Witt v. Ellis
Decision Date | 30 September 1865 |
Citation | 42 Tenn. 38 |
Parties | J. C. WITT v. GUY ELLIS et als. |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
FROM JEFFERSON.
This cause was heard by Chancellor SETH J. W. LUCKEY, at the June term 1861. There was a decree and appeal.
J. P. SWAN, for complainant.
R. M. BARTON, for respondent.
The questions presented in this record arise on the pleadings. The complainant, Witt, filed his bill in the chancery court at Dandridge, in August, 1859, and before answer or plea was filed, the parties, in September following, submitted the matters in controversy to arbitration. A submission bond was regularly executed, but without containing any provision that the award should be made the basis of the chancellor's decree. The arbitrators met, and in conformity to the stipulations of the bond, made their award, which was afterwards, December, 1859, returned into court, and made the decree of the court, and the bill dismissed. But on the special affidavit of the complainant, leave was given him to file an amended and supplemental bill, which, on demurrer, was also dismissed, and the decree confirmed the award, which had been suspended, revived and affirmed. From which the complainant appealed in error to this court. The cause was remanded, with leave to the defendants to plead, answer, or demur. On the 9th of January, 1861, defendants filed their plea, setting up the award of the arbitrators as a discontinuance or voluntary withdrawal of the cause from the court. On the same day, they filed an answer, in support of the plea. To the plea and answer, the complainant demurred, and set down, among other things not material to notice, as causes of demurrer,
1st. That the plea of the defendant was overruled by the answer.
2d. That it stands as, and is, in fact, a plea in abatement; and as such, comes too late.
The chancellor disallowed the demurrer and dismissed the bill, and there is an appeal to this court.
The plea in abatement, as it is called, is not technically so. Judge Story, in his Commentaries on Equity Pleading, sec. 354, says:
This is a plea more properly in the nature of a plea in bar, and goes to the life of the bill. If sustained in every particular, it is a complete bar to the suit, and no answer is required to aid it. The answer covers the same ground that is covered by the plea, and is substantially in the same language. They cannot both stand together. The plea must give away, because it...
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Usrey v. Lewis
...the plea or "setting down the plea for argument." See Gibson's Suits in Chancery, Fifth Edition, Vol. 1, § 359, pp. 414, 415; Witt v. Ellis, 42 Tenn. 38 (1865); Klepper v. Powell, 53 Tenn. 503 It therefore behooves this Court to respond to the motion of plaintiffs by examining the sufficien......
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State ex rel. Meloy v. Barger
...99 A.L.R. 244; Klamath Lumber Co. v. Bamber, 74 Or. 287, 142 P. 359, 145 P. 650; Goldstein v. Loeb, 21 Misc. 72, 46 N.Y.S. 838; Witt v. Ellis, 42 Tenn. 38; Kelly v. Rochelle, Tex.Civ.App., 93 S.W. 164; v. Webb, D.C., 227 F. 481; In re Thomasson, Mo.Sup., 159 S.W.2d 626. Applying these defin......
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Carver v. State
...or destruction of the suit, so that it is quashed and ended. At common law, a suit, when abated, is absolutely dead. Witt v. Ellis et al., 42 Tenn. 38, 40-41. Although neither of the aforesaid cases held specifically that the suit was abated ab initio, we believe this is the only common sen......
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Southern Foundry Supply, Inc. v. Spang & Co.
...between the two pleadings by treating a demurrer filed in chancery as motion to set for argument, or by acting on it. Witt v. Ellis, 42 Tenn. 38, 40 (1865); Klepper v. Powell, 53 Tenn. 503, 506 (1871). The point of the original opinion was that the record was insufficient simply because it ......