Wolf v. Sulik

• Decision Date: 16 April 1919
• Citation: 93 Conn. 431,106 A. 443
• Parties: WOLF v. SULIK.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

106 A. 443

93 Conn. 431

WOLF v. SULIK.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 16, 1919

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Hartford County; Edwin L. Smith Judge.

Action by Ozias Wolf against Theresa Sulik. Judgment for plaintiff. From a denial of a motion for new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Gager J., dissenting.

Michael G. Luddy, of Thompsonville, for appellant.

Jacob Schwolsky, of Hartford, for appellee.

BEACH J.

The complaint alleges that, while the plaintiff was driving his wagon on the highway, it was injured by defendant's automobile which was then being negligently operated by the defendant's husband on the left-hand side of the road and at a reckless rate of speed.

The injury and the husband's negligent violation of the law of the road are sufficiently established by the evidence, and the claim that the defendant is liable for the injury inflicted by her husband is based on section 1572 of the General Statutes of 1918, as follows:

" If the owner of any horse or other animal, or of any vehicle, shall intrust such animal or vehicle to his agent bailee, servant or employé , to be ridden, led, driven or operated by such agent, bailee, servant or employé upon the public highways, or shall rent or loan the same to an incompetent and inexperienced person to be thus ridden, led, driven or operated, and such agent, bailee, servant or employé , while in the performance of such owner's business within the scope of his authority, or such incompetent or inexperienced person, as a result of such incompetency and inexperience, shall, by neglecting to conform to any provision of sections 1568 or 1569, cause any injury to the person or property of another, such owner shall pay to the party injured his actual damages and costs."

Sections 1568 and 1569 relate to the law of the road and the carrying of lights on vehicles using the highways between sunset and sunrise.

There is no sufficient allegation in the complaint that the husband was an incompetent or inexperienced driver. That possible ground of recovery may be laid out of the case, and the question is whether or not there was evidence from which the jury might reasonably have found that at the time of the injury the husband was an agent, bailee, servant, or employé in the performance of the defendant's business within the scope of his authority. The only allegation in the complaint on this point is that-

" Said automobile of the defendant was for the use and pleasure of the family, and at the time of the collision aforesaid said automobile was being used for that purpose and with the consent of the defendant."

This allegation eliminates any possible claim that the husband was at the time of the injury driving the car under any special instructions of the defendant, or upon any separate and exclusive business of the defendant, and the plaintiff's case rests on the broader ground that the defendant is liable under the statute because the car was being operated for the purpose for which she maintained it and by a driver authorized to operate it for that purpose-whether the car was maintained for profit or for pleasure.

The evidence in support of the plaintiff's allegation was such that the jury might reasonably have found that the car belonged to the defendant, that she had no operator's license, and that she had given her husband, who was a licensed operator, general authority to take the car at his pleasure whenever he wanted to go anywhere, without obtaining special permission to do so, and that he had been in the habit of doing so. Defendant offered no evidence to show that the husband was not using the car under this general authority at the time of the injury.

Defendant claims that on this evidence the jury were not entitled to find either that the husband was the agent, bailee, servant, or employé of the defendant, or that at the time of the injury he was in the performance of the defendant's business and within the scope of his authority. On the first point the evidence is decisive. The arrangement under which the husband used the car was a bailment.

The other point involves the construction of this statute as applied to bailor and bailee. On its face it appears to make all bailors of animals or vehicles which are ridden, led, driven, or operated on the highways liable for the negligence of their bailees, to the same extent that a master is liable for the negligence of his servant. This is the plain effect of the statute when the bailment is solely for the benefit of the bailor, for then the bailee is on the business of the bailor, and, if acting within his authority, the bailor is liable as if the relation were one of master and servant. On the other hand, the statute evidently does not apply to special bailments for the sole benefit of the bailee-as where a horse and wagon is loaned for the sole benefit of the borrower-because the bailee in such a case is upon his own business, and not upon any business of the bailor. Nor would the statute apply to most special bailments for the mutual benefit of bailor and bailee, for it is ordinarily the business of the bailee, and not of the bailor, to carry out the purposes of such bailments.

The bailment in this case is not a special bailment, but a continuing one. This use by the husband was not an...