Winston v. Moore
| Decision Date | 16 March 1914 |
| Docket Number | 78 |
| Citation | 91 A. 520,244 Pa. 447 |
| Parties | Winston, Appellant, v. Moore |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued February 25, 1914
Appeal, No. 78, Jan. T., 1914, by plaintiffs, from decree of C.P. No. 1, Philadelphia Co., Dec. T., 1913, No. 4856 entering judgment for defendants on case stated in case of John C. Winston, Richard L. Austin, John Hampton Barnes Russell Duane, Samuel S. Fels, Charles L. McKeehan, J. Henry Scattergood, John Walton and George Woodward v. Robert J. Moore, John J. Powers, and Frank J. Gorman, County Commissioners for the City of Philadelphia, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Intervening Defendant. Affirmed.
Case stated to determine the constitutionality of the Nonpartisan Ballot Act of July 24, 1913, P.L. 1001. Before BREGY, J.
The case stated was as follows:
The parties to this litigation agree as follows:
1. This case shall be decided as if the facts herein stated had been duly averred in a bill in equity and an answer thereto had been filed, admitting said facts, and submitting the questions of law involved to the court for decision.
2. Plaintiffs are citizens, residents and taxpayers of the State of Pennsylvania, City and County of Philadelphia.
3. Defendants are county commissioners of the County of Philadelphia.
4. Defendants are about to, and unless restrained by the court will, spend money of the county in the printing of official nonpartisan ballots and other election material, under the provisions of the Act of July 24, 1913, P.L. 1001, for use at the forthcoming primary election to be held within the State of Pennsylvania, on the third Tuesday of May, 1914, and in preparation for the nonpartisan nomination of judges at such primary under the terms of the said act.
5. It is agreed that if the Act of July 24, 1913, P.L. 1001, entitled, "An act to regulate nominations and elections for all elective offices of cities of the second class and all offices of judge of a court of record; providing for nonpartisan nominations and elections for said offices: abolishing certain existing methods of nomination in such cases and the use of party or political names or appellations at elections with respect to said offices; imposing certain duties upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth, county commissioners, and election officers and clerks; and providing penalties for the violation of the provisions thereof, and the punishment of certain offenses," is constitutional, judgment shall be entered for the defendants; if the said act is unconstitutional, an injunction shall issue to restrain defendants from printing any nonpartisan ballots or spending any money of the county under the provisions of the said act, either party to have the right to appeal as in other cases.
The court below entered judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appealed.
Error assigned was the judgment of the court.
Decree affirmed. Costs to be equally divided between the parties.
Thos. Raeburn White, and John G. Johnson, for appellants. -- The Act of July 24, 1913, P.L. 1001, commonly known as the Nonpartisan Ballot Law, is unconstitutional and void for two reasons: First, because it interferes with the freedom and equality of elections; second, because, relating exclusively to the office of judge, it is special legislation.
The law is a denial, qualification or restriction of the elector's right, and is discriminatory in its operation: Independence Party Nomination, 208 Pa. 108; Oughton v. Black, 212 Pa. 1.
The provision of the law which limits the names to be printed upon the official ballot to two candidates for each office is invalid: State v. Junkin, 85 Neb. 1; People v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, 221 Ill. 9.
Requiring each candidate to file an affidavit, stating that he is a candidate, is in violation of the Constitution: Dapper v. Smith, 138 Mich. 104; State v. Blaisdell, 18 N.D. 55.
The abolition of party nominations is invalid: State v. Junkin, 85 Neb. 1; Murphy v. Curry, 137 Cal. 479; Hopper v. Britt, 204 N.Y. 524 (S.C. 203 N.Y. 144); State v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1.
The act is special legislation.
James Gay Gordon, with him George Quintard Horwitz, Special Counsel, and John C. Bell, Attorney General, for appellees. -- The Nonpartisan Ballot Act is not an election law with the purview of the constitutional provisions invoked by the appellants, i.e., is not a law regulating the holding of elections by the citizens, nor a law for the opening and conducting of elections; but, on the contrary, is merely an act providing a method for making nominations to the office of judge of any court of record; and hence the aforesaid constitutional provisions have no application to it: Leonard v. Commonwealth, 112 Pa. 607; Com. v. Young, 16 Pa.Super. 317; Com. v. Tucker, 23 Pa.Super. 632.
Even if this court should be of opinion that the Nonpartisan Ballot Law is an election law to which the said constitutional provisions are applicable, it does not interfere with the freedom and equality guaranteed in all elections, nor is it destructive of the uniformity required in all laws regulating the holding of elections by the citizens: Woods's App., 75 Pa. 59; DeWalt v. Bartley, 146 Pa. 529; Gilbert's Est., 227 Pa. 648; In re Greenfield Ave., 191 Pa. 290; James Smith Woolen Machinery Co. v. Browne, 206 Pa. 543; Searight's Est., 163 Pa. 210.
Even if this court should be of opinion that the Nonpartisan Ballot Law is an election law to which the constitutional provisions in question are applicable, and that the act in its operation will be destructive of uniformity in election laws, yet it is not a prohibited local or special law for opening or conducting elections, because it is based upon proper classification: Ayars' App., 122 Pa. 266; Com. v. Mathues, 210 Pa. 372.
Before FELL, C.J., BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, STEWART and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.
The purpose of this proceeding is to test the constitutionality of the Act of July 24, 1913, P.L. 1001, known as the Nonpartisan Ballot Law. The learned court below sustained the act and refused the injunction. Does the act thus assailed represent a valid exercise of legislative power? If it does, courts cannot declare it invalid, because it may prove to be unwise, or of doubtful expediency, or that it may not be effective in correcting the evils intended to be remedied, or for any other reason not based upon a subversion of constitutional rights. In the consideration of this question we start with all presumptions in favor of the validity of the act. The burden is on those who assail it to show what provisions of the act are in conflict with the organic law, failing in this the statute stands. When the constitutionality of a statute is involved in a proceeding before the courts, the question of legislative power is fundamental to the inquiry, and in this connection it must not be overlooked that the power of the legislature to make laws is supreme except as limited by the Constitution. When, therefore, the legislature has passed an act, and it has been approved as required, it has binding force and effect, unless it is clearly in conflict with the fundamental law. With this understanding of the underlying principles applicable to a correct decision of the question raised by the present appeal, let us inquire how the case stands.
It is contended for appellants that the act is unconstitutional and void for two reasons: (1) Because it interferes with the freedom and equality of elections; and (2), as applied to nominations for the office of judge, it is special legislation. The first contention is based upon the provision of the bill of rights which declares that "elections shall be free and equal." It is argued for appellees that this provision of the Constitution has no application to a primary election held for the purpose of nominating candidates, and that it was intended solely to safeguard the rights of electors in the exercise of their franchise in voting for persons or candidates to be elected to public office at a general election. This view is not without force and it finds support in the decisions of several Common Pleas judges and to some extent in the opinions of our appellate courts: Com. v. Young, 16 Pa.Super. 317; Com. v. Tucker, 23 Pa.Super. 632; Com. v. Wells, 110 Pa. 463. Primary elections such as have been provided for by the Acts of 1906 and 1913 were unknown in our State when the present Constitution was adopted, at which time nominations of candidates for public office were made as a general rule by conventions or caucuses authorized by the rules of political parties, and in some instances by popular vote, but, when this was done, the primary election officers were appointed or selected according to party rules. The regular election officers had nothing to do with the holding of primary elections under the old system. This is a recent innovation, and one to be commended, because it affords greater protection against fraudulent practices and requires primaries to be conducted by sworn election officers. But no matter how commendable and meritorious direct primaries may be in nominating candidates for office, the question still remains whether they are elections within the meaning of the Constitution. There is at least room for difference of opinion on this question, indeed it may be remarked that divergent views do exist, but since the decision of this question is not vital to a proper determination of the rights of the parties to the present controversy, we refrain from finally deciding whether a primary election law comes within the purview of Art. I, Sec. 5, of the Constitution.
Assuming however, in order that we may consider broadly the questions of constitutional limitations and legislative power...
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