Wood v. Mastick
Decision Date | 22 July 1881 |
Citation | 2 Wash.Terr. 64,3 P. 612 |
Parties | WOOD v. MASTICK AND ANOTHER. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Error to the Third judicial district, holding terms at Port Townsend.
G Morris Haller and McNaught, Ferry & McNaught for plaintiff in error.
Struve, Haines & Leary, for defendants in error.
On August 19, 1880, Charles E. P. Wood filed his complaint in the district court of the Third judicial district of Washington Territory, holding terms at Port Townsend, as vendor of certain real estate therein situate, in Snohomish county, in the Third judicial district, against Seabury L Mastick and Levi B. Mastick, vendees, alleging a contract in writing, made by the parties on the nineteenth day of June 1878, for the purchase of said real estate, the purchase price, $2,000, to be paid to plaintiff, June 1, 1879, said payment to be a condition precedent to the conveyance; also alleging due tender of a good and sufficient deed on June 1 1879, demand for the money on said day, non-payment thereof, and readiness to convey on part of plaintiff ever since; and, at the time of filing the complaint, a deposit with the clerk of said court of a good and sufficient deed of said premises for the defendants, and due performance of all conditions on plaintiff's part, and prays judgment for the agreed purchase price. To this complaint, after due personal service in Jefferson county, Washington Territory, defendants appeared in the action and interposed a demurrer, in substance, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, which demurrer was, by the court, sustained; whereupon, plaintiff, saving his exceptions, filed his amended complaint, addressed to the chancellor, alleging the same facts and praying specific performance, a judgment in personam for the agreed purchase price, and that said real estate be sold to satisfy the judgment, and for general relief. To this amended complaint defendants filed their motion to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter, which was, by the court, sustained, all relief in said court refused, and final judgment entered, dismissing the cause and assessing the costs against plaintiff; to all of which plaintiff duly excepted, and seeks to have the same reversed.
The contract was set out verbatim in the complaint, and is as follows, to-wit:
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Ralph v. State Dep't of Natural Res.
...a civil procedure statute that has been, since its inception, interpreted as a jurisdictional requirement. See Wood v. Mastick, 2 Wash.Terr. 64, 69, 3 P. 612 (1881) ; McLeod, 2 Wash. at 122, 26 P. 76 ; Seymour v. La Furgey, 47 Wash. 450, 451–52, 92 P. 267 (1907) ; Ryckman v. Johnson, 190 Wa......
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Young v. Clark
...our courts have construed such statutes to limit subject matter jurisdiction as among courts of general jurisdiction. Wood v. Mastick, 2 Wash. Terr. 64, 69, 3 P. 612 (1881) ("We are of opinion that all actions for the causes mentioned in section 48, Laws W. T., 1877, must be commenced in th......
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Real Estate Contracts and the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion in Washington: Dispelling the Ashford Cloud
...Jackson v. White, 104 Wash. 643, 177 P. 667 (1919). 6. The seller could enforce the contract by specific performance, Wood v. Mastick, 2 Wash. Terr. 64, 69, 3 P. 612, 614 (1881), or recover for damages for breach, Hogan v. Kyle, 7 Wash. 595, 598-99, 35 P. 399, 399-400 (1893). The seller cou......