Wis. Keeley Inst. Co. v. Milwaukee Cnty.

• Decision Date: 02 February 1897
• Citation: 95 Wis. 153,70 N.W. 68
• Parties: WISCONSIN KEELEY INSTITUTE CO. v. MILWAUKEE COUNTY.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

95 Wis. 153

70 N.W. 68

WISCONSIN KEELEY INSTITUTE CO.

v.MILWAUKEE COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Feb. 2, 1897.

Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee county; D. H. Johnson, Judge.

Action by the Wisconsin Keeley Institute Company against Milwaukee county to recover for treatment of a patient. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and defendant appeals. Reversed.N. S. Murphy, for appellant.

E. E. Chapin and Rietbrock & Halsey, for respondent.

CASSODAY, C. J.

Chapter 203, Laws 1895, provides, in effect: (1) That when any citizen of the state becomes an habitual drunkard, and is pecuniarily unable to procure and pay for treatment for such disease, any citizen of the state, the next friend, the attending physician, or any public officer may petition the county court or the judge thereof, within and for the county where such habitual drunkard resides, for an order of said court or judge thereof permitting said habitual drunkard to take treatment at some institution for the cure of drunkenness and drug addictions, established within the state, at the expense of the county, as the county judge may select. (6) That the term “habitual drunkard,” as defined by the act, includes all persons addicted to the use of spirituous, malt, or fermented liquors, morphine, opium, cocaine, or other drugs or narcotics to such a degree as to deprive him or her of the power of reasonable self-control. (2) That such petition is required to set forth the full name, age, and residence of such habitual drunkard, whether married or single; that he has resided within the state at least one year previously; that he has not the means to pay for said treatment, nor have the person or persons, if any, who are charged with his support; what addiction he is affected by; that he appears to be unable to abstain by means of will power alone; and praying that such habitual drunkard may have treatment at the expense of the county at such institute,--such petition to be signed and verified by the petitioner, and accompanied by a certificate signed and sworn to by two reputable citizens and taxpayers, and the written consent of such drunkard to the granting of the prayer of the petition, and his agreement to take the treatment and obey the rules of the institution. (3) That, upon presenting such petition, verification, and written consent, the court or judge thereof, upon being satisfied of the truth thereof, shall cause an order to be entered that such drunkard shall be taken to some institution within the state, to be designated therein, provided that the expense of treatment in each case shall not exceed the sum of $130, which sum shall cover and include all expenses for treatment, medicines, and board for four weeks, and such expense shall be paid by the county; (4) that no such court nor judge thereof shall send any person for treatment a second time; (5) that any person so treated is at liberty to reimburse the county. The complaint alleges, in effect, the incorporation of the plaintiff; that one J. S. White, an alleged habitual drunkard, age 42 years, and a married man, and a resident of the defendant county was, May 31, 1895, upon the requisite petition, certificate, verification, and consent of the said White, ordered by the county court to be conveyed to the Keeley Institute at Waukesha, for treatment for such habitual drunkenness, at the expense of Milwaukee county, not to exceed $130; that, under such commitment, said White was duly conveyed to the plaintiff's said institution for such treatment, and was duly received into the plaintiff's institution for treatment, and was duly treated for said drunkenness and inebriety for a period of four weeks, commencing May 31, 1895, and the plaintiff in all things conformed to and complied with the terms and provisions of said act; that the defendant, by reason thereof, became and now is indebted to the plaintiff therefor in the sum of $130 with interest, and prays judgment accordingly. To that complaint the defendant demurred, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. From the order overruling the demurrer, the defendant brings this appeal.

It is conceded that White was committed to the plaintiff's institution in the manner required by the act, and was there treated for drunkenness, as alleged, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action if the act in question is valid. On the other hand, it is obvious that, if the act is void, then the action cannot be maintained. The question presented, therefore, turns entirely upon the constitutionality of the act. It is undoubtedly true, as claimed by counsel for the plaintiff, that the state legislature has authority to exercise any and all legislative powers not delegated to the federal government, nor expressly or by necessary implication prohibited by the national or state constitution. Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 92 Wis. 595, 66 N. W. 805, and cases there cited. So, it is undoubtedly true, as claimed, that a statute should, if possible, be so construed as not to be in conflict with the constitution. But no construction is permissible which defeats the obvious purpose and object of constitutional restrictions. Counsel for the plaintiff contend that the act in question comes within the police power of the legislature, and is therefore valid. Such power undoubtedly extends to the regulation and protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, good order, morals, peace, and safety of society, and hence may be exercised on many subjects and in numerous ways. State v. Heinemann, 80 Wis. 256, 49 N. W. 818, and cases there cited; Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 92 Wis. 598, 66 N. W. 805. Mr. Cooley defines such power in the following language: “The police of a state, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its whole system of internal regulation, by which the state seeks not only to preserve the public order, and to prevent offenses against the state, but also to establish, for the intercourse of citizens with citizens, those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others.” Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th Ed.) p. 704. Mr. Tiedeman gathers from the American definitions given by him that “the term must be confined to the imposition of restraints and burdens upon persons and property.” He further says: “The power of the government to embark in enterprises of public charity and benefit can only be limited by the restrictions upon the power of taxation, and to that extent alone can these subjects in American law be said to fall within the police power of the state.” Tied. Lim. p. 4. It is not denied, if not conceded, that the legislature has ample power to suppress drunkenness and intemperance. The statutes have for many years provided for the care of inebriates in county asylums. Rev. St. §§ 604f, 604g. So they have provided for placing drunkards under guardianship, and committing them to asylums. Id. §§ 3978, 3979; State v. Ryan, 70 Wis. 683, 684, 36 N. W. 823. The power of the legislature to pass such laws is not questioned. Nor is the power of the legislature to prescribe laws for reclaiming drunkards by public authority here involved. We are clearly of the opinion that the act in question is not an exercise of the police...