Wistrom v. Duluth, Missabe and Iron Range Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. C1-88-2373,C1-88-2373 |
| Citation | 437 N.W.2d 730 |
| Parties | John Charles WISTROM, Appellant, v. DULUTH, MISSABE AND IRON RANGE RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
A person injured while repairing machinery used in loading maritime cargo is engaged in "maritime employment" for purposes of the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1986).
Patrick S. O'Brien, Pratt & Callis, P.C., East Alton, Ill., Gary J. Halom, Ashley, Hannula & Halom, Superior, Wis., for John Charles Wistrom.
D. Edward Fitzgerald, Hanft, Fride, O'Brien, Harries, Swelbar & Burns, Duluth, for Duluth, Missabe and Iron Range Ry. Co.
Heard, considered and decided by RANDALL, P.J., KALITOWSKI and SCHULTZ, * JJ.
Appellant was injured while working at respondent's Two Harbors ore docks and taconite storage facility. The action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1986). Respondent moved for summary judgment, contending appellant's sole remedy was that provided by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, and Wistrom has appealed. 1
Respondent Duluth, Missabe and Iron Range Railway Company (DM & IR) operates a taconite unloading and loading facility at Two Harbors, Minnesota. Railroad cars are brought from the Iron Range to the facility. They are then unloaded at the facility's train unloading station. Pellets are discharged onto a conveyer system which can move the pellets directly to the ore dock for immediate loading into the holds of vessels or to the storage area. Pellets conveyed to the storage area are placed in storage by a mechanical stacker which runs on tracks on an elevated berm. When taconite from the storage area is to be transferred onto a ship, a machine known as a bucket wheel reclaimer is used. The bucket wheel reclaimer loads the taconite either onto traveling hopper cars or onto the conveyer system of the mechanical stacker, which then conveys the taconite directly to the main conveyer system for transport to the docks and ships.
Wistrom was employed by DM & IR as an ore dock electrician at the Two Harbors facility. As an ore dock electrician, Wistrom performed electrical repair work on the ore dock and in the storage facility. Wistrom alleges he was injured while mounting the bucket wheel reclaimer to perform electrical maintenance work on the reclaimer.
Wistrom filed suit against DM & IR, alleging violations of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. DM & IR moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted DM & IR's motion for summary judgment, finding appellant's sole remedy was under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1986).
Was Wistrom engaged in "maritime employment" within the meaning of the LHWCA at the time of his injury?
The LHWCA provides the exclusive remedy for a harbor worker injured in the course of his employment. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a). Coverage under the LHWCA is extended to any person
engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker, including a ship repairman, ship-builder and ship-breaker.
Id. § 902(3). The personal injury damages for which recovery is provided is limited:
[C]ompensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling or building a vessel).
Id. § 903(a). An employer is defined:
[A]n employer, any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel).
Id. § 902(4).
Prior to 1972, coverage under the LHWCA was determined solely by whether or not the situs of the injury was upon navigable waters of the United States. The 1972 amendments were an attempt to insure full-time LHWCA coverage for workers who were engaged in land-to-ship, ship-to-land, or ship-to-ship movement of cargo, regardless of whether or not all duties were performed on navigable waters. P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 100 S.Ct. 328, 62 L.Ed.2d 225 (1979).
Under the 1972 amendments, there is a dual test, consisting of the traditional situs standard and a new employee status standard, for determining whether a worker is covered under the Act. Id. at 73, 100 S.Ct. at 332. The parties agree that the situs standard has been met in this case. Therefore, the issue is whether the status standard is met.
The status test defines an employee as "any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker, including a ship repairman, ship-builder, and ship-breaker." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3). The term "maritime employment" embodies an occupational rather than a geographic concept. P.C. Pfeiffer Co., 444 U.S. at 79, 100 S.Ct. at 335. In determining whether a person is engaged in maritime employment, "the crucial factor is the nature of the activity to which a worker may be assigned." Id. at 82, 100 S.Ct. at 337 (emphasis added).
In determining whether someone is engaged in "maritime employment" as that term is used in the LHWCA, it is important to keep in mind the reasons behind the 1972 amendments to the Act. One reason for the expansion of coverage embodied in the 1972 amendments was a recognition that modern cargo-handling techniques had moved much of the...
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