Wolford v. Farnham
| Decision Date | 10 August 1891 |
| Citation | 47 Minn. 95,49 N.W. 528 |
| Parties | WOLFORD v FARNHAM ET AL. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
(Syllabus by the Court.)
1. Where the person who pays the consideration for real estate conveyed to another is under an existing moral obligation to pay the money to or for the grantee, and he pays the consideration solely with intent to discharge that obligation, no trust in favor of his creditors arises, under Gen. St. 1878, c. 43, § 8.
2. Solvency or insolvency of the person paying the consideration upon a conveyance is a mere item of evidence upon the intent with which the consideration was so paid and the conveyance so taken.
3. Permitting an expert witness to state the summaries or balances from books of account, they, though not put in evidence, being in court so that either party might use them, the objection not being that they had not been put in evidence, is proper.
4. An offer of evidence must be so full that the court can see it will be material.
Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; A. H. YOUNG, Judge.
Action by Peter Wolford against Sumner W. Farnham and another to subject certain property of a wife to the payment of her husband's debts. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
W. A. Lancaster, for appellant.
Jackson & Atwater, for respondents.
This case was here once before, and is reported in 44 Minn. 159,46 N. W. Rep. 295. It was then sent back for a new trial, on the ground that the findings did not negative the fraudulent intent imputed by the statute (Gen. St. 1878, c. 43, § 8) to the transaction when a debtor pays the consideration for a conveyance of real estate to another person. So far as the intent of the debtor, Sumner W. Farnham, who paid the consideration, was concerned, the only finding on the first trial was that there was no evidence that he, or the firm of which he was a member, was insolvent at the time of the conveyance; the court below on that trial seeming to be of the opinion that the onus on the question of intent was on the creditor. We held that in such cases it is on the party endeavoring to sustain the transaction, and that solvency or insolvency is only evidence on the issue of such intent. The fund from which was derived the part of the consideration paid by Sumner W. for the conveyance to Eunice E. was the proceeds of the sale by him of real estate conveyed several years before by her to him upon no other consideration than his verbal agreement that, upon the sale by him of the real estate, the proceeds should be paid to her. This agreement, as we held when the case was here before, was void, as an attempt to create by parol a trust in real estate, and notwithstanding such agreement the real estate, and the proceeds of it when sold, belonged in law to Sumner W. The court below finds that in purchasing the property, (sought to be reached in this action,) and making payment therefor, it was the purpose and intention of Sumner W. and Eunice E. to carry out said verbal agreement; that Sumner W. then believed he was perfectly solvent, and it was not his purpose thereby to defraud or put any of his property out of the reach of his creditors, but his purpose and intention was to carry into effect the verbal agreement above mentioned. We construe this finding to be that the sole intent of Sumner W. in paying the consideration for the land conveyed to Eunice E. was to perform such agreement. It is not assigned as error that this finding was not sustained by the evidence. And the finding fully covers the point upon which the first decision in the case was reversed. It negatives the fraudulent intent. Whatever may have been the legal obligation on the part of Sumner W. in respect to the proceeds of the land conveyed by his wife to him, there was certainly a strong moral obligation on his part to perform the agreement in consideration of which she conveyed to him. Where one pays the consideration for land conveyed to...
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