Winn v. Board of Pension Commissioners

• Decision Date: 15 November 1983
• Citation: 197 Cal.Rptr. 111,149 Cal.App.3d 532
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Larry D. WINN, Petitioner and Appellant, v. BOARD OF PENSION COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. Civ. 68334.

Page 111

197 Cal.Rptr. 111

149 Cal.App.3d 532

Larry D. WINN, Petitioner and Appellant, v. BOARD OF PENSION COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent.

Civ. 68334.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Nov. 15, 1983.

Shaffer & Associates and Larry Joel Shaffer, Encino, for petitioner and appellant.

Ira Reiner, City Atty., Siegfried O. Hillmer, Asst. City Atty., Mary Jo Curwen and Beverly E. Mosley, Deputy City Attys., for respondent.

LUCAS, Associate Justice. ^*

Appellant, Larry D. Winn, appeals from a judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandate. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant is a former member of the Los Angeles Police Department. He commenced his employment as a police officer with the City on October 6, 1968.

Appellant worked car patrol duties through the latter part of 1977. In August of 1975, and April of 1976, he received orthopedic injuries while on duty. As a result of the injuries, he was off work periodically. Toward the end of 1977, he was placed on a light duty desk assignment.

About May of 1976, appellant began to have personality conflicts with other members of the police department and developed emotional problems.

Beginning in February 1977, appellant filed for workers' compensation claiming injury to his back and psyche.

On November 20, 1978, appellant applied for a disability pension pursuant to section 190.12 of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles. After several hearings, respondent Board of Pension Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, on January 10, 1980, denied appellant a disability pension.

On June 4, 1980, appellant filed a petition for a writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 challenging respondent's decision.

On May 20, 1982, the superior court denied the petition and this appeal followed.

At the superior court hearing, the court received over 800 pages of administrative record. Appellant also offered records of actions taken by and evidence submitted to the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board after the date of the denial by the Board of Pension Commissioners. The trial court admitted this evidence. Part of Exhibit 68A is a two-page document dated May 18, 1981, consisting of a Workers' Compensation Appeals Board form entitled "Stipulations with Request for Award" with various blanks filled in. The first line of the stipulations form reads "FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION PURPOSES ONLY." The next paragraph reads, in relevant part: "The parties hereto stipulate to the issuance of an Award and/or Order, based upon the following facts...: 1. Larry Dean Winn ... sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment

back and psyche

------

* * *

(parts of body injured)

3. The injury caused permanent disability of 48 1/4%, ..."

Exhibit 68A also included findings of fact and an award for permanent disability dated August 17, 1981, made by a workers' compensation judge pursuant to the above stipulation.

ISSUES

1. Whether the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board "Stipulations with Request for Award," dated May 10, 1981, and the "Findings of Fact and Award," dated August 17, 1981, are res judicata and collaterally estop respondent to deny appellant's application for a disability pension?

2. Whether the decision of the superior court was supported by substantial evidence?

DISCUSSION

I

Appellant contends that the "Stipulations with Request for Award" and the "Findings of Fact and Award" pursuant thereto, which were made after the denial of appellant's pension claim by respondent, should be res judicata and collaterally estop respondent from denying appellant a pension. Appellant argues that the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (e), admitted the "Stipulations" and "Findings" as relevant evidence which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been produced at the hearing before respondent. Having admitted the evidence, the trial court was bound to give it conclusive effect under the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Thus, the argument continues, under the independent judgment test applied by the trial court, the court was bound to find that the appellant was orthopedically and psychologically permanently disabled, and therefore entitled to a pension.

"The doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy. It seeks to curtail multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in judicial administration." (4 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment, § 147, p. 3292, and cases cited.) Where the subsequent action is on the same cause of action, a prior judgment is a complete bar. But where the subsequent action is on a different cause of action, the former judgment is not a complete merger or bar, but is effective as a collateral estoppel, i.e., it is conclusive on issues actually litigated between the parties in the former action. (Id., at p. 3293.)

Appellant urges that Dakins v. Board of Pension Commissioners for the City of Los Angeles (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 374, 184 Cal.Rptr. 576, is controlling on the issue of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In Dakins, a policeman had applied for a service-connected disability pension. The Board of Pension Commissioners found that the disability was not service connected. Prior to the pension board's finding, the policeman had filed a workers' compensation claim for the same disability. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board found, prior to the pension board's finding, that the disability was service connected. On appeal, the appellate court held that the Pension Board was collaterally estopped to deny that the disability was service related. The court found that although the workers' compensation claim and the pension claim were not the same cause of action, the identical issue of whether or not the disability was service connected was litigated before the pension board and the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. The court also found that the workers' compensation finding was part of a final judgment, and that the parties (in both cases an entity or agent of the City of Los Angeles) were identical. (Id., at p. 387, 184 Cal.Rptr. 576.)

We find the Dakins case distinguishable in that in the instant case the issues considered by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board and the Board of Pension Commissioners were not identical, and the workers' compensation award was a subsequent, and not a prior judgment.

Section 190.12 of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles (the "Charter") provides as follows:

"(a) Service-Connected Disability. Upon the filing of his written application for a disability pension or upon the filing of a written request therefor by or on behalf of the head of the department in which he is a Department Member, any System Member whom the Board shall determine has become physically or mentally incapacitated by reason of injuries received or sickness caused by the discharge of the duties of such person as a Department Member, and who is incapable as a result thereof from performing his duties, shall be retired by order of the Board from further active duty as a Department Member.

"(b) Nonservice-Connected Disability. Upon the filing of his written application for a disability pension by a System Member who shall have 5 years of service or more since the date of his last regular and permanent appointment as a Department Member including his service of the required probationary period, or upon the filing of a written request therefor with respect to such a System Member by or on behalf or the head of the department in which he is a Department Member, any System Member whom the Board shall determine has become physically or mentally incapacitated by reason of injuries or sickness other than injuries received or sickness caused by the discharge of the duties of such person as a Department Member, and who is incapable as a result thereof from performing his duties, and if the Board further shall determine that such disability was not due to or caused by the moral turpitude of such System Member, shall be retired by order of the Board from further active duty as a Department Member.

"(c) Determination of Disability. Upon the filing of any written application or request for a disability pension, as referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the Board: (1) shall cause the System Member to be examined by and a written report thereon rendered by at least three regularly licensed and practicing physicians selected by it; (2) shall hold a hearing with respect to such application or request; and (3) shall receive or hear such other evidence relating to or concerning the System Member's disability or claimed disability as may be presented to it. The Board shall have the power to hear and determine all matters pertaining to the granting and denying of any such application or request for a disability pension. The Board first shall determine whether or not the System Member is incapable of or from performing his duties as a Department Member. If the Board were to determine that he is not so incapable, it then shall be the duty of the Board to deny the application or request. If the Board were to determine that he is so incapable, it then shall determine, pursuant to the language used in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, whether his incapacity or disability is service-connected or nonservice-connected."

The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board records dated September 27, 1979, show that appellant was found to have "sustained injury to his back and psyche arising out of and in the course of his employment." There was no finding that such injury was permanent. In the Stipulations with Request for Award, dated May 18, 1981, and the accompanying Findings and Award there is an adjudication that appellant was given a 48 1/4 percent permanent...