Wood v. Firemen's Fire Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 February 1879 |
| Citation | 126 Mass. 316 |
| Parties | John L. Wood v. Firemen's Fire Insurance Company |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Exceptions overruled.
J. S Abbott, for the plaintiff.
N Morse & E. W. Hutchins, for the defendant.
OPINION
The plaintiff by one Bean, an insurance broker, procured a policy of insurance in the defendant company, upon several oil paintings in his dwelling-house, the estimated value of each being stated in the policy. At the end of a written application for insurance, given by the plaintiff to Bean and exhibited by the latter to the president of the company, was a written statement that the original of one of the paintings, called "Christ crowned with Thorns," was by Leonardo da Vinci, that it was then in the Vatican or in one of the churches at Rome, under the care of the Pope, and could not be bought for $ 1,000,000; that this copy by Pinnol de T. Salos was the only one in America; and no other copy could ever be allowed by the Pope.
The policy contained on its face the following clause: "And the assured hereby covenants and engages, that the representation given in the application for this insurance contains a just, full and true exposition of all the facts and circumstances in regard to the condition, situation, value and risk of the property insured, so far as the same are known to the assured and material to the risk; and that, if any material fact or circumstance shall not have been fairly represented," "the risk hereupon shall cease and determine, and the policy be null and void."
At the trial, the judge instructed the jury, in substance, that the representations made by Bean when the policy was issued, as to the origin and character of the painting referred to, were material to the risk; and if falsely and fraudulently made, and if relied on by the insurer, and found to be untrue, would avoid the policy. The jury were also told, that the mere expressions of opinion and belief were not to be taken as misrepresentations of fact. These instructions were sufficiently accurate. If the question of the materiality of the representations is open to the plaintiff on the bill of exceptions, yet the instructions given afford no valid ground of objection. The policy was a valued policy. The representations related to the origin of the painting, and were written statements of facts which, if true; would give peculiar value to it, as the only copy which could ever he had of an original painting of great merit, by one of the most famous of the old masters. They were calculated to induce the defendant company to take a risk by a valued policy for the sum named in it, which it would otherwise have declined or taken only for a smaller amount. Facts stated in regard to the value of the property insured are made material by the terms of the policy. The statements relied on are in writing, and their interpretation, like that of other written instruments, is for the court. There is no disputed fact left for the jury, upon which they could be permitted to find that the representations were not made, or that they were not material. Fletcher v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 18 Pick. 419. Campbell v. New England Life Ins. Co. 98 Mass. 381. Lewis v. Eagle Ins. Co. 10 Gray 508.
We find nothing in the propositions stated by the judge at the close of his charge, in answer to requests then made, inconsistent with these instructions, or calculated to mislead the jury. [*]
The plaintiff excepted to the judge's refusal to instruct the jury that Bean was not to be regarded as his agent touching representations made by him in obtaining the insurance. He insists that the question should have been submitted to the jury as a question of fact, upon which there was conflicting evidence. But the policy under which the plaintiff claims to recover provides that "any person other than the assured, who may have procured this insurance to be taken by this company, shall be deemed in all cases, and under all circumstances, to be...
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