Wise v. DeToca, A14-86-00412-CV
| Decision Date | 10 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. A14-86-00412-CV,A14-86-00412-CV |
| Citation | 761 S.W.2d 467 |
| Parties | William J. WISE and Wise Developments, Inc., Appellants, v. Rocio Ojeda DeTOCA, Appellee. (14th Dist.) |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Charles E. Fitch, Houston, for appellants.
Gary L. Crofford, Daryl W. Bailey, Preston L. Dodson, Jack H. Emmott, III, Houston, for appellee.
Before J. CURTISS BROWN, ROBERTSON and CANNON, JJ.
The supreme court reversed this court's prior opinion and remanded the cause for consideration of the other points of error. 748 S.W.2d 449. The title insurance companies who were before this court are no longer parties since, as noted by the supreme court, they settled with appellee after application for writ was filed in the supreme court. We will now address the remaining points of error raised by Wise and Wise Developments, who will be referred to only as appellants.
In their fourth and fifth points of error appellants contend the answers of the jury that (1) appellants knew the property was subject to the order of the building official and (2) they intended to induce appellee to purchase the property by failing to disclose to her that the property was subject to the order was contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence. We do not agree.
The evidence shows that when the appropriate city department determines a building is dangerous, an order is immediately issued, that a copy is mailed to the owner and a copy is posted on the building itself. Appellant Wise admitted that "possibly I got something in my file, which is laying on the desk that Preston may have mailed me but I certainly didn't read them and if I have them in there I don't know it." He further admitted that he saw the sign posted on the house and he stated that he was aware of the procedure whereby the city demolished dangerous buildings if they were not repaired or demolished by the owner. Additionally, appellant admitted that it was he who insisted the earnest money contract include a clause requiring the house to be repaired within twelve months. We conclude this evidence shows that the jury's answers to the two issues in question were not contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence. Appellant's fourth and fifth points of error are overruled.
Appellants grouped within their discussion of the above points of error their ninth point of error complaining of the award of attorneys fees "because there is no basis" for them. However, they present no argument nor authorities in support of this point; it is therefore waived.
In their seventh and eight points of error appellants contend there was no evidence to support the submission of special issue 14(b) and that the finding of the jury in response to issue 14(a) is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The issues in question were:
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence, would fairly and reasonably compensate Mrs. Toca for damages, if any, caused by the occurrence in question?
In reaching your conclusion, consider only the following elements of damage and no others. In answering any element of damage, do not include any amount, if any, for any element for which you have placed a figure in any other element.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for each element of damage listed below.
property in question on November 15, 1979.
and the fair market value of the property in question on
November 15, 1979 if it had not been subject to the Order
of the Building Official.
You are instructed that the term "fair market value" means the price the property will bring when offered for sale by one who desires to sell, but is not obliged to sell, and is bought by one who desires to buy, but is under no necessity to buy.
Appellee correctly points out that it is largely within the discretion of the trial court to determine the required qualifications of a witness testifying as to property market value. Urban Renewal Agency of San Antonio v. Abdo, 562 S.W.2d 872 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Further, an owner is competent to testify as to the market value of his own property. Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503 ...
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...only to those which are presented by argument and supported by authorities. All others shall be considered waived. See Wise v. De Toca, 761 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no The trial court filed the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: FINDINGS OF FACT ......
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