Wood v. Commissioners of Oxford

• Decision Date: 27 May 1887
• Citation: 2 S.E. 653,97 N.C. 227
• Parties: WOOD v. COMMISSIONERS OF OXFORD.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

2 S.E. 653

97 N.C. 227

WOOD v. COMMISSIONERS OF OXFORD.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

May 27, 1887

Appeal from Granville county.

Where it would be lawful for the Legislature to authorize the issue of town bonds in aid of a railroad with the assent of a majority of all the qualified voters of the town, but not with the assent of a majority of the qualified voters voting only, and, under a statute plainly requiring the proposition to be submitted to the qualified voters of the town, a majority of all the qualified voters of the town have assented to the issue of bonds, such issue will not be enjoined because it is questionable whether the statute did not contemplate the issue if only a majority of those voting favored it. In such case it is not necessary to construe the statute.

J. W Hays, for plaintiff.

T. B Venable and R. W. Winston, for defendant.

MERRIMON J.

The defendant, the Oxford & Clarksville Railroad Company, is a corporation organized under and in pursuance of the statute (Acts 1885, c. 116,) and its prescribed purpose is to construct a railroad, to be devoted to the transportation of passengers and freight; its terminal points to be the town of Oxford, in the county of Granville, and a point on the Virginia state line, to be fixed by its directors within a compass prescribed. Its railroad may be extended to other like roads designated, and it may construct branch roads not exceeding 30 miles in length. Counties, townships, or corporated cities and towns, through which its road to be constructed shall be located, are authorized, in the way and manner prescribed, to subscribe for the capital stock of that company, and to make "donations" to it; and to raise money for this purpose they are respectively authorized to issue their bonds, with interest coupons attached, in the manner prescribed. But such subscriptions or donations cannot be made until a definite proposition to make the same shall have been submitted to the "qualified voters" of the township or town which it is proposed shall make the same. In case a "majority of the votes cast" shall be "for subscription" or "for donation," as is said in one section of the statute cited, or as to towns, as is said in another section, in case a majority shall have voted for "subscription" or for "donation," the same shall be made, etc.

The grounds and purpose of the action, and the relief sought by it, sufficiently appear from the eighth paragraph of the complaint, of which the following is a copy: "(8) Your petitioner, who sues in this behalf for himself and other tax-payers of said town, alleges that the acts of the said commissioners in issuing said bonds, and making said donation, will entail a heavy burden and debt upon him and them, and that he is advised that the act incorporating the said railroad company is not constitutional, and that the bonds about to be issued by virtue of said act are illegal and void, for that (1) the general assembly had no authority to authorize the voters of said town to donate public money for the purposes set forth in the said act; (2) that the power attempted to be conferred by said act comes not in the spirit or letter of the constitution of the state; (3) that the canvass of the votes as required in section 8 of said charter a majority only of the votes cast is required, whereas the affiant is informed that said act should have required a canvass of all the qualified votes cast, and that, while the provision is not inserted in section 12 of said charter, nevertheless said section, referring to and adopting the language of section 8, must have and bear the same meaning and interpretation, wherefore affiant prays that a restraining order may issue to said defendants to show cause before his honor, FRED. PHILIPS, at chambers at Greensboro, why an injunction shall not be granted forever enjoining them from the issue and donation of said bonds, and the levy and collection of taxes to pay the same, as aforesaid, and as in duty bound he will ever pray." A restraining order was granted, and also a rule upon the defendants to show cause at chambers why an injunction, pending the action, until the hearing upon the merits, should not be granted. At the hearing of the motion for such injunction it was denied, and from the order in that respect the plaintiff appealed to this court.

Municipal corporations, such as counties, incorporated cities and towns, are instrumentalities of the state government. They serve its political and civil purposes more or less general in their nature and extent, and more particularly where they are located. They are public in their nature, and the legislature has control over them. It may determine and establish their purpose, and enlarge or modify their powers and authority from time to time; and it may create new ones, prescribing their power and authority, as public necessity and convenience may require. It may confer upon them power to raise revenue by levying taxes and otherwise, and to use and apply the same for all legitimate public purposes; and likewise to create debts, and issue their obligations to pay money for the like public purposes, except as its powers may be restrained by constitutional limitations. Such powers of the legislature are to some extent of its nature, and essential in the exercise of legislative authority; and in other respects they are conferred upon it by the express provisions of the constitution, or by reasonable implication. They are freely exercised at every session of the general assembly, in effectuating the purpose of government by legislation.

It may be said, in general terms, that the legislature can authorize a county, city, or town to use its revenues and credit for any legitimate public purpose within the scope of its organization, unless prohibited by the constitution. This is necessarily so, because the end to be attained by such municipalities cannot generally be accomplished without public expenditures. It may not always be easy to apply the rule of law to determine what is a legitimate object of such expenditures. It is clear, however, that they may be made for such public improvements and advantages as tend directly to provide for and promote the general good, convenience, and safety of the county or town making them, as an organized community, although the advantage derived may not reach every individual citizen or tax-payer...