Withrow v. Smithson

• Decision Date: 25 March 1893
• Citation: 37 W.Va. 757,17 S.E. 316
• Parties: WITHROW. v. SMITHSON et al.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

17 S.E. 316

37 W.Va. 757

WITHROW.

v.SMITHSON et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

March 25, 1893.

Judgment against Insane Person —Validity— Lien—Writ of Error—Relief in Equity.

1. A judgment against a person insane at its rendition is not for that cause void, and is a lien on land.

2. A writ of error coram nobis, or a motion in lieu of it, is not a proper process to reverse such judgment, because of the defendant's insanity, as the judgment can only be affected in equity, which has jurisdiction in such case.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from circuit court, Summers county.

Suit by Helen M. Withrow against John A. Smithson and others to enforce a judgment lien against land of defendant Smith-son. There was a decree in favor of plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

J.W.Davis, for appellants.

W. W. Adams, for appellee.

BRANNON, J. This was a suit in equity by Helen M, Withrow against John A Smithson and others for the purpose of enforcing against land of said Smithson the lien of a judgment. The defense was that the Judgment was for slander uttered by the wife of Smithson, and that he was insane when the trial took place, and when the judgment was rendered. The answer prayed, as a cross bill, that the judgment be annulled because of such insanity, The case resulted in a decree holding the judgment valid, and enforcing it as a lien, and Smith-son appeals.

A judgment against one insane at the time It is rendered is not void, and cannot be collaterally attacked, and, not being void, Is a lien on land. Freem. Judgm. § 152; 1 Black, Judgm. § 205; Vanfleet, Collat. Attack, § 616; Watt v. Brookover, 35 W. Va. 323, 13 S. E. Rep. 1007, and citations; 11 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 127; 12 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 90, note 4; Busw. Insan. § 124; authorities cited in opinion and syllabus in Sternbergh v. Schoolcraft, 2 Barb. 153; Allison v. Taylor, 32 Amer. Dec. 68; Wood v. Bayard, 63 Pa. St. 320; Foster v. Jones, 23 Ga. 168.

The point is made that the application to equity is mistaken, and that It should have been to the court of law which pronounced the judgment, by either writ of error coram nobis at common law, or by motion under section 1, c. 134, Code. There was In no manner a suggestion of Smithson's insanity in the record of the judgment. A writ of error, in appellate courts, corrects errors of law apparent in the record; but if, at the date of the Judgment, there exist a fact which, had it been introduced into the record, ought to have prevented the judgment but it was not introduced, it is a case of error in fact, to be corrected by writ of error coram nobis, or by such motion. Thus, h the defendant be dead, and his death be pleaded in the action, but the court disregard it, and render judgment, that is error of law, because the court, having the fact before it in the record has rendered a Judgment contrary to law, as the record showed the defendant to be dead, and a writ of error In an appellate court would correct it; but where the death Is not presented, and judgment is rendered, that is error in fact, to be corrected by writ of error coram nobis or motion. Jaques v. Cesar. 2 Saund. (Williams' Notes) 101a; 2 Tidd. Pr. 1191; 2 Tuck. Comm. 328; 4 Minor, Inst. 947; note to Holford v. Alexander, 46 Amer. Dec. 257. Death, infancy, and coverture are conceded grounds of error in fact, as a basis for writ of error coram nobis; and I would consider Insanity of like nature, and ground for that writ, and not for equity jurisdiction, were it a cause at law for reversal of a judgment. But 1 do not think that insanity of the defendant at the date of the judgment is a reason for the reversal of the judgment by proceedings at law. Some authorities look thatway. It is stated In 1 Freem. Judgm. § 94, that insanity is a matter to affect judgment by writ of error coram nobis. But no case cited supports this, and section 152 is pointedly to the contrary. Likewise, Allison v. Taylor, 32 Amer. Dec. 68. In Leach v. Marsh, 47 Me. 548, the court said of insanity of defendant: "This is an error not appearing on the face of the record. It is an error of fact, if error it is." And the judgment was reversed. In Daggett v. Chase, 29 Me. 361, the opinion states it, as law, that it is a subject of writ of error coram nobis. Mr. Black, in volume 1, § 205, of his work on Judgments, maintains that, though a judgment against a lunatic is not void, yet it is reversible in the same court which rendered it; and In Lamprey v. Nudd, 9 Fost. (N. H.) 299, it is held that insanity is good cause for reversing such judgment. There it is admitted that such is not the law under English decisions. Mr. Buswell's examination brings him to the conclusion that it can only be affected in equity. Busw. Insan. § 140. In section 152 of 1 Freem. Judgm., it is stated as law that, "while an occasional difference of opinion manifests itself as to the propriety or possibility of binding femes covert and infants by judicial proceedings in which they were not represented by some competent authority, no such difference has been made apparent in relation to a more unfortunate and defenseless class of persons; but, by a concurrence of judicial authority, lunatics are held to be within the Jurisdiction of the courts. Judgments against them, it is said, are neither void nor voidable. They cannot be reversed for error on account of defendant's lunacy; the proper remedy in favor of a lunatic being to apply to chancery to restrain proceedings, and compel the plaintiff to go there for justice." The current of authorities sustain this statement of the law. A lunatic is within the jurisdiction of the court, and may be sued, as others. The court may appoint a guardian ad litem to defend him, if his lunacy is discovered; but, if the case goes on without such guardian, the judgment is not void or reversible. As the authorities clearly show a lunatic to be subject to actions, it is reasonable to say that the same forum would not reverse the judgment because of lunacy. See 3 Rob. Pr. (New,) 240; opinion in Boiling v. Turner, 6 Rand. (Va.) 586; Beverley's Case, 4 Coke, 123b; Mansfield's Case, 12 Coke, 123; Bac. Abr. tit. "Idiots and Lunatics, " F; Stigers v. Brent, 50 Md. 214; Wood v. Bayard, 63 Pa. St. 320; note to Allison v. Taylor, 32 Amer. Dec. 70; Johnson v. Pomeroy, 31...