Witty v. Springfield Traction Co.
| Decision Date | 06 February 1911 |
| Citation | 134 S.W. 82,153 Mo.App. 429 |
| Parties | MAUD E. WITTY, Respondent, v. SPRINGFIELD TRACTION COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Greene Circuit Court.--Hon. James T. Neville, Judge.
Judgment affirmed.
Delaney & Delaney for appellant.
Leonard Walker and Frank B. Williams for respondent.
(1) When the judgment is manifestly for the right party it will not be reversed. R. S. 1899, sec. 865; R. S. 1909, sec. 2082; Orth v. Dorschlein, 32 Mo. 366; Hunter v Miller, 36 Mo. 143; Miller v. Newman, 41 Mo 509; Nelson v. Foster, 66 Mo. 381; Fairbanks v Long, 91 Mo. 628; Fitzgerald v. Barker, 96 Mo. 661; Bushey v. Glen, 107 Mo. 331; Henry v. Railway Co., 113 Mo. 525; Burns v. Liberty, 131 Mo. 372. (2) If there is conflicting evidence in an action at law and the issues are correctly submitted, the verdict ends the controversy. Gove v. Kansas City, 75 Mo. 672; Price v. Chamberlain, 82 Mo. 618; State v. Hart, 89 Mo. 590; Eswin v. Railway, 96 Mo. 290; Donovan v. Ryan, 35 Mo.App. 160; Williams v. Railway, 109 Mo. 470; Burnstein v. Railway, 56 Mo.App. 45; Funnell v. Gooch, 59 Mo.App. 309. (3) A judgment at law will not be reversed unless the record shows that the trial court was called upon to decide some question of law and that its decision thereon is wrong. VonPul v. St. Louis, 9 Mo. 49; Vaughn v. Bank, 9 Mo. 379; Clark v. Stevens, 10 Mo. 510; Clamorgan v. Railway, 3 Mo.App. 574. (4) The hypothetical question propounded to the witness, Dr. Ruyle, was properly framed and was based on facts within the confines of the evidence. Riley v. Sparks, 52 Mo.App. 572; Benjamin v. Railway, 50 Mo.App. 602; Holloway v. Kansas City, 184 Mo. 19. (5) It was competent to show that appellant's witness had, from the beginning of his professional career, been employed or connected with concerns whether corporations or not, having many personal injuries cases. Czezwzka v. Railway, 121 Mo. 201; State v. Prewitt, 144 Mo. 92.
Action for damages for an injury resulting to plaintiff from a collision of defendant's street car with an iron electric tower in the center of the square in the city of Springfield. As a result of this collision plaintiff alleges that she was thrown from her seat and was seriously injured, having received a serious blow in the back, another in the region of the abdomen, another in the region of the lower end of the spine, as a result of which she had become impaired in health, her nervous system was shocked, and she had become an invalid and would remain so during her life. Trial by jury and verdict for plaintiff for fifteen hundred dollars, and defendant has appealed.
This is a companion case to the case of Wolven v. Springfield Traction Co., 143 Mo.App. 643, 128 S.W. 512, and after the trial of the Wolven case the attorneys in this case filed a stipulation that this case should abide the decision in the Wolven case which had been appealed and if the judgment in that case should be affirmed, then the only question that should be tried in this case would be the question of damages. The Wolven case was affirmed, and thereafter this case was called for trial, and at the trial this stipulation and also the mandate of the Court of Appeals showing the affirmance of the judgment in the Wolven case were offered in evidence over defendant's objection, and this is now assigned as error. It is contended that the reading of this stipulation and the mandate to the jury were prejudicial to defendant. We are unable to see how this could be so for defendant had already agreed that if the Wolven case was affirmed it would concede its liability in this case, and would try only the question of damages. Neither the stipulation nor the mandate read to the jury showed the amount of the judgment in the Wolven case, and it could not, therefore, prejudice the jury against the defendant on the question of the amount of damages which it should be required to pay the plaintiff in this case.
Dr Ruyle had testified on behalf of plaintiff, and was asked the following question: "Doctor, a person thrown out of a seat in a street car with some force and violence, alighting on the lower end of the spine and striking that, or the buttocks against the floor of the car--A woman, a female person--what would be the effect upon a person so thrown out of the seat?" Objection was made to this question upon the ground that it assumes and places witness in both the roles of physician in waiting and expert at the same time, and because the question is not based upon the facts proved, the basis is not sufficiently broad upon which to predicate an opinion. There is nothing in this question to show that to answer it the physician would be required to base this answer upon information secured while attending the patient and to commingle that with his judgment as an expert. Neither is the objection that it was not based upon the facts proven well taken for the plaintiff had previously testified that she had been thrown from the seat as indicated by the question. The latter part of the objection that the basis is not sufficiently broad upon which to predicate an opinion is not well taken. The plaintiff had described the manner of her fall, and had also stated that she had been in good health prior to the time of the injury; that she had suffered constantly since the injury and had been unable to defecate properly, being compelled to remove the fecal matter mechanically, and in answering the question, the doctor had stated that if the blows were severe they might produce concussion of the brain, a shake-up of the nervous system, possible paralysis of the lower parts, and might cause paralysis of the rectum and paralyze the sphincter muscle so as to destroy the power to expel the fecal matter. We see no objection to the question or its answer. A physician may testify as to the probable results of a described injury, or may detail the causes which might produce certain...
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