Wise v. State
Decision Date | 22 November 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 5748,5748 |
Citation | 654 P.2d 116 |
Parties | Wendell WISE, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.
Steven F. Freudenthal, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Allen C. Johnson, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before ROSE, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.
Appellant was convicted following trial by jury of a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver in violation of §§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 35-7-1014(d)(x), W.S.1977, 1 and was sentenced. The issue on appeal is whether the trial judge erred in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense.
We will affirm.
On the date of the offense, appellant, with a Peter Christensen, both of Fort Collins, Colorado, went to the residence of Kathy LeJeune in Cheyenne. It was appellant's idea to come to Cheyenne to sell marijuana. Appellant requested Kathy's assistance in selling some pot (marijuana). Appellant and Kathy had known each other since they were children. She called a friend, Al, and advised him a friend of hers had some smoke for sale. Arrangements were made for appellant and his companion to meet with Al in the parking lot of Little America, Cheyenne. They met. Al, along with another person, got out of his yellow corvette and appellant and Kathy got out of Christensen's automobile. Christensen remained seated in the car. The price was discussed at which time Christensen interjected that the price was $500 per pound. When asked where the marijuana was, appellant pointed it out as being in the back seat of the car. Al took out a pound package and examined it. It was appellant who asked Al and the other person with him how much marijuana they wanted to buy; they had two and one-half pounds to sell. Appellant did all the talking except as to Christensen's interjection on the price as above noted. Al and his companion were undercover narcotics investigators. Appellant and Christensen were then arrested.
It is the claim of appellant that the evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of the element of the offense that he had possession of the marijuana. It is his position that Christensen, rather than appellant, had possession since he was the owner of the marijuana, it was in Christensen's automobile, and there is no proof that appellant ever touched the marijuana.
Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal at the end of the State's evidence in its case in chief, and renewed the motion at the close of all the evidence, pursuant to Rule 30(a), W.R.Cr.P.:
The motion was overruled by the trial judge on both occasions.
Citing and quoting from Leppek v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1981), we very recently, in Weathers v. State, Wyo., 652 P.2d 970 (1982), again set out the standard used by this court in examining the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal:
As there noted, in making such a review, it must be done in the light of the applicable law, with respect to the essential elements of the crime. As the jury was instructed by the trial judge, the essential elements of the crime charged are: (1) The crime occurred within the county of Laramie on or about the date of January 11, 1982; (2) Wendell Howard Wise unlawfully possessed (3) with intent to deliver (4) marijuana, a controlled substance. Section 35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S.1977, supra fn. 1. The only element in dispute is element number 2, possession. There is no controversy here as to whether or not an offense was committed; the issue is appellant's guilt or innocence to be settled on whether or not he had possession. That he had the intent to deliver is beyond question.
The trial judge, over the objection of appellant, instructed the jury that:
Possession has a variety of meanings. See, 72 C.J.S., Possession, pp. 233-235 and pocket part. We are concerned with that term's application to the criminal law and, in particular, possession of controlled substances even though it appears from our research that there is no variation in its application through the range of crimes in which it is an element. This court has not previously discussed the subject to any considerable extent, so we will take this occasion to explore the subject more thoroughly. 2 It is clear that mere presence in a vehicle belonging to another where contraband is discovered does not amount to possession of a controlled substance. Rodarte v. City of Riverton, Wyo., 552 P.2d 1245 (1976).
The history of the law of possession as to drug violations reveals that it had its principal origin in liquor possession cases. Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306 (9th Cir.1960). It was said in Bennett v. State, 160 Tex.Crim.App. 354, 271 S.W.2d 284 (1954) that possession of whiskey and beer for sale in a dry area means to exercise control over; that possession need not be exclusive, and ownership is not essential to possession. This principle is also applied to the crime of receiving stolen goods in that receiving envisages possession, State v. Kimbrough, 109 N.J.Super. 57, 262 A.2d 232 (1970), as well as possession of papers pertaining to a numbers game, the court saying there must be an intent to possess the forbidden papers and the possession must not be by accident or the design of another without the knowledge of the accused, State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951).
In a no-nonsense opinion involving possession of obscene motion picture films, it was held that it is not essential for the State to show that the defendant had manual or physical possession of the films. It was sufficient if they were in the actual possession of the person over whom the defendant had control so that they would be forthcoming if he ordered them. The word possession denotes a group of facts, in that instance: (1) defendant asked the friend to bring a movie projector; (2) defendant had charge of the evening's events; (3) defendant took on and assumed the role of master of ceremonies to introduce the show; (4) defendant knew the films were obscene; (5) defendant announced the films in vulgar language; and (6) the films were then...
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