Wise v. State Bd. for Examination, Qualification & Registration of Architects, 36847

• Decision Date: 11 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 36847,36847
• Citation: 247 Ga. 206,274 S.E.2d 544
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: WISE v. STATE BOARD FOR EXAMINATION, QUALIFICATION & REGISTRATION OF ARCHITECTS et al.

Page 544

274 S.E.2d 544

247 Ga. 206

WISE v. STATE BOARD FOR EXAMINATION, QUALIFICATION & REGISTRATION OF

ARCHITECTS et al.

No. 36847.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 11, 1981.

Luther P. Cochrane and John F. Elger, Griffin, Cochrane & Marshall, Atlanta, for John R. Wise.

Joseph R. Bankoff, King & Spalding, Atlanta, John C. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., for Georgia State Bd. for the Examination, Qualification & Registration of Architects et al.

MARSHALL, Justice.

John R. Wise filed an action for declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief, seeking to compel the defendants the State Board for Examination, Qualification & Registration of Architects ("state board"); the secretary of the board; and the National Council of Architectural Registration Boards ("NCARB") to accept his past work experience and credentials, which would ultimately enable him to obtain a license to practice as an architect in the State of Georgia.

The plaintiff is an architect licensed in Illinois and currently working for Bank Building and Equipment Corp. ("Bank Building") in Atlanta, Ga. For purposes of this lawsuit, Bank Building is a general contractor in construction, and known in the trade as a "design/build" firm, which utilizes architects in both phases of designing and building structures.

Defendant NCARB is a non-profit corporation whose membership consists of architectural registration boards of all 50 states, and the defendant state board is one of its members. One of the functions of NCARB is to standardize licensure requirements throughout the United States in an effort to facilitate reciprocity. Council certificates are issued to those individuals who meet the minimal standards established by NCARB, and this certificate would enable the architect to practice in Georgia without the necessity of taking a licensure examination.

NCARB has for many years required that applicants for council certificates have at least three years of diversified practical experience in the offices of a registered architect, and it has limited the credit given for experience with general contractors. NCARB has prescribed a maximum experience credit of two years for employment by "design/build" firms, and, thus, the plaintiff was not eligible for a council certificate, and was refused a certificate in 1974.

The plaintiff applied for a license by reciprocity in Georgia based upon his Illinois license. However, Georgia law requires an applicant to either submit a council certificate from NCARB or demonstrate sufficient credentials, i. e., a diploma from an architectural school and at least three years' experience which the state board deems acceptable by rules and regulations. Code Ann. § 84-303(a) (Ga.L.1974, pp. 162, 165). Under the rules of the board, the plaintiff is permitted a maximum experience credit of two years, since the plaintiff has worked exclusively for a general contractor (category F-12 from the Table of Equivalents for Academic Training and Practical Experience). Based upon this shortage of acceptable practical experience and a lack of a council certificate, the plaintiff was denied a license by the state board.

The plaintiff sought to have the court declare the above standard unconstitutional and to compel both defendants to either issue a council certificate or a license to the plaintiff. Count 2 of the amended complaint sought damages from defendant NCARB for its alleged "arbitrary, unreasonable and tortious interference with plaintiff's employment, career and prospective business advantage."

The trial judge granted defendant NCARB's motion to dismiss as to Counts 1 and 2, and dismissed Count 1 as to the state board and its secretary. From these judgments, the plaintiff appeals. ¹

1. Enumerated error 1 is the dismissal of Count 1 as to the board and its secretary.

"It has often been held that the constitutional restriction on delegation of legislative powers does not prevent the grant of legislative authority to some ministerial officer, board or other tribunal to adopt rules, by-laws, or other ordinances for its government, or to carry out a particular purpose. 'Thus, while it is necessary that a law, when it comes from the lawmaking power shall be complete, still there are many matters as to methods or details which the legislature may refer to some designated ministerial officer or board.' (Cits.)" Scoggins v. Whitfield Finance Co., 242 Ga. 416(1), 249 S.E.2d 222 (1978). Code Ann. § 84-304 is not unconstitutional on the grounds of its delegation of legislative authority to defendants state board and NCARB.

"The legislature has the right in the exercise of the police power of the State to determine what trades or occupations shall be regulated, and the nature and extent of the regulations to be applied, and if such regulation be reasonable, and the law operates alike on all who come within the scope of its provisions, constitutional uniformity is secured." Lamons v. Yarbrough, 206 Ga. 50(3), 55 S.E.2d 551 (1949). The trial judge was authorized in holding that the requirement, that an architect working for a "design/build" firm must obtain some full-time experience working for an independent architect, can not be said to be unreasonable. The job of an architect is to ensure that his plans are followed precisely, irrespective of the additional cost to the contractor. In many respects, the architect is seen as an antagonist to the contractor, as the contractor is seeking the maximum profit, while the architect is seeking the best final product possible. Individuals working in the setting of a "design/build" firm, experience a constant conflict of interests not normally present in the setting of an independent architect. Thus, the experience requirement in question is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of ensuring that all licensed architects are properly qualified and will competently practice in the interest of the public health, safety and welfare.

The appellant argues that the effect of this statute and the regulation promulgated thereunder will be to deprive him of his ability to be licensed in Georgia as long as he is employed by Bank Building. While this may be true, this fact alone does not invalidate either the statute or the regulation. Since there is a reasonable basis for the regulation issued by the board in the exercise of the power conferred upon it by the legislature, we would not be authorized to substitute our judgment for that of the state board and invalidate the regulation on the ground that some other method for earning the required experience for licensure would be equally as satisfactory in result, even if we were of that opinion. See Duggins v. N. C. State Bd. of CPA Examiners, 294 N.C. 120, 240 S.E.2d 406 (1978). The evidence here fails to sustain the contention of the equality of experience in the appellant's present employment with that obtainable in the employ of an independent architect. Code Ann. § 84-303 provides for alternative methods of licensure, and the appellant has been on notice of its requirements and the NCARB rules at least since the enactment of the statute in 1974.

Nor does the evidence sustain the appellant's equal-protection claim based upon the licensure of a Mr. David Whitfield, who allegedly possessed qualifications similar to the appellant's. The record shows that Mr. Whitfield not only had 11 years' experience with Bank Building (as compared with the appellant's eight years), but also had the experience of 16 months' work under an independent architectural firm. Furthermore, the board's rules requiring the outside experience had not been adopted at the time Mr. Whitfield applied for a license. There is no evidence that all applicants for licensure have not been treated identically with respect to the requirement of experience.

The prayer for the writ of mandamus was properly denied, as the board is not authorized by law to grant the appellant a license. See Skrine v. Kim, 242 Ga. 185, 249 S.E.2d 534 (1978). The allegations of Count 1 having failed to state a claim for the relief ought, dismissal of that count as to the board was not error.

2. Enumerated error 2 is the dismissal of Count 1 as to NCARB. The order of dismissal does not specify the grounds therefor. The motion to dismiss was made upon four grounds, among which was lack of personal jurisdiction. This was the sole ground briefed and argued by the parties.

The contended basis for jurisdiction of NCARB is Code Ann. § 24-113.1 (Ga.L.1966, p. 343; 1970, pp. 443, 444), the "Long Arm" statute. In support of his contention of jurisdiction under this statute, the appellant urges the following transactions of NCARB, which allegedly comprise the "minimum contacts with this state" required by the statute. (See Davis Metals v. Allen, 230 Ga. 623, 198 S.E.2d 285 (1973).) NCARB is a non-profit corporation, incorporated under the laws of Iowa, with its principal place of business in Washington, D. C. The defendant state board is a member of NCARB. One of the directors of NCARB is a resident of Georgia. NCARB prepares and sells the examinations to be given to applicants for architectural registration in Georgia, and is paid for such activity. NCARB pursues its primary business (the regulation of the practice of architecture through certification of records for registration) within Georgia by the use of national examinations and the evaluation of applicants for council certificates. The appellant's application for a council certificate was considered and evaluated by NCARB, for its services in connection with which it solicited and received compensation. Such business transactions between NCARB and architects residing in Georgia are required by Georgia statutes, and the fees received by NCARB for this service are solicited from Georgia residents. Since 1969, the State of Georgia, through the defendant state board, has been billed for and has paid to NCARB more...