WOMEN'S MED. CENTER, ETC. v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 21 April 1981
• Docket Number: 80-334.,Civ. A. No. 80-292
• Citation: 512 F. Supp. 316
• Parties: WOMEN'S MEDICAL CENTER OF PROVIDENCE, INC. v. Dennis J. ROBERTS, II, et al. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF RHODE ISLAND, et al. v. Dennis J. ROBERTS, II, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

512 F. Supp. 316

WOMEN'S MEDICAL CENTER OF PROVIDENCE, INC. v. Dennis J. ROBERTS, II, et al.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF RHODE ISLAND, et al. v. Dennis J. ROBERTS, II, et al.

Civ. A. Nos. 80-292, 80-334.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

April 21, 1981.

Deming Sherman, Edwards & Angell, Providence, R. I., Lynette Labinger, Providence, R. I., for plaintiff.

John Foley, Dept. of Atty. Gen., — R. I., Providence, R. I., Joseph Palumbo, Newport, R. I., Mary Ellen McCabe, R. I. Dept. of Health, Providence, R. I., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ This Court's jurisdiction stems from 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), 1343(3), 2201, and 2202. Plaintiffs seek an injunction² preventing the enforcement of Rhode Island General Laws Chapter 23-4.7, entitled "Informed Consent for Abortion", and a declaration that Chapter 23-4.7 violates certain provisions of the United States Constitution.³ Women's Medical Center and Planned Parenthood have sued as entities. They challenge the Rhode Island statute insofar as it infringes on their right to provide abortion services. In addition, these institutional plaintiffs contend that they have jus tertii standing to challenge the statute because it infringes on the constitutional rights of women who seek legal abortions at the facilities. The individual doctors, on behalf of themselves and the class of doctors they represent, have challenged the statute on grounds that it violates their right to provide abortions and on grounds that it violates the rights of women seeking legal abortions. Defendants, in a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, have moved to dismiss plaintiffs Women's Medical Center and Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island (the institutional plaintiffs), from the action. Defendants contend, first, that these particular plaintiffs lack standing to challenge Chapter 23-4.7. Alternatively, defendants assert that even if plaintiffs have established sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy the requisites of Article III of the Constitution, they may not assert jus tertii standing to raise the constitutional rights of their patients — women who seek to obtain legal abortions at their facilities. For the reasons that follow, I must reject defendants' arguments and deny their Motions to Dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Necessity of Reaching the Issue

Initially, I note that authority exists to the effect that if one plaintiff in an action has standing, a court need not reach the issue of the standing of other plaintiffs. See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 682, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2014, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263-64 & n.9, 97 S.Ct. 555, 562 n.9, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62-63 & n.2, 96 S.Ct. 2831, n.2, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189, 93 S.Ct. 739, 746, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973); Westchester Women's Health Organization v. Whalen, 475 F.Supp. 734, 737 (S.D.N.Y.1979). The rationale for this approach is that, where one plaintiff has standing, the merits will necessarily be raised and decided in the litigation. Consequently, "nothing is gained or lost by the presence or absence of" other plaintiffs. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 189, 93 S.Ct. at 746. Hence, when one party with standing presents a justiciable claim, courts will — when it makes no difference to the merits of the case — avoid deciding elusive and difficult questions of standing. This approach serves the general principle that, where possible, a decision on a constitutional question should be avoided. See, e. g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-75, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 1419-23, 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482-83, 80 L.Ed. 688 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

In the case at hand, the challenge to Chapter 23-4.7 was initiated by the institutional plaintiffs, certain named physicians, and the class of doctors these physicians represent. Defendants contest only the standing of the institutional plaintiffs, they have not questioned the standing of plaintiff individual doctors or the class they represent. Indeed, any such challenge would likely be unavailing. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972). Arguably, therefore, under Supreme Court precedent, this Court could avoid deciding the standing issues presented in defendants' motions to dismiss. Superficially, it looks as if "nothing will be gained or lost by the presence or absence of" the institutional plaintiffs in this case. A closer look, however, reveals a good and important reason to reach and decide these issues.

Certainly, for purposes of deciding the constitutionality of the challenged Rhode Island statute, it makes little difference who presents the issues to the Court. However, if plaintiffs prevail in their action, Rhode Island probably will be liable for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.⁴ As a result, the number of parties present and the issues each is allowed to litigate could have a direct and real bearing on the State's ultimate liability in this action. If the institutional plaintiffs lack standing in the sense that they cannot establish injury-in-fact, they will be dismissed from the action and even if the remaining plaintiffs prevail on the merits, the State will not be liable for attorney's fees attributable to the actions by the medical facilities. If the institutional plaintiffs establish standing in their own right but are not allowed to raise jus tertii, the constitutional rights of their patients, the state's potential liability for fees to the facilities will include only those fees attributable to arguments concerning the specific constitutional rights of the institutional plaintiffs. Finally, if the institutional plaintiffs possess standing and if, as a prudential matter, they are permitted to raise and litigate the rights of their women patients, the state could be liable for the fees of all plaintiffs in the action, including fees attributable to arguments advanced in behalf of women not technically parties to the action. As I perceive it, the potential availability of attorney's fees turns the standing question raised by defendants' motions to dismiss into a situation in which a great deal "may be gained or lost depending upon the presence or absence of" multiple plaintiffs. Because of its importance to the State's potential liability for attorney's fees, I will therefore reach and decide the question whether the institutional plaintiffs have standing and, if they do, whether they may assert, jus tertii, the rights of women patients who seek abortions during the first trimester of their pregnancies.

B. Article III Standing

The first issue is whether plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the requisites of Article III of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The touchstone of this threshold determination has become whether a plaintiff can establish "injury in fact". See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1607-08, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73-81, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630-34, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Rhode Island Committee on Energy v. General Services Administration, 561 F.2d 397, 401 (1st Cir. 1977). The First Circuit has recently held that this preliminary inquiry "turns largely on the extent to which it appears that plaintiff is suffering tangible harm traceable to the challenged actions of the defendant — harm which will be lessened if the requested remedy is granted." NAACP Boston Chapter v. Harris, 607 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1979). See Theriault v. Brennan, 641 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1981). Hence, to decide if plaintiffs have met the standards imposed by Article III, I must determine whether plaintiffs have established 1) a distinct and palpable injury, 2) that is fairly traceable to the statutory enactment in question and 3) that the relief requested will redress the injury suffered. See Theriault v. Brennan, at 31.

In their complaints, the institutional plaintiffs have alleged only that enforcement of Chapter 23-4.7 would "unduly burden" the "rights of plaintiff's patients to terminate their pregnancies" and would subject operating physicians to possible criminal penalties for noncompliance. By themselves, these allegations may be insufficient to satisfy the first prong of the test I have enumerated above. However, in response to defendants' motions to dismiss, plaintiffs have submitted affidavits that contain further factual allegations.⁵ Specifically, the plaintiff institutions have alleged that under the terms of the Rhode Island enactment, they could lose their licensing for failure to comply.⁶ Plaintiffs also have alleged that enforcement of various provisions of 23-4.7 will cause them to suffer direct financial losses.⁷ These allegations clearly satisfy the first element of the injury-in-fact test because they establish a "palpable" injury.

Plaintiffs' allegations also satisfy the second and third parts of the standing test. The injuries alleged will flow directly from enforcement of the new enactment. In fact, "but for" Chapter 23-4.7, plaintiffs would not suffer any of the anticipated injuries. See Duke Power Company v. Carolina...