jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) ("Motion"). Doc. 14. After careful consideration of the parties' briefs and arguments raised at the August 28, 2013 hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
Plaintiffs are a group of police officers currently and formerly employed by Defendant in hourly, non-exempt positions (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), who are alleging violations of federal and state law with respect the payment of overtime compensation. Compl. ¶ 22, ECF No. 1(hereinafter, "Doc. 1"). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they have not received compensation for hours worked in excess of their regularly scheduled hours. Id. Plaintiffs also allege that they have not been compensated for time during which they fulfilled work related obligations, such as: being called while "on call" only to be turned away upon reporting to work; fielding phone calls during off-duty hours; and arriving to court a half-hour early for a court appearance, as a subpoena requests, but only being paid for the actual appearance. Doc. 1 ¶ 23.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, injunctive relief, unpaid overtime compensation, and liquidated damages for themselves and others similarly situated pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201. et seq. and Virginia Code section 9.1-700, et seq. While there are some differences between the statutory schemes, both laws provide that law enforcement officers must receive compensation at a rate of one and one-half times their regular hourly rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of their regularly scheduled hours ("overtime compensation"). Doc. 1 ¶ 1. Relief under the FLSA is only available to those who meet its eligibility threshold, which is defined in terms of number of overtime hours worked in a prescribed work period. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(k). For example, a law enforcement officer is eligible for relief after working more than 171 hours in a twenty-eight (28) day work period. 29 C.F.R. § 553.230. Virginia law permits officers to recover overtime compensation for any overtime hours worked that falls below the FLSA eligibility threshold. Va. Code § 9.1-701.
Plaintiffs' federal claims are brought using the FLSA's collective action provision. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs allege that this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over its state law claims; and seek to certify a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
The Complaint was filed on October 11, 2012. Doc. 1. On February 5, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Joint Motion for Extension of Time to Effect Service, which the Court granted, giving Plaintiffs until February 19, 2013 to effect service of process. Docs. 8-10. On March 8, 2013, Defendant filed its Answer, the instant Motion, and supporting briefs. Docs. 13-15. Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition was filed on April 4, 2013, and Defendant's Reply was filed on April 10, 2013.3 On April 11, 2013, the Clerk referred the Motion for review.
The parties participated in oral argument at the August 28, 2013 hearing. After considering the parties' respective positions, the Court took the matter under advisement.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint; it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007): see Venkatraman v. REI Svs., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) () (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). Although the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, the same is not true for legal conclusions. "Threadbarerecitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a defendant to move for dismissal when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, having invoked the jurisdiction of the court, bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. A.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 548 F. Supp. 2d 219, 221 (E.D. Va. 2008).
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be presented in two different ways. Edwards v. Murphy-Brown, L.L.C., 760 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614 (E.D. Va. 2011) (quoting Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)). First, a Defendant may argue that the complaint fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based, in which case, all facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true, and the plaintiffs receives the same procedural consideration as with a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration. Id In the second instance, a defendant challenges the veracity of the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint. Id. Then, a district court is to regard the allegations contained in the pleadings as mere evidence, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment. Richmonda Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir.1995) (). While a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is not converted into a motion for summary judgment, "[a] court should only grant a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss 'if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the movingparty is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.'" Wilson, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 221 .
Defendant asks the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims. Doc. 15 at 3. Before determining whether the Court has the discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims, it must first determine whether it is empowered to do so.
A court with original jurisdiction over any claim may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over "all other claims that are so related that they form part of the same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Section 1367 embodies the standard established in the seminal case, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, where the Supreme Court determined that a district court with valid jurisdiction over a federal claim had the discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional state claims if the state claims arose out of "a common nucleus of operative fact" such that the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try the claims in one judicial proceeding. 383 U.S. 715, 722 (1966): see also White v. County of Newberry, S.C., 985 F.2d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1993).
The Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' FLSA claim, as it arises under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ().
Plaintiffs argue that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over its Virginia law claim is appropriate because it relies on the same underlying facts as the FLSA claim and presents "identical legal issues that are common to all of the officers working for Norfolk in hourly non-exempt positions." Doc. 19 at 2. Specifically, Plaintiffs note that both the FLSA and Virginia claims "are based on how the officers were scheduled and how many hours they worked inside and outside their regular schedules." Doc. 19 at 3. Both counts allege that Defendant failed to pay the officers the proper overtime for hours worked in excess of their regularly scheduled hours. Id. The only difference, Plaintiffs argue, is that the state law claim alleges that Defendant failed to pay officers proper overtime for hours worked in excess of the officer's regularly scheduled hours but below the eligibility threshold for relief under the FLSA. Doc. 19 at 3-4.
Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' characterization is both factually and legally inaccurate. Doc. 20 at 1-2. In support of this contention, Defendant asks the Court to consider the different eligibility thresholds under the FLSA and Section 9.1-701(A) of the Virginia Code. Doc. 20 at 2. Defendant finds the fact that Virginia law protects hourly employees only up to the point where they become eligible for the protections of the FLSA significant.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs' characterization of the claims as being "so intertwined as to set forth a single case or controversy." Both claims are brought by officers of the Norfolk Police Department who are working (or have...
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