Wisner v. Wisner
| Decision Date | 19 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,CA-CIV,1 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of Mary Jane WISNER, Appellant, v. Harry Kern WISNER, Appellee. 4105. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This appeal by the wife from a decree of dissolution questions the disposition of certain property and the amounts awarded by the court for spousal maintenance and child support.
The parties, Harry Kern Wisner (husband) and Mary Jane Wisner (wife) were married in Omaha, Nebraska in February of 1962. At that time, wife was a nurse and husband was completing his final year of medical school. Following eight years of further training by husband in surgery and plastic surgery, the parties moved to Mesa, Arizona in 1970, where husband set up a medical practice in plastic surgery. During their marriage, wife was not formally employed, but rather assumed responsibilities for homemaking and raising of the Wisners' family. The husband filed a petition for dissolution on May 13, 1976. A decree dissolving the marriage was ultimately entered on July 12, 1977.
Wife first urges that the spousal maintenance and child support awards were arbitrary and inadequate. We disagree. A.R.S. §§ 25-319 and 25-320 confer upon the trial court not only the power to grant such awards, but set forth guidelines to be used in determining their propriety and amount. On review, this court will not disturb that determination if there is any reasonable evidence to support it. Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140, 584 P.2d 604 (App.1978); Williams v. Williams, 19 Ariz.App. 544, 509 P.2d 237 (1973). Here, the judgment grants to wife the custody of one of three children and child support was fixed at $250 per month. In addition, the court ordered husband to pay wife $1,500 per month for six months and $1,000 per month for 30 months thereafter, along with an allocation of community property worth approximately $80,000.
In support of her argument that the support awards were insufficient, wife points to evidence that at the time of filing the petition for dissolution, living expenses for both parties were $3,500.00 per month. That figure is, however, deceptive, in that it reflects expenses incurred by the Wisners when they were living together as a family of five in a $130,000 home (subsequently ordered sold as part of the settlement). Wife testified at trial that she expected to be moving into smaller and less expensive quarters; and this, along with the fact that her expenditures now need accommodate only herself and the one child, renders the $3,500.00 figure of little use in resolving the issue. In our opinion there is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court awards of maintenance and child support.
Wife next argues that the court abused its discretion in failing to include in the spousal maintenance award a provision for future modification, citing Lindsay v. Lindsay, 115 Ariz. 322, 565 P.2d 199 (App.1977). This argument is without merit. In Lindsay, the trial court was held to have abused its discretion in awarding a lump sum payment of $400.00 per month for three years with no provision for modification. The wife in that case was 49 years old at the time of trial, with no specialized employment skills. Further, there was testimony that she had been wholly unsuccessful in securing employment, and the property distribution to her amounted to less than $7,000. In contrast, the wife here was 39 at the time of trial, trained as a nurse, and contemplating further schooling. Also, as before noted, she received a property award approximating $80,000. Nor is there any indication in the record that she had been unsuccessful in securing employment. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's failure to include a provision for modification.
Due to their conceptual similarities, the next two issues raised by wife will be considered together. She first posits that the trial court failed to properly classify certain intangible personal property of the parties, and then asserts that even if the property was properly classified, the court erred in its valuation of that property. The items wife refers to are the following: (1) common stock of husband's professional corporation; (2) goodwill of the corporation; (3) retirement plan assets; (4) social security retirement accounts; and (5) medical license, board certificate and value of postgraduate education received by husband while he was married. We consider these items in order.
Wife contends that the trial court incorrectly ruled that husband's stock in his professional corporation was his sole and separate property. We agree. A.R.S. § 25-211 establishes that all property acquired during marriage, except that which is acquired by gift, devise or descent, is the community property of the husband and wife. The stock in question was acquired during marriage and does not fall under any of the exceptions.
Husband, however, argues that the trial court's characterization as separate property was correct by virtue of the provisions of A.R.S. §§ 10-907 and 10-908(6). 1 We think otherwise. These statutes set strict guidelines for the organization and ownership of professional corporations. They are not intended to alter the statutory scheme of A.R.S. § 25-211. See A.R.S. § 10-902(4). The stock therefore should properly be characterized as community property.
The trial court's error in characterization does not, however, require reversal, since only errors which prejudice a party's substantial rights justify reversing a trial court's judgment. In the Matter of the Estate of Tortensen, 125 Ariz. 373, 609 P.2d 1073 (App.1980); Seely v. McEvers, 115 Ariz. 171, 564 P.2d 394 (App.1977). Here, though the court's characterization of the stock as separate property was error, the court went on to find that wife was nevertheless entitled to one-half the value of the stock. We therefore find the error to be harmless and the wife's argument in this regard moot.
In a related argument, wife asserts the trial court erred in its valuation of the fair market value of husband's "interest" in the professional corporation. She claims that the court's figure of $8,050 is not supported by any evidence. The court found:
The assets of the professional corporation entitled to community property recognition consist of cash on hand, equipment and prepaid expenses. The total value of these assets less liabilities is $8,050.00.
Again we agree. A diligent search of the record has failed to produce any supporting evidence for this valuation and husband has not referred us to any. Accordingly, we remand this issue to the trial court for a determination of the basis for the value fixed, or an appropriate division of this asset.
Wife next challenges the court's determination that a professional corporation cannot possess a "goodwill" value. In the alternative, she urges that the judge erred in placing no value on the goodwill of husband's corporation. In support of her first argument, wife refers us to a number of cases which support the proposition that a professional corporation can possess goodwill. 2 We do not reach this question, however, since in our opinion, the trial court made no such finding. The judgment merely determined that there was no goodwill value to be attached to this professional corporation. On this point the judgment read:
10. That the petitioner is a sole practitioner, has no present plans to engage in any other form of practice, and is a specialist who tends to see a patient for only one surgical procedure of short duration rather than treating a patient over an extended period. The life of the professional corporation is directly and literally tied to the life of the petitioner. The Court finds that the goodwill of the petitioner's practice to be of no value. (emphasis added).
In our opinion, the trial court's finding that a professional corporation "is directly and literally tied to the life of the husband" is an incorrect statement of the law and is unsupported by the evidence. A.R.S. § 10-908(3)(a) provides that a professional corporation shall cease to exist upon the death of the last surviving shareholder. Moreover, under A.R.S. § 10-908(6), the shares of a professional corporation are transferable to "persons duly licensed to perform the same category of professional service as that for which the professional corporation was organized..." It is thus conceivable that through transfers of shares, husband could extend the life of the professional corporation indefinitely and well beyond his natural life. Even if such transfers were not to occur, A.R.S. § 10-909(D) provides for transferral of shares of the corporation, upon death of a shareholder, to "persons qualified to own such shares..." Significantly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that husband would not or could not take any of these actions.
Of more importance, we have further determined that the finding that the husband is "a specialist who tends to see a patient for only one surgical procedure of short duration rather than treating a patient over an extended period," while supported by the evidence, is not conclusive that husband's practice possessed no goodwill value. To the contrary, the record is clear that husband's medical practice relied for its success, not on repeat patients, but on repeat referrals of patients from physicians and other medical personnel (his so-called "referral base"). In such a situation, the mere lack of the one element, repeat customers, cannot preclude, ipso facto, the existence of a goodwill value.
Admittedly, "go...
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