Womack v. Shell Chemical Co.

• Citation: 514 F. Supp. 1062
• Decision Date: 18 May 1981
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 80-06-50H.
• Parties: Joe Neal WOMACK, Plaintiff, v. SHELL CHEMICAL COMPANY, a division of Shell Oil Company, Defendant.
• Court: United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Southern District of Alabama

514 F. Supp. 1062

Joe Neal WOMACK, Plaintiff, v. SHELL CHEMICAL COMPANY, a division of Shell Oil Company, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 80-06-50H.

United States District Court, S. D. Alabama, S. D.

May 18, 1981.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James D. Wilson, Prichard, Ala., for plaintiff.

Willis C. Darby, Jr., Mobile, Ala., for defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HAND, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Shell Chemical Company, a division of Shell Oil Company (Shell). Shell seeks summary judgment on each claim asserted by plaintiff Joe Neal Womack (Womack) on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Shell is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Womack initially brought this action against Shell under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Womack alleged:

Womack was not promoted by Shell because Womack is black and for no other valid reason.

Donna Lowery a white female accountant was promoted over Womack because Womack is black and for no other reason.

(Complaint ¶ 13, ¶ 15).

Womack was in February 1980 denied the training on Shell's Product Cost Information System that had been given to his white predecessor, Donna Lowery.

This training has been denied Womack because he is black and for no other reason.

(Complaint ¶ 18 and ¶ 19).

The rating system used by Shell to grade its professional staff, specifically its accounting staff, is applied to those employees desiring a promotion in such an arbitrary and capricious manner by Shell ... so as to amount to no rating system at all, but merely a device to promote some employees and deny promotion to others not based on actual job performance.

(Complaint ¶ 22 (emphasis supplied).

Shell answered the complaint and asserted defenses under Rule 12(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On December 23, 1980, this court dismissed (a) all claims under the fourteenth amendment for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (b) the promotion claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as barred by the statute of limitations.¹ The court retained for adjudication (a) the promotion claim under Title VII and (b) the Product Cost Information System (PCIS) training claim under both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court has not previously addressed Womack's allegation that the rating system utilized by Shell to grade professional accounting staff is "arbitrary and capricious" and "is applied" as "a device" to deny promotion to "some employees." Although Womack did not allege that the rating system is applied as a device to deny promotion on the basis of race, the court has liberally construed the allegation within the context of Womack's other claims of race discrimination and has fully considered the claim herein.

Shell seeks summary judgment on the following grounds:

(1) This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction² over Womack's Title VII claims (promotion and PCIS) because Womack failed to file a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in connection with the only claimed act of racial discrimination—a poor performance rating given Womack in March 1977;

(2) Womack has failed to adduce facts to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under either Title VII or § 1981 in connection with his failure to achieve promotion, his delay in receiving training on the Product Cost Information System, or the application of Shell's rating system; and,

(3) Regardless whether Womack could establish a prima facie case, Shell has adduced undisputed facts articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the promotion and PCIS decisions and Womack has filed to adduce facts to establish that the proffered reasons are a pretext for racial discrimination.

The court is cognizant that summary judgment is "especially questionable" in employment discrimination cases, because such cases necessarily involve examining motive and intent. Summary judgment should be used cautiously in such cases and all procedural requirements must be given strict adherence. See Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1981); Hayden v. First National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979).³ The Fifth Circuit has particularly cautioned against summary disposition "on a potentially inadequate factual presentation." Hayden v. First National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1979). See also, 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.157 (2d ed. 1980).

In considering the motion for summary judgment, this court may not adjudicate factual issues. This court's duty is to determine whether or not there is an issue of fact to be tried. Shell has the burden of clearly establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against Shell. In reviewing the entire record, this court has viewed the facts together with all underlying inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to Womack. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Hayden v. First National Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1979); Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1981); 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.15 (2d ed. 1976).

Furthermore, in considering a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case such as this, the court must fully heed the admonition of the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977):

Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.

Cognizant of the sensitive nature of Womack's claims, this court has strictly adhered to all the procedural requirements of summary judgment. The court may not, however, ignore the clear dictates of Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No civil action is "immune" from summary adjudication. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.158 at 56-641 (2d ed. 1980); First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289-90, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) (on summary judgment, defendant successfully demonstrated that the facts were not susceptible of the "interpretation" plaintiff advanced). Even in employment discrimination cases, summary judgment will be granted, if appropriate. See e. g., Gatling v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 577 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861, 99 S.Ct. 181, 58 L.Ed.2d 169 (1978); Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 529 F.2d 721, 728 n.13 (5th Cir. 1976) ("the fact that the party opposing summary judgment vigorously disputed the legal conclusions to be drawn from the facts presented by the movant was no bar to the grant of summary judgment"); Anderson v. Viking Pump Div., Houdaille Industries, 545 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1976).

Shell is entitled to summary judgment "if everything in the record ... demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists" and if Shell is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1981). Although Shell must clearly establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, see Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), when confronted with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, Womack "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Fifth Circuit long ago made clear that this court may not avoid its judicial obligation when presented a properly supported motion for summary judgment:

Litigants have no difficulty finding expressions urging courts to have a due regard for a cautious observance of the requirements of a summary judgment or, if they are appellees, they may find expressions that summary judgments are looked upon with favor. Barron & Holtzoff, however, make the pertinent observation: "Cases voicing such sentiments as that courts should be slow to grant summary judgment and that any error should be on the side of caution should be limited to their facts. Rule 56 itself provides that `the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if * * * there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and * * the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1231.

Bruce v. Travelers Insurance Co., 266 F.2d 781, 786-87 (5th Cir. 1959).

The court has fully considered the pleadings, depositions and exhibits on file, the affidavits filed in connection with the motion for summary judgment, and the briefs and oral argument of counsel for the respective parties, including the Womack Response to summary judgment. The court concludes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that based upon the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Shell is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Shell operates a chemical plant in Mobile County, Alabama (Mobile Plant). At all pertinent times, Shell employed more than 15 employees at the Mobile Plant. Womack, a black male, resides in Mobile, Alabama, and has been continuously employed at the Mobile Plant since November 1973 (Womack at 5).

2. Womack alleged that he was not promoted from "Grade 5 Accountant" to "Grade 6 Financial Accountant" because he is black and for no other valid reason (Complaint ¶ 13). On deposition, Womack testified that his claim against Shell "basically comes from the job that...