Wong v. Hawk

• Decision Date: 06 November 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. Cum–12–86.
• Citation: 55 A.3d 425,2012 ME 125
• Parties: Myndilee WONG v. Jack HAWK.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

55 A.3d 425

2012 ME 125

Myndilee WONG

v.Jack HAWK.

Docket No. Cum–12–86.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs: Sept. 27, 2012.

Decided: Nov. 6, 2012.

William J. Schneider, Attorney General, and Carlos Diaz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Attorney General, for appellant Department of Health and Human Services.

Jack L. Hawk, appellee pro se.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

LEVY, J.

[¶ 1] The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) appeals from a judgment entered in the District Court (Portland, Eggert, J.) modifying a child support order of the Family Law Magistrate ( Najarian, M.). DHHS asserts that (A) the District Court erred in crediting toward Jack Hawk's support obligation the dependent benefit his daughter receives based on his Social Security retirement account, and (B) the magistrate did not abuse her discretion in declining to deviate from the child support guidelines. We agree, vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand with instructions to reinstate the magistrate's modification order.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Jack Hawk and Myndilee Wong divorced in 2002, and Wong received primary custody of their only child, a daughter who turned seven that year. The initial child support order required that Hawk pay $165.33 per week in child support. In 2008, the District Court ( Cantara, J.) increased Hawk's support obligation to $187.95 per week, based on an imputed annual income of $80,000 for Hawk, $25,000 income for Wong, and Hawk's provision of health insurance for his daughter.

[¶ 3] In July 2011, DHHS filed a motion to modify Hawk's child support obligation, based on an alleged decline in his annual income from $80,000 to $38,344. The magistrate held a hearing on the motion,at which DHHS presented evidence, Wong testified, and Hawk participated telephonically, also testifying. The magistrate made the following findings: Hawk is a retired architect who receives Social Security retirement income, earnings as a part-time professor, and rental revenue, for a total gross annual income of $46,066.50. Wong receives rental income and wages from part-time employment performing odd jobs, for a total gross annual income of $21,600.

[¶ 4] The magistrate also found that the daughter suffers from mental illness and spends most days in a residential facility. As a result, each week, Wong attends at least four multi-hour meetings related to her daughter's treatment. The daughter has, since May 2010, received $1001 in monthly Social Security dependent benefits based on Hawk's Social Security retirement account. The magistrate found that Hawk voluntarily retired and reduced his income, not because he was unable to work, but to provide his daughter with the dependent benefit. The magistrate based this finding on Hawk's own admission, and the attachment to Hawk's child support affidavit stated, “I am a 65 year old diabetic who due to [the] down turn in our area's building [industry] retired early so my daughter could receive benefits which I hoped would help [Wong] in [the child's] care.”

[¶ 5] Applying the child support guidelines to these findings, the magistrate concluded that Hawk's child support obligation was $152.32 per week. The magistrate considered deviation from the guidelines pursuant to 19–A M.R.S. § 2007 (2011) based on the daughter's receipt of the dependent benefit. However, the magistrate ultimately concluded that application of the guidelines without deviation for the dependent benefit was “just and equitable” based on Hawk's voluntary retirement and the child's special needs, which affected Wong's ability to maintain full-time employment. The magistrate did not consider whether, pursuant to 19–A M.R.S. § 2107 (2011), Hawk should receive a credit toward his child support obligations based on his daughter's receipt of the dependent benefit. Hawk did not move for additional findings of fact or conclusions of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).

[¶ 6] Following the modification order, Hawk filed an objection in the District Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 118(a), requesting, among other things, that the court credit the child's dependent benefit toward his child support obligation. The court ( Eggert, J.) modified the magistrate's order without a hearing. Based on the magistrate's factual findings as to the amount of the dependent benefit and the weekly child support obligation, the court concluded that 19–A M.R.S. § 2107 provided Hawk with a child support credit in an amount equal to the child's dependent benefit. The court recognized that the plain language of section 2107 provides the credit only for benefits received as a result of the obligor's disability, but concluded that even if section 2107 did not apply to retirement account benefits, a deviation from the child support guidelines based on the child's receipt of the dependent benefit was appropriate pursuant to 19–A M.R.S. § 2007.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

[¶ 7] DHHS raises two issues on appeal. First, DHHS argues that the District Court erred as a matter of law in granting Hawk a credit toward his child support obligation for the child's receipt of the dependent benefit, because 19–A M.R.S. § 2107 authorizes a credit only for benefits derived from a parent's disability and not from a parent's retirement. Second,DHHS contends that the magistrate did not abuse her discretion in declining to deviate from the child support guidelines pursuant to 19–A M.R.S. § 2007, and therefore the District Court erred in summarily reversing the magistrate's decision. We address each argument in turn.

A. The Dependent Benefit Credit Pursuant to 19–A M.R.S. § 2107

[¶ 8] Whether the District Court erred in concluding that 19–A M.R.S. § 2107 permits a credit toward child support obligations for retirement account benefits is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. See Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149, ¶ 15, 957 A.2d 94;see also Pratt v. Sidney, 2009 ME 28, ¶ 7, 967 A.2d 685 (providing for de novo review of a District Court's additional legal conclusions following a family law magistrate's order). In interpreting a statute, we examine the plain meaning of the language to “avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results.” Schaefer v. State Tax Assessor, 2008 ME 148, ¶ 7, 956 A.2d 710 (quotation marks omitted). “Words in a statute must be given meaning and not treated as meaningless and superfluous.” Blue Yonder, LLC v. State Tax Assessor, 2011 ME 49, ¶ 10, 17 A.3d 667 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶ 9] In relevant part, 19–A M.R.S. § 2107 provides that after calculating a parent's child support obligation, a court must apply a credit toward that obligation “[i]f a child receives dependent benefits as a result of the obligor parent's disability.” To grant the credit, the tribunal “shall” find that “the child currently receives dependent benefits as a result of the obligor parent's disability.” Id. § 2107(2)(A). Section 2107 does not define what constitutes a disability, and the provision does not expressly provide a credit for dependent benefits as a result of a parent's retirement. Thus, we must determine whether, as the District Court concluded, a parent's retirement is sufficiently equivalent to a disability to fall within the child support credit authorized by section 2107.

[¶ 10] We have previously recognized, albeit in a different context, that “retirement benefits do not fill the same role as disability benefits, but represent a form of entitlement deriving from the employee's years of work.... [Retirement benefits] may be elected voluntarily, and have nothing to do with disability.” Dishon v. Me. State Ret. Sys., 569 A.2d 1216, 1217 (Me.1990) (addressing benefits affected by 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 1095, 1122 (1979)).¹ In contrast, disability benefits generally constitute compensation for a personal injury that impairs earning capacity. See, e.g., Carroll v. Celsius Contractors, 637 A.2d 111, 111–12 (Me.1994) (concluding that a claim for workers' compensation benefits requires a showing of disabling injury); Wiedmaier v. Comm'r, 774 F.2d 109, 111 (6th Cir.1985) (noting that federal tax regulations “distinguish between benefits that are intended to compensate an employee for lost earning capacity due to an injury ... and those benefits that are simply a retirement pension in consideration for past services”).²

[¶ 11] The analysis we have recognized in other contexts applies with equal force here. Disability is not synonymous with retirement. For purposes of 19–A M.R.S. § 2107, a benefit results from “the obligor parent's disability” only if it accrued due to an injury or illness that impaired that parent's earning capacity.

[¶ 12] In Hawk's case, the dependent benefit his daughter receives is based on his Social Security retirement account, not on a disability resulting from an injury that impaired his earning capacity. Hawk retired due to a downturn in the building industry and to provide the dependent benefit for his daughter. Reading section 2107 to apply to retirement accounts would render superfluous section 2107's reference to dependent benefits based on a disability. See Blue Yonder, LLC, 2011 ME 49, ¶ 10, 17 A.3d 667. Accordingly, the District Court erred in granting Hawk credit toward his support obligation based on his daughter's Social Security retirement dependent benefit.

B. Deviation from the Child Support Guidelines Pursuant to 19–A M.R.S. § 2007

[¶ 13] DHHS also contends that the District Court erred in summarily reversing the magistrate's decision not to grant a deviation from the child support guidelines because the magistrate acted within the bounds of her discretion when she declined to deviate. Before addressing the merits of this argument, we first identify the proper standard of review.

[¶ 14] When the District Court modifies a family law magistrate's decision in part and adopts that decision in part pursuant to M.R. Civ. P....