Wojcik v. State, 30461

• Citation: 204 N.E.2d 866,246 Ind. 257
• Decision Date: 10 March 1965
• Docket Number: No. 30461,30461
• Parties: Stanley Anthony WOJCIK, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Page 866

204 N.E.2d 866

246 Ind. 257

Stanley Anthony WOJCIK, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 30461.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 10, 1965.

Donald M. Mosiman, Indianapolis, for appellant.

John Dillon, Atty. Gen., David S. Wedding, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

MYERS, Judge.

Appellant was charged by affidavit with the crime of entering to commit a felony. He was tried and convicted by a jury of the crime charged and was sentenced to not less than one year nor more than ten years in the Indiana State Prison, pursuant to the Acts of 1941, Ch. 148, Sec. 5, p. 447, as found in Burns' Ind.Stat., Sec. 10-704, 1956 Replacement.

The only error assigned by appellant is the overruling of his motion for new trial in which he states three causes for a new trial: (1) That the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence; (2) that the verdict of the jury is contrary to law; and (3) that it was error for the court to overrule appellant's motion for discharge at the end of all the evidence on the ground that the State had failed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

In regard to the first specification of error, it should be noted that on appeal this court will consider only that evidence which is most favorable to the State. Tait v. State (1963), Ind., 188 N.E.2d 537. Also, it is well established that a judgment will not be reversed for insufficiency of evidence unless there is a total lack of evidence of probative value to support an essential element of the offense. Pendleton v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 341, 156 N.E.2d 782.

The evidence most favorable to the State is as follows: In Indianapolis, Indiana, on October 21, 1962, at approximately 11:40 p. m., several police officers, in response to a radio alarm, went to investigate the premises of the Tabernacle Presbyterian Church. When Officer Bennett arrived at the scene, he saw appellant coming out of a window of the church at which time the officer arrested the man. Outside the window beside appellant, the officer found a claw hammer which later was identified as the property of the church. When asked about his activities, appellant told Officer Glesing that he had entered the church through a window. A further investigation revealed that a door had been forced open into one of the church offices where filing cabinets were located. A large filing cabinet was found to be damaged, bent and partly pried open. The cabinet in question had been locked and was not bent when it had been last observed earlier in the day. In addition, appellant made a statement to another officer that he had entered the church through an unlocked window to get money with which to purchase some food.

Despite the above evidence, appellant contends that it is insufficient to sustain the verdict. He argues that the oral confession is not competent evidence because, in his opinion, it is not corroborated by independent evidence and that without such a confession, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict.

We cannot agree with either of appellant's contentions. This is so because of several facts brought out by the evidence. First, appellant was seen coming out of the church window; second, there was definite evidence of an attempted break-in of the filing cabinet; and, third, church property, the claw hammer, was found outside the church beside appellant. These facts are some evidence from which the jury could have inferred that a crime of the type charged had been committed. Furthermore, even without the confession, there was sufficient evidence to uphold the jury's verdict since it is settled that the intent to commit the crime charged may be inferred from the voluntary commission of the act. Coffer v. State (1958), 239...