Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Fin. Corp.

• Decision Date: 11 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 17256.,17256.
• Citation: 276 Conn. 1,882 A.2d 597
• Parties: Kristine COGAN v. CHASE MANHATTAN AUTO FINANCIAL CORPORATION.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

882 A.2d 597

276 Conn. 1

Kristine COGAN v. CHASE MANHATTAN AUTO FINANCIAL CORPORATION.

No. 17256.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 17, 2005.

Decided October 11, 2005.

William F. Gallagher, Syracuse, NY, with whom, on the brief, were Hugh D. Hughes and Charles B. Angelo, Branford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

James E. O'Donnell, Fairfield, for the appellee (defendant).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

The plaintiff, Kristine Cogan, appeals, following our grant of certification,¹ from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corporation. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that her action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and could not be saved under General Statutes § 52-593,² which permits a new action to be filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations period when a plaintiff has failed to obtain judgment in a prior action for failure to name the "right person" as defendant. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In June, 1999, the plaintiff commenced an action against Shannon L. McKernan and McKernan's stepfather, Richard Plasky, for personal injuries that she allegedly had sustained in an automobile accident on September 12, 1997. The plaintiff alleged that the vehicle in which she was a passenger was struck by a vehicle operated by McKernan as Plasky's "agent, servant and/or employee under the family car doctrine with full authority to drive said vehicle." On February 3, 2000, the plaintiff released McKernan and Plasky from all claims arising from the accident in consideration of $100,000, the upper limit of liability coverage available under Plasky's automobile insurance policy. On February, 14, 2000, the plaintiff withdrew her complaint because the dispute had been "resolved" by a "[d]iscussion of [the] [p]arties on [t]heir [o]wn."

In a letter dated April 19, 2000, Plasky's attorney advised the plaintiff of his recent discovery that Plasky, who never had been asked about ownership of the vehicle prior to the withdrawal of the plaintiff's complaint,³ was not the owner of the vehicle that McKernan was driving at the time of the accident. Rather, Plasky had leased the vehicle from the defendant. The plaintiff thereafter commenced this action against the defendant on December 4, 2000, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 14-154a, which provides in relevant part that the owner of a leased motor vehicle "shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so ... leased ...."⁴

On October 26, 2002, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff's action was barred by General Statutes § 52-584⁵ because it was brought more than two years after the date of the accident. The defendant also claimed that § 52-593 did not save the action because the prior action had not been "terminated as a result of a judgment against the plaintiff for failure to name the correct defendant, but instead the plaintiff voluntarily withdrew the prior claim and collected the full amount of insurance available to the [parties] who she ... [had] sued."

In its memorandum of decision on the motion, the trial court noted the plaintiff's concession that if the complaint could not be saved by § 52-593, her action against the defendant would be time barred by § 52-584. The court then concluded that the prior action against McKernan and Plasky "did not result in a judgment of any sort. Rather, that action was withdrawn on February 14, 2000. Under these circumstances, [the plaintiff] cannot be said to have `failed to obtain judgment' in [the prior action]." The court further explained that the plaintiff's failure to obtain judgment had resulted not from naming the wrong defendant but from her settlement with McKernan and Plasky. The court finally concluded that the plaintiff had named the proper defendant for the legal theory alleged in her complaint. The court thus granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon in favor of the defendant.

On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had not obtained judgment in the original action because she withdrew her complaint in favor of settlement. See Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 83 Conn.App. 843, 847, 851 A.2d 407 (2004). The Appellate Court concluded that voluntary withdrawal "is not equivalent to a judgment." Id., citing Billerback v. Cerminara, 72 Conn.App. 302, 308, 805 A.2d 757 (2002). The Appellate Court also determined that the plaintiff had not named the wrong defendant in the original action because of a reasonable and honest mistake of fact regarding the identity of the responsible party. See Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., supra, at 847, 851 A.2d 407, citing Isidro v. State, 62 Conn.App. 545, 549-50, 771 A.2d 257 (2001). This appeal followed.

The plaintiff claims that the present action is saved by § 52-593 because the withdrawal of her original complaint qualifies as a failure to obtain judgment. She notes that the statute does not expressly require judgment in favor of the defendant but merely requires failure by the plaintiff to obtain judgment in her favor. According to the plaintiff, a judgment need not be rendered in the first action prior to application of the savings statute. She also contends that she was forced to settle and to withdraw the original action because the only available insurance was that afforded under Plasky's policy, and the $100,000 coverage under that policy was the maximum that she could obtain in that action. She therefore asserts that, to the extent that she was unable to recover more than $100,000, which, she claims, was less than the "full value of the case," the original action was unsuccessful on the basis of her failure to name the right defendant. The defendant responds that withdrawal following settlement is not the same as failure to obtain judgment, even if the potential exists for a greater recovery, because the plaintiff's recovery in the first action represents a partially successful judgment. According to the defendant, failure to obtain judgment under § 52-593 means "a complete failure to obtain any recovery by way of judgment or settlement." The defendant also argues that a plaintiff has not failed to name the right defendant when the named defendant "pays money to avoid the risk of litigation, whether judgment enters or not. The existence of some other entity for whom theoretical liability also may attach is immaterial." We agree with the defendant that the plaintiff's claim must fail.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. "Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 548, 848 A.2d 352 (2004). "On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greenwich Hospital v. Gavin, 265 Conn. 511, 519, 829 A.2d 810 (2003). "Our review of the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocco v. Garrison, supra, at 548-49, 848 A.2d 352.

The issue before this court involves a question of statutory interpretation that also requires our plenary review. See, e.g., Parrot v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 273 Conn. 12, 18, 866 A.2d 1273 (2005). "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 18-19, 866 A.2d 1273. When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to "the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lutters, 270 Conn. 198, 205-206, 853 A.2d 434 (2004).

We begin our analysis by examining the language of the statute. General Statutes § 52-593 provides in relevant part: "When a plaintiff in any civil action has failed to obtain judgment by reason of failure to name the right person as defendant therein, the plaintiff may bring a new action and the...