Winter v. Spradling

• Decision Date: 01 April 1912
• Citation: 145 S.W. 834
• Parties: WINTER et al. v. SPRADLING.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

145 S.W. 834

WINTER et al. v. SPRADLING.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

April 1, 1912.

1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 934) — REVIEW — SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

In determining whether a judgment is sufficiently supported, the testimony will be given the most favorable construction consistent with sound reason to uphold the judgment.

2. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (§ 53)—ORAL LEASE.

Under Rev. St. 1909, § 2783, providing that no action shall be brought to charge one upon a lease of lands for a longer period than one year, or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof unless the agreement or some memorandum thereof shall be in writing, an oral lease of land was unenforceable when made in July of one year for a period to extend one year from March 1st of the next year.

3. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (§ 129) — ORAL LEASE.

In an action at law, part performance of an oral lease for a period longer than one year from the date of its execution by performing certain labor upon a building in part payment of rent and plowing ground preparatory to sowing grain did not take the contract out of the statute of frauds (Rev. St. 1909, § 2783), which makes such leases unenforceable.

4. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (§ 123)—VOID ORAL LEASE—TENANCY FROM YEAR TO YEAR.

The delivery of possession by a lessor under an oral lease unenforceable under the statute of frauds will constitute the lessee a tenant from year to year.

5. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (§ 129)—TENANCY—POSSESSION.

The act of a tenant while in possession of premises under an unexpired lease in plowing a few acres of land without the knowledge or consent of the landlord was not a taking of possession under an unenforceable verbal lease for a period not yet begun, though the plowing was for planting to be done during the period of the verbal lease.

6. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (§ 138)—SERVICES—LANDLORD'S LIABILITY.

A tenant who performs labor in part payment of his rent under a lease unenforceable under the statute of frauds, and which the landlord later repudiates, may recover from the landlord the reasonable value of his services.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Crawford County; L. B. Woodside, Judge.

Action by Antonio Winter and another against William H. Spradling. From judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Harry Clymer, of Steelville, for appellants. Frank H. Farris, of Steelville, for respondent.

COX, J.

Action of unlawful detainer begun before a justice of the peace then removed to the circuit court by certiorari. Trial by court, judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs have appealed.

The question for our determination is whether or not the testimony will support the judgment. This being true, we must give to the testimony the most favorable construction consistent with sound reason with a view of upholding the judgment. Proceeding in this way, the facts will be found to be as follows: Plaintiffs by written lease rented certain lands to defendant for a period of three years, ending March 1, 1911. Defendant went into possession and continued in possession beyond the expiration of that lease, and was in possession at the time this suit was begun. In July, 1910, according to defendant's testimony, an oral agreement was made between plaintiff, Antonio Winter, the owner of the land, and defendant, by the terms of which defendant leased the land for another year to begin at the expiration of the written lease on March 1, 1911, and expiring March 1, 1912. As a part of the terms of said oral lease, certain improvements were to be made on the land for which plaintiff was to furnish the material and defendant perform the labor, and that part of these improvements were made as agreed. Defendant also plowed eight acres of ground preparatory to sowing wheat. After this was done, plaintiffs on August 15, 1911, notified defendant that they wanted possession at the expiration of the written lease, and nothing further was done in relation to the oral lease. Plaintiffs denied that an oral contract of lease was made. This suit was filed March 4, 1911, after the expiration of the written lease.

It will be observed that the oral contract under which defendant claims the right to continue in possession after March 1, 1911, was made in July, 1910, and was for a lease of the land from March 1, 1911, to March 1, 1912, and therefore could not be performed within one year from the date of its execution. The contract standing alone is clearly unenforceable by reason of the statute of frauds (section 2783, Stat. 1909), for the reason that it could not be performed within one year. This provision of this statute means that the contract to be enforceable, if not in writing, must be capable of being performed within one year from the date of its execution, and not within one year from the date of the beginning of its performance. Brookfield v. Drury College, 139 Mo. App. 339, 368, 123 S. W. 86; Keller v. Fertilizer Co., 153 Mo. App. 120, 124, 132 S. W. 314.

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