Wong v. City of Stockton, C053601 (Cal. App. 11/5/2007)
| Decision Date | 05 November 2007 |
| Docket Number | C053601 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | WARREN WONG, As Trustee, Etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF STOCKTON et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Appeal from the Super. Ct. No. CV027517.
Plaintiff, Warren Wong, individually and as trustee of the Wong Family Trust (hereafter Wong), appeals from the judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendants, City of Stockton and the Stockton Redevelopment Agency (hereafter the City) to Wong's complaint for inverse condemnation, without leave to amend.
The complaint alleges that Wong owns two parcels of property, one had a building on it, the other one had a paved parking lot. As part of defendants' plan to redevelop the downtown area of the city, defendants began condemning certain properties but discovered that process was too costly. In an effort to reduce their costs, defendants began demolishing the improvements on the targeted properties after issuing building code violations and recording Notices to Abate, which alleged that the code violations rendered the structures unsafe. In furtherance of that scheme, the City demolished Wong's building and parking lot.
Wong filed this action in inverse condemnation to recover damages for the building and pavement removed from the parking lot. The City demurred to the complaint on two grounds, failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to file within the three-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338.)1 At the City's request, the trial court took judicial notice of an amended petition for writ of administrative mandate (§ 1094.5) (hereafter petition for writ of mandate) filed by Wong prior to filing the instant action. The trial court sustained the demurrer on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
We shall conclude that because the complaint alleges a physical taking within the meaning of the takings clause of the United States Constitution, the claim of inverse condemnation is not subject to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and that Wong's failure to allege that he exhausted his administrative and/or judicial remedies does not defeat his complaint on that claim.2
In the absence of emergency circumstances justifying summary demolition, the government may demolish a building only after it has given the property owner a due process hearing to determine whether the property constitutes a public nuisance and whether "`in fairness and in justice there is no other way reasonably to correct the nuisance.'" (Leppo v. City of Petaluma (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 711, 718, 719 (Leppo).)
We shall also conclude that the City's alternative claim of the preclusive effect of the City's administrative determination that his property constituted a nuisance for failure to obtain a judicial resolution of its merits fails because, (a) no notice was taken of any administrative record or hearing officer's decision and it cannot be determined what issues, if any, were entitled to preclusive effect, and (b) no notice was taken that Wong's action to review the City's administrative determination was completed prior to the demolition of Wong's property.
Lastly, we shall conclude that Wong's complaint was within the five year statute governing the applicable statute of limitations. (§ 319.)
We shall reverse the judgment of dismissal.
According to the operative allegations of Wong's complaint and facts properly noticed by the trail court, Wong is the owner of real property in the City of Stockton located at 442 North Sutter Street and an adjacent parcel at 414 E. Freemont Street. There was a building on the Sutter Street parcel and a paved parking lot on the Freemont Street parcel.
The City was attempting to redevelop the core of the old downtown area of Stockton where the Wong property was located. To that end, it began acquiring property through eminent domain, followed by private redevelopment. However, the City concluded acquisition of all the areas it desired to raze and develop would be too expensive to accomplish, so it developed a plan to acquire the targeted properties by using its building code enforcement powers to demolish the improvement on the desired properties, charging the landowner for the cost of the demolition and placing liens on the properties cleared by use of the code enforcement. In so doing, City created an inventory of cheaper raw land available for redevelopment and avoided having to pay for existing improvements in eminent domain proceedings. The City refused to grant variances and recorded "Notices of Intent to Abate" properties in the downtown area alleging that all code violations rendered the structures "unsafe." This declaration prevented the property owners from rehabilitating their properties and obtaining reconstruction and rehabilitation financing. The City then demolished the improvements on the targeted properties although less drastic means could have been employed to correct the dangerous conditions.
The City denied building owners due process of law by resolving issues relating to these demolitions through an administrative hearing process that failed to afford the property owners the right to confront and compel the attendance of witnesses, obtain pre-hearing discovery, and have the dispute heard by a fair and impartial hearing officer to the extent required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
On May 19, 1998, Wong filed a petition for writ of mandate (§ 1094.5) seeking damages and injunctive relief from the City's order to demolish the building on his property. The record does not reflect the outcome, if any, of that proceeding.
On January 8, 2001, the City began demolishing the building and pavement on the parking lot on Wong's property and billed him for the cost of the demolition. The City did not compensate Wong for the taking of and damage to his property.
Wong filed the present action for inverse condemnation on September 14, 2005, seeking compensation for the building and the adjacent parking lot.
The City filed a request for judicial notice of Wong's petition for administrative mandamus and demurred to the complaint on the grounds Wong's claim is barred by the three year period of limitations (§ 338, subd. (j)) and fails to state a cause of action (§ 430.10, subd. (e)) because Wong failed to allege he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing the complaint. As to the latter ground, the City argued that Wong had filed the petition but did nothing else to utilize the procedures for judicial review and failed to exhaust his administrative remedies through the writ process.
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend for failure to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies and dismissed the action with prejudice. The court entered a judgment of dismissal after denying Wong's motion for reconsideration. Wong now appeals from the judgment.
When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we assume the complaint's properly pleaded or implied factual allegations are true and, reading the complaint as a whole and its parts in context, we give it a reasonable interpretation to determine whether it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 320; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
If the complaint is insufficient on any ground properly specified in the demurrer, we must uphold the trial court's ruling even though the particular ground upon which the court sustained the demurrer may be untenable. (Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach (1966) 65 Cal.2d 13, 20.)
Wong contends the trial court improperly sustained the demurrer because the requirement of exhausting administrative remedies as a prerequisite to judicial relief in a collateral action is inapplicable in an action for inverse condemnation based upon a physical taking. Wong further contends the exhaustion requirement does not apply to his claim for the parking lot because it was demolished without any administrative action.
Conceding the last point relating to the parking lot, the City argues with respect to the building, that Wong failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to challenge the hearing officer's decision in a proceeding for administrative mandamus that resulted in a judicial determination. The City further argues the exhaustion doctrine is applicable because there has been no taking, it demolished Wong's building and parking lot pursuant to its police power, and if the demolition did amount to a taking, it was a non-physical regulatory taking.
We find the trial court erred by sustaining the City's demurrer because the taking was a physical taking, which is exempt from the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
To resolve the taking issue, we must first determine the nature of the taking alleged in the complaint. We therefore turn to the principles governing governmental takings and actions for inverse condemnation.
Inverse condemnation actions "implement the constitutional rule that private property may not be `taken' (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) or `taken or damaged' (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19) for public use without just compensation." (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 939.) The term has been characterized as "a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted." (United States v. Clarke (1980) 445 U.S. 253, 257 ; Frustuck v. City of Fairfax (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 345, 357.)
Unlike eminent...
To continue reading
Request your trial