Winkler v. Solutions Group, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 84119,84119,1
• Citation: 915 P.2d 386
• Parties: 1995 OK CIV APP 134 John C. WINKLER, Appellee, v. The SOLUTIONS GROUP, INC., d/b/a Dealer Solutions, Inc., a Texas corporation, Defendant, Memorial Bank, an Oklahoma banking corporation, Intervenor, Appellant. Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Division
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 386

915 P.2d 386

1995 OK CIV APP 134

John C. WINKLER, Appellee, v. The SOLUTIONS GROUP, INC., d/b/a Dealer Solutions, Inc., a Texas corporation, Defendant Memorial Bank, an Oklahoma banking corporation, Intervenor, Appellant.

No. 84119.

Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1.

Court of Appeals of Oklahoma Division No. 1.

Oct. 24, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 1995.

Certiorari Denied March 27, 1996.

Edward O. Lee and John W. Mee, III, Lee & Mee, Oklahoma City, for Appellant.

C. Craig Cole and Kurt Rudkin, Cole, Johnson & Rudkin, Oklahoma City, for Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOPLIN, Judge:

Appellant Memorial Bank (Bank) seeks review of the trial court's order granting attorney fees to Appellee John C. Winkler (Winkler) in Winkler's post-judgment garnishment action. In this appeal, Bank asserts (1) Bank's dismissal of its intervention claim without prejudice prior to a merits adjudication thereof deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to grant Winkler further relief; (2) Winkler stated no "claim for relief" against Bank in the garnishment action as to confer jurisdiction to the trial court to grant Winkler's motion for attorney fees; and (3) the Oklahoma garnishment statutes neither contemplate nor authorize an award of "prevailing party" attorney fees.

In May 1992, Winkler commenced an action against Defendant The Solutions Group, Inc., d/b/a Dealer Solutions, Inc., a Texas corporation (Defendant), to recover earnest money paid in connection with a contract for purchase of an automobile dealership, and in July 1992 obtained judgment. On September 3, 1992, Winkler served a garnishment summons on American Guaranty Title Company (American), the escrow agent chosen to close the sale contract between Winkler and Defendant, alleging that American held funds belonging to Defendant available to satisfy Winkler's judgment, and thereby impressing those funds with a garnishment lien. 12 O.S.1991 § 1185; First Mustang State Bank v. Garland Bloodworth, Inc., 825 P.2d 254 (Okla.1991). American filed a garnishee's answer admitting possession of such funds, and asserted that Bank claimed some interest therein.

On September 18, 1992, Winkler then filed a motion to compel Bank to "interplead" its interest in the held funds, and prayed for an adjudication of Bank's competing claim. On that same date, the trial court granted Winkler's motion to compel, while Bank (also on that same date) filed a motion to intervene, asserting that the Defendant judgment debtor had granted Bank a prior valid, perfected security interest in the funds, superior to any interest of Winkler as judgment creditor. Winkler responded, denying superiority of Bank's claim. American eventually interplead the funds into Court for distribution according to the trial court's determination of the merits of the competing claims.

Bank and Winkler subsequently both filed motions for summary judgment, claiming prior rights in and to the funds. At hearing thereon, and nearly fifteen months after commencement of the garnishment action, Bank announced that it dismissed its claim to the garnished funds without prejudice, and Winkler dismissed as to American. Winkler then sought to reinstate his action for recovery of the interplead funds and therein requested an award of attorney fees and costs against Bank as a competing lien claimant and prevailing party under 42 O.S.1991 § 176. The trial court reinstated Winkler's claim, granted judgment to Winkler and awarded Winkler attorney fees as against Bank. Bank appeals.

In its first proposition, Bank argues the trial court lost jurisdiction to award attorney fees against Bank upon Bank's dismissal of its competing claim to the interplead funds, citing 12 O.S.1991 § 684 and General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Carpenter, 576 P.2d 1166 (Okla.1978). Winkler responds pointing out that notwithstanding Bank's dismissal, there remained for determination Winkler's prayer for an adjudication of rights to the garnished funds, and that therefore, the trial court retained jurisdiction not only over the merits of Winkler's prayer for affirmative relief, but also over any ancillary matters thereto, including (upon reinstatement of his claim) Winkler's prayer for prevailing party attorney fees. Mullis v. Mullis, 669 P.2d 763 (Okla.1983); Harden v. District Court of Tulsa County, 175 Okla. 417, 53 P.2d 247 (1935); Wood v. Hines, 117 Okla. 86, 245 P. 846 (1925); Brown v. Massey, 19 Okla. 482, 92 P. 246 (1907).

We agree with Winkler. The record clearly bears out that notwithstanding Bank's dismissal of its competing claim, upon reinstatement of Winkler's claim, there remained for adjudication Winkler's demand for affirmative relief, i.e., a determination of Winkler's right to the interplead funds as against Bank. Bank's cited authority is distinguishable, in that case there remained no such prayer for affirmative relief by either plaintiff or defendant after plaintiff's dismissal of the principal claim. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 576 P.2d at 1167. We therefore hold the trial...