Wood v. Bullard
| Decision Date | 01 April 1890 |
| Citation | 25 N.E. 67,151 Mass. 324 |
| Parties | WOOD et al. v. BULLARD. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Report from supreme judicial court, Middlesex county; OLIVER W. HOLMES, Jr., Judge.
R.M Morse, Jr., T.H. Armstrong, and W.E. Jewell, for plaintiffs.
S Hoar, for defendants.
In August, 1877, Caleb Wood died childless, leaving a widow, Caroline A. Wood, and a will wherein he devised the residue of his estate to a trustee in trust, to invest the same, and pay over to her such sums or parts thereof as she might from time to time desire, and upon her decease to dispose of the trust fund then remaining as she might by her will direct; and, in case she should fail to make a will, then to pay at her decease one-half of said trust fund to his heirs at law then surviving, they taking by right of representation, and one-half to the heirs at law of his wife then surviving, they taking by right of representation. His heirs at law at the time of his death, besides his widow, who was a statutory heir, were as follows: (1) A brother, Charles; (2) four children of a deceased brother, Eliphalet; (3) three children of a deceased brother, Lyman; (4) a sister, Abigail W. Smith. As some of the heirs at law of the testator had been thinking of contesting the probate of the will, his widow, on the 24th of September 1877, entered into an agreement under seal with the heirs, wherein she covenanted that within two months from the probate of the will she would pay over to the said Abigail W. Smith the sum of $5,000, and "that I will not make any testamentary disposition of the trust fund created under said will, and remaining at my decease, that shall prevent one-half of the said trust fund remaining at my decease from descending to the said heirs, or their legal representatives, exactly as it would descend to said heirs by the terms of said will, should I make no will, and that I will do no act which will prevent one-half of such trust fund as shall remain in the hands of the trustee at my decease from going to the said heirs." The will was accordingly proved and allowed, and the $5,000 duly paid to Mrs. Smith.
It is conceded that this agreement by its terms did not have the effect to prevent Mrs. Wood from calling upon the trustee to pay to her the whole of the trust property in her life-time, and that, if the property had been thus paid over to her in pursuance of such a request, it would have become her own, and that she might have disposed of it as she pleased. The agreement merely precluded her from making a testamentary disposition of the trust fund. On the 10th of April, 1879, Charles Wood, the testator's brother, entered into an agreement under seal with the testator's widow, reciting the above-mentioned agreement, and that she was dissatisfied therewith, and claimed it to be illegal; wherefore, in consideration of $7,000 paid to him by her, The former agreement was accordingly surrendered to her by Charles Wood, in whose possession it seems to have been, and was canceled. On the 16th of December, 1886, Mrs. Wood died, leaving a will, wherein she disposed of all of the property in the hands of the trustee, which then amounted to about $260,000, away from the heirs of her husband. Charles Wood had already died December 11, 1884, intestate, childless, and unmarried, having procured formal releases from three only out of four of Eliphalet Wood's children, dated February 2, 1886. Mrs. Smith died before the death of Charles Wood, leaving two adult children. The four children of Eliphalet, the three children of Lyman, and the two children of Mrs. Smith, these all being also the heirs at law of Charles Wood, now bring this bill in equity seeking to enforce the agreement of Mrs. Wood that she would not make any testamentary disposition of the trust fund created under her husband's will. The defenses are: The release and agreement given by Charles Wood; the formal releases given by three of Eliphalet's children; the acceptance by others of the plaintiffs of the money paid by Mrs. Wood for the release and agreement by Charles under circumstances constituting an estoppel or an accord and satisfaction; and the death of Mrs. Smith before that of Mrs. Wood, which it is contended had the effect to cut off any claim on the part of her two children. The plaintiffs' replication alleges that the release of Charles Wood was given when he was of unsound mind, and this question was submitted to a jury, who disagreed. As to the three children of Eliphalet who signed formal releases to Mrs. Wood, it is conceded that no claim can now be maintained in their behalf, and that they are to be treated as out of the case. As to the fourth child of Eliphalet, Mrs. Minor, and the three children of Lyman Wood, their claim is cut off by their acceptance of $1,000 each as an accord and satisfaction. It is conceded that each one of them received from the administrators of the estate of Charles Wood a sum sufficient, when taken with certain payments made to Lyman's three children by Charles Wood himself in his life-time, to make up $1,000, with interest from the time when Mrs. Wood paid the $7,000 to Charles Wood. The testimony and circumstances show clearly that they received these sums, not as gifts from Mrs. Wood, but on a consideration connected with the compromise agreement which she had given with reference to the allowance of her husband's will. She had already paid all the money called for by that agreement,--namely the $5,000 to Mrs. Smith; and, after having done so, she had paid $7,000 more to Charles, of which he had in his life-time paid certain portions to some of these children. A question had arisen early in respect to the purpose of Mrs. Wood in paying this money, and her letter to Mrs. Minor dated August 9, 1879, showing that it was intended for the children of Eliphalet and Lyman, had been exhibited to several, if not to all, of those children immediately after the death of Charles. All of their children were in consultation together in Worcester in December, 1884, with a common purpose to get this money. Three of them, being children of Eliphalet, had signed formal releases to Mrs. Wood in the life-time of Charles. They all demanded and obtained from the administrators of Charles the payment of such sums as made up the sum of $1,000 to each, with interest. The suggestion in the argument that they took it as a gift from Mrs. Wood cannot be entertained for a moment. Without going minutely into the details of the testimony, we are satisfied from reading it that they all then knew of the agreement which she had made, and knew that Charles Wood had received this money from her upon some bargain or understanding referring to her agreement; and that they either knew all the particulars of that bargain, or at any rate had all the information in regard to it which they cared to have. If any particulars were wanting, it was because they shut their eyes and turned away their ears. Under these circumstances, their taking steps to enforce the payment of the money to them by Charles Wood's administrators, and their acceptance of it, constitute a virtual adoption by them of the bargain upon which he obtained the money from her, so far, at least, as to preclude them from enforcing her original agreement. It was equivalent to saying, "Whatever he promised as to our giving up that agreement, we adopt it." Kelley v. Railroad Co., 141 Mass. 496, 499, 6 N.E. 745.
It remains to be considered whether the bill can be maintained in behalf of the two children of Mrs. Smith,--one of whom is Mrs. Moor, who is also one of the administrators of the estate of Charles Wood; and the other is Charles W. Smith. In respect to Mrs. Moor it is contended that her claim is cut off by reason of her transactions above referred to, in which she, as an administrator of the estate of Charles Wood, took part. It is contended, and the justice before whom the case was heard found as a fact, subject, however, to the question of law whether administrators of an insane intestate could so ratify, that the administrators of Charles Wood have ratified the release by him to Mrs. Wood, and the transaction in relation to it. This ratification is certainly so far effectual as to cut off any claim by the administrators or representatives of Charles Wood under the agreement of Mrs. Wood. Charles Wood executed a formal release of said contract, and, if this was invalid by reason of his insanity, the ratification makes it good to this extent, at least. The claim of Mrs. Moor, however, does not rest upon her rights as an heir of Charles Wood, but upon her rights as daughter of Abigail W. Smith, who was a sister of the testator. It is not easy to see in what way her individual claim under Mrs. Wood's agreement is affected by her acts as administratrix of Charles Wood. Let it be assumed that her ratification as administrator of the release and covenants of Charles Wood to Mrs. Wood was full and valid, both in fact and in law; the effect of this is only to give to that instrument the same force which it would have had if its validity had never been questioned. It makes the instrument valid and effectual as an instrument...
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