Wolfe v. Bank of Anderson

Decision Date15 March 1923
Docket Number11161.
Citation116 S.E. 451,123 S.C. 208
PartiesWOLFE v. BANK OF ANDERSON.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Cothran J., dissenting.

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Anderson County; G. B Greene, Special Judge.

Controversy without action pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. 1912, §§ 413, 414 (Code Civ. Proc. 1922, §§ 651, 652), by S. M. Wolfe, as administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Lexius P. Henson, deceased, against the Bank of Anderson. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The decree of the judge of the circuit court was as follows:

This is a controversy without action pursuant to provisions of section 413 and 414, Code of Civil Procedure S.C. 1912 which have been re-enacted as sections 651 and 652 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1922, and from the agreed statement of facts upon which the controversy is submitted it appears: That one Lexius P. Henson, a painter by trade has had his residence and domicile in the city of Anderson, county of Anderson, and state of South Carolina, for some 10 or more years up to and inclusive of the date of his death; that the said Lexius P. Henson was a widower, and died in the city of Augusta, county of Richmond, and state of Georgia, on the 21st day of November, 1920, while he was there on a temporary visit, and that soon after his death, to wit, on the 5th day of January, 1921, one Parris R. Pryor (colored), of the city of Augusta, was granted letters of administration on his estate by the ordinary of Richmond county, Ga., said administrator qualifying as such; that the assets of the estate of Lexius P. Henson at the time of his death were as follows: A deposit balance, subject to check, in the National Bank of Waynesboro, Burke county, Ga., of $209; a savings deposit in the Bank of Anderson, county of Anderson, state of South Carolina, which, with interest to February 2, 1921, amounted to $1,768; two small insurance policies aggregating $150, which were in the custody of S. M. Wolfe, attorney, in the city of Anderson, S. C.; also some clothing, household goods, a watch, and some tools of trade, the household goods and tools of trade being situate in the city of Anderson and county of Anderson, S. C.
It appears further that on February 2, 1921, the said Parris R. Pryor, administrator as aforesaid, made draft upon the Bank of Anderson for the sum of $1,768, the amount of the savings deposit, with accrued interest, at said bank, attaching to said draft certified copies of letters of administration granted to the said Pryor by the ordinary of Richmond county, Ga., and that the Bank of Anderson paid said draft. It appears also that on the 30th day of April, 1918, the said Lexius P. Henson made his last will and testament whereby he bequeathed and devised to his former lawyer and friend, S. M. Wolfe, of Anderson, S. C., his entire estate; that on the 18th day of April, 1922, the said last will and testament was admitted to probate in the probate court for Anderson county, S. C., and on the 3d day of May thereafter the said S. M. Wolfe duly qualified as administrator with the will annexed of the estate of the said Lexius P. Henson; that on May 5, 1922, the said S. M. Wolfe, as administrator as aforesaid, made draft upon the Bank of Anderson for the sum of $1,768, the amount of the said savings deposit, including interest, but payment of the draft was refused by the said bank for the reason that the amount of the said savings deposit, including interest, had already been paid by the said bank to Parris R. Pryor, administrator of the estate of the said Lexius P. Henson, in Augusta, Richmond county, Ga.
The agreed statement of facts also shows that no administration, ancillary or otherwise, was had on this estate in Anderson county, S. C., prior to the probate of the will of said Lexius P. Henson, as above stated.
The question of law to be determined by me upon the foregoing agreed statement of facts herein is the liability, if any, on the part of the defendant, Bank of Anderson, to the plaintiff, as administrator with will annexed and beneficiary under the will of Lexius P. Henson, deceased, in Anderson county, state aforesaid, by virtue of its payment and surrender of the deposit to the credit of the account of the said Lexius P. Henson at the time of his death, and upon the date upon which it was drawn in the sum of $1,768 to the said Parris R. Pryor, as administrator, in Richmond county, Ga.

As stated in Ruling Case Law, vol. 11, at page 432: "It is an elementary principle that letters testamentary or of administration have no legal force or effect beyond the territorial limits of the state in which they are granted. Whatever operation is allowed to it beyond the original territory of the grant is a mere matter of comity, which every nation is at liberty to yield or to withhold, according to its own policy and pleasure, with reference to its own institutions and the interests of its own citizens. Yet a title acquired through foreign administration is universally respected by comity of nations. This comity, however, does not extend so far as to permit a foreign representative to take possession of and remove assets beyond the jurisdiction of the state, when such removal may be prejudicial to creditors who are citizens of the state." This principle has been adhered to by the courts of this state, as will be seen by reference to the cases of Dial v. Gary, 14 S.C. 573, 37 Am. Rep. 737, Stoddard v. Aiken, 57 S.C. 134, 35 S.E. 501, and others. However, it has been generally held that a domiciliary representative may accept voluntary payment of debts from debtors residing outside of the jurisdiction in which the grant of letters was made, provided there are no debts due from the estate in the jurisdiction where a foreign debtor of the estate resides; and in many jurisdictions the absence of debts due by the estate does not seem to be a prerequisite to the validity of a voluntary payment to the domiciliary executor or administrator by a nonresident debtor, a voluntary payment being made in this manner being held final and conclusive as against an ancillary administrator subsequently appointed, and a bar to a suit brought by such subsequently appointed ancillary administrator. The reason for this rule is that the duties of a domiciliary administrator are general and unlimited. He is invested with a title to all the property of the deceased for the purpose of collecting the effects of the estate, paying the debts, and making distribution of the residue according to the law of the place.

On the other hand ancillary administration is special and limited, and the duties of an ancillary administrator do not extend beyond the jurisdiction in which he was appointed, and cannot make collections outside of the jurisdiction of his appointment and give full and final acquittance to debtors as can be done by the domiciliary administrator.

In the case of Wilkins v. Ellett, 108 U.S. 256, 2 S.Ct. 641, 27 L.Ed. 718, it was held that a foreign administrator could make collection and give a valid acquittance to a debtor residing in the state of the domicile of the decedent provided there were neither creditors nor next of kin in the state of the domicile of the decedent. The foregoing case was quoted with approval by our Supreme Court in the case of Jones v. Jones, 39 S.C. 256, 17 S.E. 591, the court quoting in italics the following words: "There having been no creditors of the intestate in this last place, nor any persons there entitled as distributees"--and adding thereafter these words: "This is the law in South Carolina. Dial v. Gary, 14 S.C. 582. In the case before the court it does appear that there was a creditor of intestate in North Carolina, and that appellant knew it; for as soon as he collected the money in North Carolina he paid it to a creditor of intestate in that state. There is no evidence that there are no other creditors of intestate in North Carolina, while there is evidence that there are other creditors there; indeed, the 'case' says that a suit is about to be begun against the estate of intestate in North Carolina. Again, it does not appear that there are no persons in that state entitled to the property as distributees." From these cases I conclude that it is the law of this state that a foreign administrator cannot collect assets and give a valid release to debtors residing in this state, the domicile of the decedent, except when there are no creditors of the decedent in this state, and no persons here entitled as distributees or legatees of decedent's estate.

In the case under consideration the grant of letters of administration to Parris R. Pryor in a state foreign to that of the domicile of decedent constituted ancillary administration merely. It does not appear that there are no debts against the estate in this county and state. Administration was granted to plaintiff in Anderson county, S. C., on the 3d day of May, 1922, and, as an administrator has one year from the date of his appointment to ascertain the debts against the estate, it is possible that creditors of said estate, unknown to him now, may appear and prove their claims. Furthermore, the sole beneficiary under the last will and testament of the said Lexius P Henson resides in Anderson county, S.C. It would be unreasonable and unfair to the creditors of this estate, and the record does not show that there are none, and also to the sole beneficiary under that last will and testament of the deceased, to go away from the county and state of the domicile of the decedent and into a foreign jurisdiction to prosecute their claims. As was stated in the case of Dial v. Gary, supra: "It is the duty of every government to protect its own citizens, and especially the rights of creditors, as...

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