Wolfe v. Au, 9888

• Decision Date: 13 August 1984
• Docket Number: No. 9888,9888
• Citation: 686 P.2d 16,67 Haw. 259
• Parties: In the Matter of Charles WOLFE, Petitioner, v. Honorable Richard Y.C. AU, Judge of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, Respondent, State of Hawaii, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 16

686 P.2d 16

67 Haw. 259

In the Matter of Charles WOLFE, Petitioner, v. Honorable Richard Y.C. AU, Judge of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, Respondent State of Hawaii, Real Party in Interest.

No. 9888.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Aug. 13, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. This court's original jurisdiction includes the issuance of writs of prohibition in appropriate situations. However, the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, the object of which is not to cure a mere legal error or to serve as a substitute for appeal, but to restrain a judge of an inferior court from acting beyond or in excess of his jurisdiction.

2. This court will exercise its discretion and issue a writ of prohibition only when there are special circumstances that render the case a rare and exceptional one in which the extraordinary remedy is appropriate.

3. The Federated States of Micronesia is not an independent nation since the United States still retains and exercises control over its affairs in several significant respects.

4. HRS Chapter 832, the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, must take meaning from and be consistent with the federal statute implementing the Extradition Clause of the United States Constitution.

5. Federal legislation is not automatically applicable to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Congress must manifest an intention to include the Trust Territory within the coverage of a given statute before courts may apply its provisions to the territory.

6. The necessary congressional design to include the Trust Territory within the ambit of the federal-state system of interstate rendition has been found by the Supreme Court.

7. Congress and the legislature of the State of Hawaii could not have intended that the Federated States of Micronesia would be without means to reclaim fugitives from its justice or that it would be an asylum for fugitives from American justice.

8. The Federated States of Micronesia is a "Territory of the United States" for purposes of extraditing criminals pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3182 and HRS Chapter 832, even though it is destined for nationhood rather than statehood.

9. A governor's grant of extradition is prima facie evidence that constitutional and statutory requirements have been met, and a court considering release on habeas corpus can only decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive.

10. A contention that the charges against the petitioner were constituted through improper motives affords no basis for relief against extradition.

11. Allegations of prospective irreparable injury and deprivation of constitutional rights present matters that are improper for a trial court to consider in ruling on an application for a writ of habeas corpus.

Christopher L. Chamness, Honolulu, on the writ for petitioner.

Alvin T. Nagao, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu (with him on answer to petition for writ: Tany S. Hong, Atty. Gen., Michael A. Lilly and John Campbell, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., Charles F. Marsland, Jr., Pros. Atty., and Peter C.K. Fong, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, for State of Hawaii.

Vernon F.L. Char, Honolulu (Michael K. Kawahara, Honolulu, with him on the brief; Damon, Key, Char & Bocken, Honolulu, of counsel), for amicus curiae.

Before LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Purporting to invoke the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 602-5(4), Petitioner Charles Wolfe prayed that a Writ of Prohibition issue to compel the Circuit Court of the First Circuit to effect his release from custody. Finding no basis for the exercise of our extraordinary powers, we summarily denied his petition. We now set forth in detail our reasons for doing so.

I.

The petitioner is a Hawaii resident who has been engaged in business in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). He was arrested in Honolulu on March 29, 1984 and held thereafter at Oahu Community Correctional Center until his extradition to Micronesia. The arrest warrant charged him with violations of sections of the FSM Criminal Code, alleging deception and theft by failure to make a required deposit of funds received from the sale of air travel tickets. The Governor of Hawaii signed a Governor's Warrant authorizing the extradition on April 12, 1984.

Shortly thereafter, Wolfe sought his release from custody by petitioning the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus on grounds that the FSM is a foreign nation without authority to invoke the provisions of HRS Chapter 832, the Hawaii Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. He argued (1) Hawaii had no power to act in a matter governed by article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution ¹ and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184, and 3185 (i.e., federal law governed and federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction), ² (2) the FSM is not a "Territory" of the United States within the meaning of HRS § 832-1, and (3) his detention was patently illegal. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886), and Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 54 S.Ct. 191, 78 L.Ed. 315 (1933), he claimed, were controlling and ruled out action by the State.

On May 10, 1984, the circuit court denied the habeas corpus petition and a Motion for Supervised Release and/or Bail Reduction. It found the FSM is a territory of the United States, not a sovereign country, and HRS Chapter 832 could be employed to extradite a person to Micronesia. The court therefore concluded resort to federal courts was not necessary to effect Wolfe's extradition and the Governor's Warrant was sufficient and valid under the standards established in Murray v. Burns, 48 Haw. 508, 405 P.2d 309 (1965), and Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978).

Wolfe then petitioned us for relief. Although he entitled his pleading a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition, in essence he prayed that this court order the circuit court to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The FSM joined the State in opposing the petition and argued it remained an American territory despite recent events that may have given rise to misapprehensions about the applicability of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act in a situation where the FSM is the demanding territory. ³

II.

Our original jurisdiction permits us to issue writs of prohibition when warranted. HRS § 602-5(4). But as we said in Honolulu Advertiser, Inc. v. Takao, 59 Haw. 237, 241, 580 P.2d 58, 62 (1978):

The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, the object of which is not to cure a mere legal error or to serve as a substitute for appeal, but to restrain a judge of an inferior court from acting beyond or in excess of his jurisdiction.... Only where special circumstances are shown to exist which render the matter a rare and exceptional case will this court, in its discretion, consider deviating from [its] settled rule.

(Emphasis added) (citations omitted). The circumstances that would have warranted an exercise of our extraordinary powers, however, were clearly absent, for the petitioner made no showing that the circuit judge exceeded his jurisdiction in denying the requested relief. And the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act was properly invoked to effect Wolfe's extradition to Micronesia.

A.

Wolfe first argued the FSM, whence the request for his return to face criminal charges originated, was not a proper demanding party, under HRS Chapter 832. He claimed the extradition of a putative law violator to the FSM, an independent country, could not be accomplished under a state law. If we had accepted this thesis, Wolfe could only have been returned for prosecution in Micronesia in accord with a treaty between the United States and the FSM. See notes 1 and 2 supra. In the course of oral argument, however, Wolfe acknowledged the United States and the FSM were not parties to an extradition treaty. Thus, the adoption of his argument would have placed both of them in an anomalous and embarrassing predicament--neither could have sought the return of a law violator from the other. But we found Wolfe's thesis was devoid of merit.

Micronesia is part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) which is administered by the United States pursuant to a United Nations Security Council Trusteeship Agreement. Primary responsibility for governing the TTPI rests with the Secretary of the Interior. See In re Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d 595, 600 (9th Cir.1983); Gale v. Andrus, 643 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C.Cir.1980). Recent developments, however, have engendered confusion about the FSM's political status.

The FSM has ratified a Compact of Free Association that defines its status and powers as an independent polity with close political, military, and economic ties to the United States. ⁴ But the compact has yet to be approved by the United States Senate and the United Nations. It must also be ratified by those bodies before the incipient nation is set free. True, the FSM has advanced rapidly toward this goal of independence; nevertheless, the United States has yet to relinquish control in several significant respects. For one, the Secretary of the Interior may still veto enactments of the FSM legislature, and the federal government still controls all matters regarding trade between the FSM and independent nations. See Department of Interior Secretarial Order 3039 (1979); ⁵ Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association--Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?, 21 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1, 13-14 (1980). See also MacDonnald, note 4 supra, at 235-82. And while the FSM has a constitution modeled on the federal constitution and a Bill of Rights that encompasses the guarantees of due process, equal protection, speedy trial,...