Wolfson v. American Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-CV-11802-PBS.,00-CV-11802-PBS.
• Parties: Jason WOLFSON, et al, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

170 F.Supp.2d 87

Jason WOLFSON, et al, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al, Defendants.

No. 00-CV-11802-PBS.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

September 28, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James S. Murphy, Brockton, MA, for Plaintiffs.

James W. Matthews, Sherin and Lodgen LLP, Boston, MA, for American Airlines, Inc., Gerald J. Carty, defendants.

Harold L. Lichten, Pyle, Rome, Lichten & Ehrenberg, P.C., Boston, MA, Kathy L. Krieger, James & Hoffman, PC, Washington, DC, for Allied Pilots Ass'n, Richard T. Lavoy, defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SARIS, District Judge.

When the Allied Pilots Association, the exclusive bargaining agent for American Airlines' pilots, failed to halt an illegal "sick-out" in early February, 1999 in violation of a temporary restraining order, plaintiffs were among the members of the public who paid part of the price. Like hundreds of other ticketed passengers, their flight was canceled as a result of the sick-out. They bring suit against American Airlines, the Allied Pilots Association, and its president Richard LaVoy, for tortious interference with contractual relations. Defendants Allied Pilots Association and Richard T. Lavoy have moved to dismiss on a variety of grounds. For the reasons stated below, the Court ALLOWS the motion of defendant Richard T. Lavoy and DENIES the motion of defendant Allied Pilots Association.

I. BACKGROUND

Many of the key facts that gave rise to this case are succinctly summarized in In re Allied Pilots Class Action Litigation, No. CIV.A. 3:99-CV-0480P, 2000 WL 1405235, at *1 (N.D.Tex. Sept.26, 2000), appeal pending, No. 00-11223 (5th Cir. argued Sept. 6, 2001) (a proposed class action asserting state and federal claims on behalf of ticketed passengers whose flights were delayed or canceled as a result of the sick-out).¹ For a more comprehensive history, see American Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n., 53 F.Supp.2d 909, 914-17 (N.D.Tex.1999). A brief synopsis will suffice for the purposes of this Court.

In 1998, a dispute arose over the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between American Airlines and the Allied Pilots Association ("the APA"), the exclusive bargaining agent for the airline's pilots. As a result of the dispute, the APA staged a sick-out from February 6, 1999 through February 9, 1999, resulting in the cancellation of more than 1600 American flights. On February 10, 1999, Judge Kendall of the Northern District of Texas issued a temporary restraining order ("the TRO") prohibiting the union and its officers from "calling, permitting, instigating, authorizing, encouraging, participating in, approving or continuing any interference with American's airline operations, including but not limited to any strike, work stoppage, sick-out, slowdown or other concerted refusals to fly over a minor dispute or otherwise in violation of the [Railway Labor Act], 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988)." American Airlines, 53 F.Supp.2d at 918 (quoting language from the TRO).

The day after the TRO was issued, the number of canceled flights increased. On February 12, 1999, Judge Kendall found that defendants APA and LaVoy (and a third defendant not a party to the case before this Court) acted in concert in violating the TRO. Judge Kendall held all three defendants jointly and severally liable for $45,507,280.00 in "lost revenue, unnecessary costs and expenses" incurred by American as a consequence of the TRO violation. American Airlines, 53 F.Supp.2d at 937.

The plaintiffs filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on September 5, 2000, alleging that they were booked on an American Airlines flight scheduled to travel from Boston's Logan Airport to San Juan, Puerto Rico on February 12, 1999, and that their flight was canceled as a result of the sick-out. This cancellation disrupted their vacation plans and forced them to incur additional expense. Plaintiffs seek money damages for the expenses they incurred after being denied passage on their original flight, plus interests and costs.

On December 1, 2000, defendants APA and Richard T. Lavoy filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that three separate strands of federal preemption doctrine bar the plaintiffs' claims against them (Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 5-21). They also cite two additional grounds for dismissal of the claims against Richard T. Lavoy: his immunity from personal liability for acts performed on the union's behalf; and the absence of personal jurisdiction (Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 21-23).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to dismiss standard

For purposes of this motion, the Court takes as true "the well-pleaded facts as they appear in the complaint, extending [the] plaintiff[s] every reasonable inference in [their] favor." Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 442-43 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990)). A complaint should not be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) unless "`it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim which would entitle [them] to relief.'" Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir.1987) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

B. Federal Preemption

(i) Garmon/Jacksonville Preemption

The defendants offer three distinct arguments based on theories of federal preemption to justify the dismissal of the suit. First, defendants argue that the claim of tortious interference with contract is preempted by the Railway Labor Act ("the RLA") under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959) (finding state tort claims were preempted where union picketing was arguably within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act sections on collective bargaining and unfair labor practices); and Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 385, 89 S.Ct. 1109, 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969) ("State courts may not enjoin a peaceful strike by covered railway employees [under the RLA], no matter how economically harmful the consequences may be."). See also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729, 742, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (holding that court may not award tort damages under state law for non-violent illegal strike). Defendants argue that the Garmon/Jacksonville preemption doctrine bars a state-law remedy for a non-violent work stoppage, such as the sick-out at issue in this case.

While the Garmon/Jacksonville preemption doctrine lends great credence to defendants' position, "the same considerations that underlie the Garmon rule have led the Court to recognize exceptions in appropriate classes of cases." Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S. 290, 296, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977). Garmon itself noted that the court may not "find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act ....[o]r where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44, 79 S.Ct. 773. One such exception is labor disputes involving "violence and threats of violence." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 729, 86 S.Ct. 1130. Other noteworthy examples of non-preempted claims include malicious libel, see Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 54, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966); intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Farmer, 430 U.S. at 302, 97 S.Ct. 1056; and vandalism, see Cranshaw Constr. of New England, L.P. v. Int'l Ass'n of Ironworkers Local 7, 891 F.Supp. 666, 675 (D.Mass.1995).

The question is twofold. First, is conduct undertaken after the issuance of a temporary restraining order a concern sufficiently peripheral to federal labor law that the courts should not infer that Congress intended to deprive the states of the power to act? Second, does the state have a strong local interest in protecting consumers who have entered into contracts for airline transportation? I conclude that the answer to both questions is yes. The common law remedy here of intentional interference with contract is not designed to sanction labor violations, but is a generally applicable tort to protect private expectations arising from binding contracts. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 533, 99 S.Ct. 1328, 59 L.Ed.2d 553 (1979) ("[O]ur cases have consistently recognized that a congressional intent to deprive the States of their power to enforce such general laws is more difficult to infer than an intent to preempt laws directed specifically at concerted activity.") If the purpose of the common law remedy were to deter labor law violations and to reward "fidelity to the law," the remedy would be preempted. See Wisconsin Dep't. of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 287, 106 S.Ct. 1057, 89 L.Ed.2d 223 (1986) (preempting state debarment statute which precludes a firm from competing for state business if it violates the NLRA three times). To be sure, Gibbs noted specifically the danger presented by the anti-labor uses to which the tort of malicious interference with contract could be put, and precluded such private tort remedies for unlawful, peaceful (as opposed to violent) strike activity. 383 U.S. at 732 n. 19, 86 S.Ct. 1130. However, Gibbs did not involve strike conduct that post-dated a federal court determination of unlawfulness.

While the question is close because the sick-out was peaceful, not violent, the Court is persuaded that conduct undertaken in violation of a court order is an exception to the otherwise sweeping scope of Garmon preemption. The state's interest in protecting innocent consumers who have a contract with the airlines...