Woi v. State
| Decision Date | 27 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | A17-1779 |
| Parties | Abraham Deng Woi, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Affirmed
Olmsted County District Court
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean M. McGuire, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Assistant County Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges the postconviction court's denial of relief from his conviction for domestic assault, arguing that the district court committed structural error when it dissuaded him from a court trial and the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments by misstating the burden of proof and asking the jury to find appellant guilty to protect appellant's nonvictim children from future harm. We affirm.
Appellant Abraham Deng Woi was charged with domestic assault by strangulation, interference with a 911 call, and domestic assault (fear) after his wife, A.K., called police to report an assault and told the responding officer that appellant struck her on her face and body and strangled her when she called 911. The case proceeded to trial. Before the jury was brought to the courtroom on the first day of trial, appellant indicated his intent to waive a jury trial. The district court expressed frustration that appellant had waited until after a prospective jury had appeared, but indicated it was appellant's right to do so. The district court then stated, "Frankly, I don't particularly think it's a great decision to ever waive a jury trial but it's his right, he's consulted with [counsel] and that's what he wants to do . . . ."
Appellant's attorney questioned appellant about his waiver of his right to a jury trial. The district court then inquired further. The district court asked appellant if he understood that (1) by waiving a jury trial, the state would only need to convince one person of guilt, rather than 12; (2) the district court "may have reviewed things in the case that a jury would never see," such as statements made after the assault; (3) the district court's exposure to evidence that he ruled inadmissible, while not being used in a determination of guilt, "could certainly affect . . . [the district court's] thinking unconsciously or unintentionally"; (4) a jury, on the other hand, would not be exposed to evidence the district court ruled inadmissible; (5) a waiver would result in the district court making a decisionas to guilt and admissibility of evidence; and (6) although the district court would "separate those roles . . . to the best of [its] ability," it is "not the same as having the . . . admissible evidence only heard by a jury." After appellant confirmed his request to waive a jury trial, defense counsel requested additional time to "go over the finer points" of the district court's questioning. After conferring with defense counsel, appellant decided to exercise his right to a jury trial.
At trial, A.K. testified that she called the police because she was arguing with appellant and wanted him to leave. She testified that appellant did not hit her, and she did not recall telling police that he struck or strangled her. She testified that appellant did not place his hands around her neck or remove the phone from her hands when she called 911. She testified that blood on her chest was from biting her own lips. She denied telling the police that appellant had assaulted her every year and that she had not previously reported it because of their children.
The officer who responded to the 911 call indicated that dispatch received a call of an adult female being struck by a male, and the phone disconnected during the call. When he approached the apartment door, he could hear screaming, yelling, sounds of a scuffle, and a hysterical female. When the officer reached to open the door, the deadbolt turned and the door cracked open. The officer pushed the door open and observed an "extremely upset" female facing him with teeth stained red with blood and with red drool on her face. He observed appellant holding the woman by the shoulder and neck. The officer observed children in the room.
After being separated from appellant, A.K. demonstrated to the officer "the universal choking position" when asked by the officer to describe how appellant assaulted her. The officer testified that A.K. told him that appellant punched her in the face and all over her body. The officer photographed blood on A.K.'s chest and the floor.
Appellant testified in his defense that his wife was yelling at him about money, so he attempted to leave the house. He testified that when he tried to leave, she grabbed his shirt to hold him back and then called 911. Appellant denied choking or hitting A.K. that day or in the past.
During the prosecutor's rebuttal summation, the prosecutor discussed his theme of the case: courage. He argued:
After the jury began to deliberate, defense counsel objected to the state's characterization of the burden of proof in summation as "saying this case comes down to what version do you believe." The district court overruled the objection.
The jury acquitted appellant of domestic assault by strangulation and interference with a 911 call, but found him guilty of domestic assault. The district court convicted appellant of the domestic-assault charge and stayed imposition of sentence.
In April 2017, appellant petitioned for postconviction relief. He argued that the district court committed structural error by indicating that a court trial may be tainted by inadmissible evidence. Appellant also argued that the district court erred in admitting hearsay and that the prosecutor committed misconduct during trial and his closing argument. The postconviction court summarily denied relief on all claims except one claim of prosecutorial misconduct concerning whether the prosecutor erred in arguing that A.K. no longer had courage for her children and that the torch (of courage) was passed to the jury. After a hearing on that issue, the postconviction court denied relief, concluding that the children could be considered victims in the case because it can be "reasonably infer[ed]that children are harmed by or suffer" from crimes committed in the home against their mother. Any error, the postconviction court indicated, was not plain because whether the argument was proper was "reasonably debatable."
This appeal followed.
We review a denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015). We review the postconviction court's legal conclusions de novo, "but on factual issues our review is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court's findings." Id. (quotation omitted). "A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Appellant claims the postconviction court erred in denying relief because the district court committed structural error when it interfered with his choice to waive a jury trial by indicating it might not be impartial in a court trial.
Structural errors are "defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by harmless-error standards" because "[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously affected." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991) (quotation omitted). Such errors "affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself" and "call[] into question the reliability and fairness of the trial." I...
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