Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover North Am. LLC

• Decision Date: 17 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-55104,09-55105.,09-55104
• Citation: 617 F.3d 1168
• Parties: Brian J. WOLIN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.Kenneth Gable, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

617 F.3d 1168

Brian J. WOLIN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

Kenneth Gable, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 09-55104, 09-55105.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 11, 2010.

Filed Aug. 17, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James C. Shah (argued), Nathan Zipperian, Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP, Media, PA; James E. Miller, Laurie Rubinow, Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, LLP, Chester, CT, for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Christopher T. Handman (argued), Martin A. Price, Paul A. Werner, Erica M. Knievel, Hogan & Hartson, LLP, Washington, D.C., for the defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. Nos. 8:07-cv-00627-AG-RNB, 8:07-cv-00376-AG-RNB.

Before DOROTHY W. NELSON and RONALD M. GOULD, Circuit Judges, and JAMES S. GWIN, District Judge.^*

OPINION

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

Kenneth Gable and Brian Wolin appeal the district court's denial of their respective motions for class certification. Gable and Wolin each brought a class action lawsuit against Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“Land Rover”) alleging that Land Rover's LR3 vehicles suffer from an alignment geometry defect that causes tires to wear prematurely. We must decide whether the district court erred as a matter of law when it declined to certify a class because Gable and Wolin were unable to prove that a majority of potential class members suffered from the consequences of the alleged alignment defect. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, and we reverse.

I. Background

Kenneth Gable and Brian Wolin each bought a 2005 Land Rover LR3. Gable purchased his vehicle in 2004 in Michigan. Wolin made his purchase in 2006 in Florida. Both vehicles came factory equipped with Goodyear Wrangler tires.

Gable and Wolin both allege that their vehicles are defective. The defect, characterized by the plaintiffs as a geometry defect in the vehicles' alignment, allegedly caused uneven and premature tire wear and gave their vehicles a rough ride. According to Gable and Wolin, LR3 drivers must replace their tires prematurely, in many cases after just 15,000 miles.

The LR3 came with a four-year, 50,000 mile factory warranty (the “Limited Warranty”). This warranty covered “repairs required to correct defects in factory-supplied materials or factory workmanship ... with the exception of tires.” Land Rover also provided a separate warranty (the “Tire Warranty”) covering tire replacement of tires and/or vehicle realignment in the event the tires exhibit “[e]xcessive wear that is inconsistent with normal use” and “caused by a manufacturing defect elsewhere on the vehicle.”

On October 3, 2006, Land Rover issued a Technical Service Bulletin indicating that the tires on certain vehicles may wear prematurely and unevenly due to the vehicles' steering alignment geometry. Land Rover then began to cover the costs of temporarily fixing the defect on a pro rata basis. Land Rover did not offer owners full reimbursement as provided in the warranty. Gable complained to his Land Rover dealer, and the Land Rover service manager covered part of Gable's bill for the replacement of his tires. Wolin complained multiple times and, ultimately, Land Rover's dealer covered part of Wolin's bill for the replacement of his tires.

Gable filed a class action complaint on behalf of all those who purchased or leased 2005 and 2006 Land Rover LR3s in Michigan. Wolin filed a class action complaint on behalf of all those who purchased or leased a 2004, 2005, or 2006 Land Rover LR3 in Florida. The lawsuits were filed pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). According to the appellants, Land Rover knew of the defect and continued to sell the vehicles without disclosing the existence of the defect. Appellants also allege that Land Rover breached its warranties by failing to cover the entire cost of repairing the defect and replacing the tires. Gable asserts claims under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.901 et seq. , as well as for breach of express and implied warranties, and for unjust enrichment. Wolin asserts claims under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq. , and for breach of express warranties and unjust enrichment.

On September 29, 2008, the district court denied each of the appellants' respective motions for class certification. The court concluded that neither could meet his burden of showing that common issues predominate. The court indicated that the number of people in the class who have experienced the alignment defect is an important factor in the Rule 23 analysis, and concluded that neither Gable nor Wolin produced sufficient evidence of the rate of the defect. After first stating that the plaintiffs in Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc. showed that up to 85% of the vehicles were defective, the court held that both Gable and Wolin failed to meet their respective burdens because neither could estimate the percent of prospective class members whose vehicles manifested the defect, let alone show credibly that even a majority of class members' vehicles experienced premature tire wear. 212 F.R.D. 271, 282 (E.D.Pa.2002) vacated on other grounds, 357 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.2004). Gable and Wolin timely filed their appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court's denial of class certification for abuse of discretion. Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir.2001); see also In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir.2008) (“When reviewing a grant of class certification, we accord the district court noticeably more deference than when we review a denial of class certification.”). “Our review is limited to whether the district court correctly selected and applied Rule 23 criteria.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 580 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court, in making a discretionary ruling, relies upon an improper factor, omits consideration of a factor entitled to substantial weight, or mulls the correct mix of factors but makes a clear error of judgment in assaying them.” Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 536 F.3d 975, 977-78 (9th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To the extent that a ruling on a Rule 23 requirement is supported by a finding of fact,” we review that finding for clear error. In re Salomon Analyst, 544 F.3d at 480.

III. Discussion

According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), a plaintiff hoping to certify a class must demonstrate that “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” The parties do not seriously dispute that the proposed class satisfies the numerosity and adequacy requirements. The plaintiff must also meet one of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b). Only one such requirement is at issue in this litigation: “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). We will first address commonality, predominance and typicality under Rule 23(a), followed by superiority under Rule 23(b).

A. Commonality and Predominance

Gable and Wolin assert that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that the proposed class could not show that common issues predominate. We agree.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) provides that “questions of law or fact common to the class” are a prerequisite to class certification. Commonality exists where class members' “situations share a common issue of law or fact, and are sufficiently parallel to insure a vigorous and full presentation of all claims for relief.” Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 917 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1998).

Appellants easily satisfy the commonality requirement. The claims of all prospective class members involve the same alleged defect, covered by the same warranty, and found in vehicles of the same make and model. Appellants' complaints set forth more than one issue that is common to the class, including: 1) whether the LR3's alignment geometry was defective; 2) whether Land Rover was aware of this defect; 3) whether Land Rover concealed the nature of the defect; 4) whether Land Rover's conduct violated the Michigan Consumer Protection Act or the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act; and 5) whether Land Rover was obligated to pay for or repair the alleged defect pursuant to the express or implied terms of its warranties. These common core questions are sufficient to satisfy the commonality test. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019-20.

We next consider whether these common questions predominate. While Rule 23(a)(2) asks whether there are issues common to the class, Rule 23(b)(3) asks whether these common questions predominate. Though there is substantial overlap between the two tests, the 23(b)(3) test is “far more demanding,” see Amchem...