Wolfla v. Wash. State Patrol

• Docket Number: 2:22-cv-734
• Decision Date: 22 August 2023
• Parties: CRAIG WOLFLA, a single man, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON STATE PATROL, an agency of the State of Washington, and CALE J. HAYES, a Washington State Patrol Trooper, Badge #809, individually and in his duties as a Washington State Patrol Trooper, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

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CRAIG WOLFLA, a single man, Plaintiff,
v.
WASHINGTON STATE PATROL, an agency of the State of Washington, and CALE J. HAYES, a Washington State Patrol Trooper, Badge #809, individually and in his duties as a Washington State Patrol Trooper, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-734

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

August 22, 2023

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Jamal N. Whitehead, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Craig Wolfla sued Defendants Washington State Patrol and Trooper Cale J. Hayes, alleging damages after his traffic stop and subsequent arrest. Wolfla alleges various claims arising from the incident, including violations of federal civil rights laws, the Washington Constitution, as well as other tortious conduct. Defendants filed this motion to dismiss under Federal Civil Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff's claims are materially deficient and cannot be cured. In his response brief, Wolfla abandons many of his claims, while failing to oppose other arguments raised by Defendants. Having reviewed the parties' briefs and supporting materials filed in support of and opposition to the motion, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion.

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BACKGROUND

The Court takes the following alleged facts from Plaintiff Craig Wolfla's complaint and considers them true for purposes of ruling on the pending motion.

Defendant Washington State Patrol is a law enforcement agency of the state of Washington. Dkt. No. at 1. Defendant Trooper Cale J. Hayes is a State Patrol employee. Id. Wolfla is an individual who resides in Arlington, Washington. Id.

On March 24, 2019, Wolfla was on his way to get fast food in Arlington. Id. at 2-3. Hayes stopped Wolfla, and stated that he pulled Wolfla over because Wolfla “did not use his left turn signal coming out of the AM/PM, was driving slowly and erratically, that his tires were on the turtles when he was using the turning lane,” and he made an illegal lane change. Id. at 3. Wolfla informed Hayes that he had a concealed weapon on him with a valid permit. Id. at 3. Wolfla then explained to Hayes that he had “left McDonalds not AM/PM, had used his turn signal, and had even passed [him] on his prior traffic stop . . . and had intentionally given [him] a wide berth when he had passed.” Id. at 3-4. Hayes repeated his statement that Wolfla did not use his left turn signal. Id. at 4. Wolfla questioned how Hayes could see the left turn signal from where he was located. Id.

Hayes then ordered Wolfla to turn off his car and exit his vehicle. Id. at 4. While he was exiting the vehicle, Wolfla noticed there were other officers present with their guns drawn towards him. Id. Hayes tried to forcibly remove Wolfla's pistol from its holster. Id. at 4-5. Hayes asked Wolfla a series of personal questions and conducted various field sobriety tests. Id. at 5. Hayes “belittle[d] and humiliate[d] [Wolfla] by laughing at [him]” throughout the interaction. Id.

Hayes “twisted [Wolfla's] arm up over his back while yelling ‘stop resisting, stop resisting.”' Id. at 6. Then Hayes arrested Wolfla for driving under the influence and impounded

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his license, permitted concealed weapon, and car. Id. Wolfla's fiancee was left on a street corner. Id. Hayes threatened and intimidated Wolfla into taking a blood test. Id.

Six months after his arrest, Wolfla learned that all his blood tests came back negative. Id. Wolfla was then allowed to retrieve his gun. Id. Wolfla was “deprived of his vehicle and incurred impound fees, and was deprived of his concealed weapon.” Id. The police report also contained inaccuracies about the arrest and events that followed. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard.

The Court will grant a motion to dismiss only if the complaint fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard is less than probability, “but it asks for more than a sheer possibility” that a defendant did something wrong. Id. (citations omitted). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.''” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). In other words, a plaintiff must have pled “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts factual allegations pled in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2021). But courts “do not assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064

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(9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Thus, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Wolfla's claims against the Washington State Patrol and Trooper Hayes in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Defendants argue, and Plaintiff concedes, that the Eleventh Amendment bars this suit in federal court against the State Patrol and Hayes in his official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars suits against states, state agencies, and state officials in their official capacity in federal court. Krainski v. State ex rel. Bd. of Regents, 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010). The Eleventh Amendment prohibits litigants from pursuing both federal and “pendant state law claims against nonconsenting state defendants in federal courts.” Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004).

The Washington State Patrol did not waive, nor has Congress abrogated its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, Hayes does not seek prospective injunctive relief, so the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment does not apply. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). As such, this Court cannot exercise federal jurisdiction over the State Patrol or Hayes in his official capacity. Thus, the Court DISMISSES all claims against the State Patrol and Hayes, acting in his official capacity, without prejudice. Green v. N. Seattle Cmty. Coll., 237 Fed.Appx. 186, 187 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999)) (‘“The Eleventh Amendment is a limit on federal courts' jurisdiction. Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction should be . . . without prejudice so that a...